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I. INTRODUCTION 
Claimant was injured in the workplace and solicited and entered into a fee agreement 
(referred to hereinafter as "The Fee Agreement") with Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. (Claimant's 
Counsel) under which Claimant's Counsel agreed to provide legal counseling and representation 
on all matters related to the Claimant's case in consideration of the contingent fee set forth in the 
Fee Agreement!, who provided lawful services as counselor and advocate. In that capacity, 
Claimant's Counsel ultimately negotiated a Lump Sum Settlement Agreement (LSSA), which 
was submitted to the Commission for approval in May, 2009. The Commission issued its 
ORDER2 on September 4,2009, in which it approved the LSSA as between Claimant and 
Defendants, but ruled pursuant to IDAPA 17.02.08.033 that Claimant's Counsel's claims for 
attorney fees were not reasonable in part. The rules applicable to that determination and this 
hearing are IDAPA 17.02.08.033(01)(a) and (c)(ii) referred to hereinafter as the "applicable 
IDAPA attorneys fees rules".3 The Commission staff provided no statement of reasons for its 
ruling, and rebuffed Claimant's CoUnsel's attempts to discover the factual and legal basis for the 
ruling. 
At a hearing on Nov. 23, 2009, Claimant's Counsel argued that Seiniger Law Offices is 
constitutionally and legally entitled to the claimed attorney fees in full, that the Commission's 
regulations relating to the definitions of "available funds" and the associated standard defining 
them as benefits "primarily and substantially" made available as a result of the efforts of 
1 That agreement was entered into evidence at the hearing in this matter. 
2 ORDER APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM 
SETTLEMENT, entered September 4, 2009 (hereinafter "ORDER"). The ORDER states that attorney fees ''have 
not been substantiated to the Commission as reasonable in accordance with IDAPA 17.02.08.033." 
3 The ORDER found that part of Counsel's request for attorney fees on PPD benefits was not reasonable pursuant to 
. However, at hearing on Nov. 23, 2009, the Commission stated that it was modifying its original ORDER, and that 
the only issue was Counsel's entitlement to attorney fees on the PPI benefit. So the amount in controversy is now 
$1,942.19. 
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Claimant's Counsel are vague and unconstitutional under controlling case law laid down by the 
Idaho Supreme Court, that the fee contract involved was reasonable, especially when viewed at 
the time that it was entered into, and that Claimant's Counsel and Claimant are constitutionally 
entitled to have their fee contract honored unless it is patently unreasonable (outside the 
guidelines furnished by IDAP A attorneys fees rules. Claimant testified by affidavit in support of 
Claimant's Counsel's position. Defense Counsel spoke in support of Claimant's Counsel's 
position. No party presented any contrary evidence. For purposes of these proceedings only, and 
without waiving the right to raise the constitutionality of the applicable IDAP A attorneys fees 
rules on appeal, Seiniger Law Offices stipulates that its attorneys were not "primarily or 
substantially" responsible for securing the PPI benefit involved -- whatever "primarily or 
substantially" may mean in the context of defining "available funds" as those terms are used in 
the relevant IDAP A rules. 
Thus, Seiniger Law Offices withdraws any claim that it is entitled to attorneys fees under 
applicable attorneys fees rules, and seeks an award of attorneys fees consistent with the terms of 
its fee agreement with the Claimant based upon the fact that those fees and terms are reasonable 
under the circumstances and considering the totality of the services provided to the Claimant as a 
result of, and relying upon, the entry into and terms of that fee agreement. Therefore, Claimant's 
Counsel seeks a contingent attorney fee pursuant to the Fee Agreement from the impairment 
rating given to the Claimant based solely upon work performed exclusive of obtaining any 
impairment rating and benefits paid for that rating. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are not in dispute. They are set forth in the pleadings; the Affidavit ofWm. Breck 
Seiniger, Jr. In Support of Claim for Attorneys Fees (hereinafter "Seiniger Affidavit"); the 
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affidavits of Claimant's Counsel Andrew Marsh and Claimant Laurel Ku1m; and the exhibits to 
the affidavits contained in the Commission's file in this matter. In the interest of administrative 
economy, they need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that Claimant's Counsel requests an 
award of fees based upon its services to the Claimant rendered to the time of the execution of the 
Lump Sum Agreement and thereafter, exclusive of anything that it may have done to obtain 
"available funds" with respect to the Claimant's impairment rating. 
It appears from the Commission's questions at hearing and from communications from 
Commission staff throughout this case that the Commission considers there to be one particular 
issue applied to the facts before it: namely, whether Claimant's Counsel was "primarily or 
substantially" responsible for securing the PPI benefit out of which Claimant's Counsel seeks to 
be paid. IDAP A 17.02.0S.033.01.c. To this point, the Commission's staff's analysis of the right 
of Claimant's Counsel to the fees claimed turns entirely and solely upon the resolution of this 
issue of fact. 
III. ISSUES AND ARGUMENT 
A. LIMITATIONS ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE COMMISSION TO TAKE 
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS INTO CONSIDERATION IN 
ADOPTING, IMPLIMENTING, AND INTERPRETING ITS OWN 
REGULATIONS 
One of the fundamental issues raised by the Commission is whether its lack of authority 
to decide constitutional issues frees it from any duty to pass regulations that comport with clearly 
defined constitutional law as handed down by the Idaho Supreme Court. Claimant's Counsel is 
aware of no authority supporting that premise, and, suffice it to say, the premise is illogical given 
the predictable consequences of its adoption by any court. The Commission has the authority 
that duty. Furthermore, if the Commission's authority were so limited, it would have no 
authority to consider whether Curr has been implicitly overruled, as it has already done. 
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Specifically, the Commission may not adopt a regulation that clearly flies in the face of the 
constitutional limitations on its authority set forth in Curr and cannot apply its "primarily or 
substantially" rule in such a way as to patently violate that authority. 
If the Commission were limited from even considering whether its regulations violate 
clearly established law, it could simply flout the import of the constitutional holding in Curr by 
simply adopting regulations seriatim that restate a constitutionally prohibited regulation in new 
words. This is precisely what has occurred with respect to the regulations at issue here, since, in 
the words of the late George Wallace (quoted here though concededly neither an authority on, 
nor and advocate of, constitutional rights other than those he believed were related to 
segregation) there is not a "dimes worth of difference" between "new money" and "available 
funds" as presently defined by the Commission's regulations. It would appear that upholding the 
relevant regulations as against in the face of the constitutional prohibitions of Curr would leave 
the Commission free to simply rephrase its regulations each time the Idaho Supreme Court 
strikes a particularly worded regulation based on the same grounds relied upon in Curro 
B. THE CONSITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL AND 
CLAIMANT ARE GOVERNED By CURR V. CURR 
At hearing, much of the discussion focused on whether the constitutional holdings in 
Curr V. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993) controlling the rights of claimant's counsel in 
a Worker's Compensation case remain good law and control the bounds of discretion of the 
Commission in determining the reasonableness of a claim for attorneys fees and other aspects of 
the authority granted to the Commission and the and the exercise of that authority. The 
Commission appears to consider Curr to have been implicitly overruled by Rhodes V. Indus. 
Comm., 125 Idaho 139, 868 P.2d 467 (1993), Mancilla V. Greg, 131 Idaho 685, 963 P.2d 368 
(1998), and Johnson V. Boise Cascade Corp., 134 Idaho 350, 2 P.3d 735 (2000), though it is 
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willing to entertain the arguments of Claimant's Counsel to the contrary. 
1. The Curr Holdings 
We begin by reviewing the actual holdings from Curr, set forth in quotes (emphasis added): 
• For an attorney fee agreement, "Reasonableness ... derives from the totality ofthe 
circumstances from the perspective of the parties at the time that the fee agreement 
was made." 
Curr, at 690. 
• The "parties to a contract have a property interest in the subject matter of the 
contract that is protectable both under the Contract Clause and the Due Process Clause 
of the United States Constitution." 
Curr, at 691-692. 
• In Idaho, "the right to follow a recognized and useful occupation is protected by a 
constitutional guarantee of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution and Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13." 
• The Commission must permit the Claimant to "compensate an attorney for acting solely 
as a counselor." 
• The Commission must "recognize [ advocacy] efforts that do not generate monetary 
awards such as [sometimes] obtaining permission for medical care or procuring an 
impairment rating." 
• The Commission may not make suspect an attorney's "integrity in the eyes of their 
clients." 
• The Commission may not limit attorney fees to "new money." 
• The Commission may not limit representation to "disputed matters." 
• The Commission "must have clearly articulated evidentiary standards that will be 
used at the hearing .. : and formally publish clear guidelines upon which it will base the 
fee modifications." 
Curr, at 692. 
• "This Court has recognized that a reasonable contingent fee must be 'sufficiently high 
to compensate the lawyer not only for the reasonable value of the time he or she 
anticipates devoting to the particular lawsuit, but also for the time devoted to other 
lawsuits undertaken on the same basis but unsuccessful in result. '" 
Curr, at 693. 
c. RHODES DISTINGUISHED FROM CURR 
Next, we look at whether the Rhodes decision overruled the Curr holdings. The key point 
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is that the Court in Rhodes addressed only the validity of.2.!!!: specific regulation, to-wit: 
4. Maximum attorney fee to be charged by a claimant's counsel. 
... [A]ny contingent fee agreement between counsel and a claimant in a workers' 
compensation case shall provide that the amount of attorney fees will not exceed 
25% ... [or] after hearing, ... up to 30%. Rhodes at 143. 
Accordingly, Rhodes has no application to any worker's compensation regulation other than the 
constitutional issue of whether the percentage of an attorney fee can be limited to 25% and 30% 
as applied across the board to all attorneys fees for all services pursuant to a regulation that 
defines the rights of the parties at the time of entry into the agreement. 4 That regulatory limit on 
attorney's fees is unrelated to the vicissitudes of the case, and does not limit compensation to 
only certain services provided by an attorney. Neither does the holding of Rhodes limit the 
review of the Commission to determine the reasonableness of an attorney's claim for attorneys 
fees on a case-by-case basis, as opposed to authorizing the Commission to carve out certain 
services that may be furnished by an attorney to which it presumptively (and apparently 
conclusively) denies the right to compensation - such as here. Some analysts fail to recognize 
the narrowness of the Rhodes holding. This is probably because the "specific regulation at issue" 
is not identified in the Court's opinion until it is quoted verbatim in the dissenting opinion by 
Justice Trout, IDAPA 17.02.08.033 at 143, in which she correctly observes that the opinion is 
limited to the regulation under consideration; an undisputed principle of law. 
Accordingly, Commissioner Baskin's observation at hearing that the current IDAP A 
rules were upheld in Rhodes" is, respectfully, not a correct statement of the law. (Transcript, 
p.lO, Line 22) Moreover, the current version ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033 took effect in 1994; 
Rhodes was decided in 1993. The Rhodes case does not even mention Curr; much less address 
4 Note: the "specific regulation at issue" no longer exists; it has been superseded (IDAP A 17.02.08.033.01.e.). 
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the constitutional questions that were raised in Curro Nor does Rhodes perform a review or 
analysis of any provision of the attorney fee regulations at issue here. Accordingly, Rhodes 
cannot be said to implicitly overrule Curr, even if a case establishing specific constitutional 
rights could ever be implicitly overruled by a case challenging an unrelated regulation. 
Fundamentally, the fact that a regulation limiting fees to 25% was found to be 
constitutional in Rhodes, does not lead to the logical conclusion that every IDAP A rule that the 
Commission enacted thereafter relating to attorneys fees (including the "available funds" and 
"primarily or substantially" regulations challenged here) are constitutionally valid. Nor does it 
mean that the Court overruled or abandoned all of the other constitutional requirements it set 
forth in Curro For example, if that were this the case, a holding that a particular regulation 
intended to protect the environment survives constitutional challenge would compel the 
conclusion that all regulations protecting the environment are constitutional. For example, after 
Rhodes could this Commission adopt a regulation voiding all contract property rights of 
attorneys and claimants? Of course not. As a matter of simple logic it must be concluded that 
Curr has not been implicitly overruled and remains good law. 
1. Mancilla and Johnson Distinguished from Curr 
Likewise, the Mancilla and Johnson cases do not mention Curr or address the 
constitutional questions that were raised in Curro As with Rhodes, they cannot be read as 
implicitly overruling Curr's constitutional requirements. It is axiomatic that when a 
constitutional issue is neither raised by the parties, nor considered by a Court of Appeals, the 
issue has not been determined. 
The Court's holdings in Mancilla and Johnson were very narrow and were limited to a 
review of whether or not the Commission acted within the bounds of its discretion: "We hold 
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that substantial and competent evidence exists to support the Commission's order denying Pena's 
motion for reconsideration of the Commission's previous order partially denying Pena's request 
for attorney fees." Mancilla at 689. The reason for the narrow holding is that the issue presented 
to the Court was itself very narrow-and only an evidentiary issue, not a constitutional one. The 
Court's holding affirmed that weighing evidence and making rulings on attorney fee issues is 
within the Commission's discretion, but the Court did not address whether the Commission was 
acting within the outer limits of that discretion-because the appellant in Mancilla and Johnson 
did not raise this issue in the context of constitutionality. 
Since the Mancilla and Johnson cases provide no guidance on the constitutional 
principles set forth in Curr, Mancilla and Johnson have no precedential value on whether, in the 
instant case, the Commission's regulations and their application is within constitutional limits 
generally nor the constitutional limits specifically addressed in Curr. 56 
Until such time as the Idaho Supreme Court explicitly overrules its constitutional 
holdings in Curr, it remains the touchstone for determining the rights of Claimant's Counsel and 
Claimant, and the bounds of the Commission's constitutional authority and discretion. 
What, then, is the precedential value of Mancilla/Johnson? As with any other such case 
in which the Supreme Court narrowly and specifically limits its holding to a finding ''that 
substantial and competent evidence exists to support the Commission's order,,,7 the import of the 
case is limited to that holding. Anything else is just dicta.8 The Commission is found to have 
5 At hearing, defense counsel Alan Hull agreed with Claimant's Counsel that Mancilla and Johnson should not be 
seen as having any important precedential value. (Transcript, p. 18, Line 17 et seq.) 
6 Indeed, the issue of what the outer bounds of that discretion are generally, which might have included its 
Constitutional limitations, was not addressed, and therefore the decision has no Constitutional significance 
whatsoever, nor does it define the outer bounds of the Commission's discretion for all purposes. 
7 Mancilla at 689. 
8 At hearing, Commissioner Baskin stated: "As I look at [the Mancilla] case and the Johnson case that came after, it 
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acted within the bounds of its discretion; however, these two cases do not discuss or define the 
constitutional limitations on the parameters of that discretion. By no stretch of imagination do 
they overrule or limit the holdings in Curro 
D. THE COMMISSION'S ApPLICATION OF ITS RULES VIOLATES THE 
"CLEARLY ARTICULATED EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS" 
REQUIREMENT 9 
Having established that the legal principles of Curr must govern the Commission's 
interpretation of its IDAP A rules, we now examine how the Commission may apply those rules. 
The Commission in its ORDER has found that the attorney fees sought by Claimant's 
Counsel are not reasonable. IDAP A 17.0.08.033.0 I.e. defines "reasonable" as requiring three 
elements,IO two of which are not believed to be in dispute: that the attorney fees must be 
consistent with the fee agreement, 11 and that they must be subject to the element of 
reasonableness in IRPC 1.5.12 
1. The Meaning of "Primarily or Substantially" is Unclear, in Violation of 
Curr 
Although Claimant's Counsel stipulates for purposes of these proceedings that their 
actions did not "primarily and substantially" result in the payment of permanent impairment 
seems to me that the court has upheld rulings of the Commission finding that the would have and should haves and 
what may have happened had counsel not been involved isn't sufficient to meet that burden of proof, that there has 
to be something more, something to show that, again, the efforts of counsel were instrumental in obtaining that 
award." (Transcript, p. 14) Counsel respectfully disagrees. What Mr. Baskin concluded was "upheld" is mere dicta. 
9 Although Claimant's Counsel does not assert that its services ''primarily and substantially" resulted in obtaining 
the impairment rating in this case, they do argue that the application of that standard during any phase of these 
proceeding was and is Constitutionally prohibited, and that the Commission must consider clearly established 
Constitutional rights in the application of authority. For example, the Commission is not free to imprison an 
attorney without charges or the right to tria~ simply by virtue of the facts that it has adopted a regulation arrogating 
to itself that authority and that no Constitutional holding has been issued on that regulation. Constitutional 
guarantees would have no meaning is they were not to be reasonably interpreted by those legally empowered to 
exercise the authority of the state. 
10 For a chart that sorts out the interconnectivity of the elements of "reasonable," See Seiniger Affidavit, Exhibit 6 
11 See Seiniger Affidavit, including ExhIbit 1, which is a copy of the fee agreement, which shows it to be in writing 
and to conform to IRPC 1.5. 
12 See Seiniger Affidavit, including Paragraphs 32-106, which set forth facts proving the factors listed in IRPC 1.5. 
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benefits to the Claimant, this issue is not moot because Claimant's Counsel were required to 
expend time and effort to at least defend themselves from charges made and transmitted to their 
client that they were seeking unreasonable attorneys fees. As reflected in the record, this has 
become the customary practice of the Commission and left unchallenged these regulations will 
continue to require Claimant's Counsel either to forego any attorneys fees denied by the 
Commission staff (without a hearing) or risk having their integrity made suspect in the eyes of 
their clients at best, worse yet being reported to the Idaho State Bar for consideration of 
disciplinary action, or at worst being sued by the client. 
The element of reasonableness in question in the determination of to what a "Charging 
Lien" may attach involved at issue in this case is the requirement "ii. The services of the 
attorney operated primarily or substantially to secure the fund out of which the attorney seeks to 
be paid." As observed by Commissioner Baskin during the telephone conference preceding the 
hearing in this matter, the meaning of that standard is obscure. 
Moreover, it appears from the Transcript of the hearing (e.g., pp. 11, Line 10; 38, Line 
20; 39, Line 13; 55, Line 2) that the Commission itself remains uncertain both as to the meaning 
of the phrase, and the standard of proof required to meet it. Claimant's Counsel respectfully 
submits that the Commission's uncertainty is the establishing that IDAP A 17.0.08.033.01.c.ii. 
violates Curr, which requires "clearly articulated evidentiary standards ... and clear guidelines" 
for determining the reasonableness of attorney fees. Curr, at 692. Moreover, Claimant's 
Counsel pointed out at hearing (citing specific examples) that ''the Commission historically has 
changed its interpretation of what those regulations mean," which further demonstrates that the 
regulations are not clear and that there application is arbitrary, "and, therefore, they are 
constitutionally invalid" pursuant to Curro (Transcript, p. 27, Line 23) 
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2. The Meaning of "Disputed" is Unclear, in Violation of Curr 
Returning now to the defInition of "Available Funds,,,13 not only does it include the 
Charging Lien, but it excludes "compensation ... not disputed to be owed prior to claimant's 
agreement to retain the attorney." At present, the Commission seems to be requiring a showing 
by attorneys that ''the specifIc benefIt was disputed;,,14 or that there is "evidence that the surety 
disputed the impairment rating;,,15 or that there was a "fIght, contest, or dispute" between the 
claimant and defendants over a PPI rating. 16 This defInition, if it is one, is highly ambiguous. 
The standard clearly requires the attorney seeking approval of an attorney fee agreed to by his 
client to prove a negative! The problems with applying such a defInition need not be repeated 
here, as they are set forth in great detail in the Seiniger Affidavit, Exhibit 8, and in Par. 54 et seq. 
(see also Transcript, p. 29, Line 23, et seq.) Where "clearly articulated evidentiary standards and 
clear guidelines" are lacking, as they are here in regard to the meaning of "disputed" and the 
proof required thereof, the constitutional requirements of Curr have not been met, and therefore 
that criteria cannot be the basis of denying Claimant's Counsel's claim to attorneys fees on the 
benefIts paid resulting from the impairment rating. Further, this standard fails to account for 
compensation that is merely delayed, or which is uncertain, and with respect to which an 
attorney is hired for purposes of applying pressure on the surety to follow the law by virtue of the 
fact that the claimant has a highly trained, skilled and experienced advocate on his or her side 
providing the "vigilance" historically and universally required to keep the peace - which in this 
case means the Defendant's compliance with the law. Indisputably, the fact that the claimant has 
counsel strengthens the claimant's bargaining power with respect to benefIts that the defendants 
13 17.0.0S.033.01.a 
14 Seiniger Affidavit, Exhibit 27, "Statement of Reasons for Denial" of fees on the Drotzman claim, page 1, par. 5. 
15 Seiniger Affidavit, Exhibit 32, "Order Releasing Retained Proceeds," Sandra Perez v. Idaho Fresh Pak, Inc. and 
Liberty Northwest Insurance Corp., Ie No. 2005-530757 (2009) (hereinafter "Perez") 
16 Seiniger Affidavit, Exhibit 33, "Order Denying Reconsideration," Perez 
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might withhold on marginal grounds. With respect to such benefits, the defendants would 
seldom risk the hazard of attorneys fees under I.C. 72-804 if a client is represented, but might 
well assume such a risk as long as a claimant in unrepresented and there is little chance that the 
unrepresented claimant would even be aware of his or her rights under that statute. The 
testimony of Defense Counsel, Alan Hull, implicitly makes that clear. 
3. The Present Practice Is Unconstitutional Because It Requires Claimant's 
Counsel to Prove A Negative and Violates Their Constitutional Right Not 
Have Their Integrity Needlessly Called Into Question 
The Commission's practice of finding all attorneys fees to be unreasonable unless the 
attorney can prove the negative that the subject benefits would not have been paid but for his 
efforts necessarily renders the attorney suspect in the eyes of his client in contradiction to the 
considerations giving rise to the constitutional rights recognized in Curro More importantly, it is 
presently impossible to avoid a situation in which the Commission issues an order that must be 
sent to the claimant holding that the attorney has sought fees that are unreasonable - in clear 
violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct - unless the attorney limits his claim for 
compensation to benefits expressly denied by the Defendant. Clearly this would have a "chilling 
effect" on the willingness of attorneys to undertake representation in cases where the 
unwillingness of the Defendants to pick up a claim or pay benefits was implicit in their conduct -
thereby infringing upon the claimant's right to counsel. This outcome may be a "consummation 
devoutly to be wished" by defendants, but one that if not unconstitutional, should not be 
desirable to the Commission and is clearly contrary to the spirit of Idaho's Workers 
Compensation Act. 
4. It is Often Impossible to Prove That the Defendants Paid PPI Benefits 
"Primarily or Substantially" Because of Claimant's Counsel's Efforts 
Given the indefinable nature of the phrase "primarily or substantially," and the confusion 
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over the level of proof required for same, Claimant's Counsel submits that it will often be is 
impossible for him to prove that he was "primarily or substantially" responsible for securing the 
PPI benefits, absent a stipulation to such facts by the Defendants or an evidentiary hearing 
entangling the Defendants in an adversary proceeding after they have assumed that they have 
bought their peace and relieved themselves of the obligation to continue to pay for the defense of 
the case. Defendants are at best unlikely to stipulate that they "unreasonably" denied or delayed 
payment of benefits. But such a showing would appear to be required by the regulations 
challenged here and their past interpretation by the Commission. 
At hearing, in response to a question from the Commission about what is Claimant's 
Counsel's evidence on the issue at hand, Claimant's Counsel replied: "I don't know and I can't 
know what caused the surety to decide to pay that [pPI] benefit. .. I can't know what 
discussions [defense counsel] had, if any, with the adjuster. I can't really know what the 
adjuster's thought process is. I can't know whether they decided to pay the benefit because we 
got [our own IME] report, so they had to go out and get another report and, then, they decided to 
pay that. As far as I'm concerned it's simply impossible for me to meet that evidentiary burden." 
(Transcript, p. 46, Line 9) (See also Seiniger Affidavit, ,107-110) 
The following exchange is even more enlightening: 
12 COMMISSIONER BASKIN: I'm guided by the language of 
13 the statute. Primarily and substantially responsible. 
14 What does that mean to you? 
15 MR. SEINIGER: Well, I don't know. And part of the 
16 reason that I don't know is this: I'm assuming that if! 
17 were to call [defense counsel] to testify and I said to him, well, 
18 I want to know whether or not these were paid as a result 
19 of my efforts, so I'd like you to tell me about your 
20 conversations with the adjuster. He'd refuse to do it 
21 based on privilege and he would be correct. 
22 COMMISSIONER BASKIN: And you could certainly ask 
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23 that question of the adjuster. 
24 MR. SEINIGER: I'm not so sure that you can, based on 
25 the present rules that create a privilege. (Transcript, p. 39, Line 12)17 
Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 502(a)(1), an adjuster is protected consulting with an 
attorney is a client and is protected by the attorney-client privilege. As the Commission is well 
aware, the largest Workers Compensation surety in the State of Idaho is the Idaho State 
Insurance Fund. Ibis privilege is easily invoked by a representation by the adjuster that it 
investigation is being conducted under the oversight of an attorney, or, better yet, that its actions 
with respect to the subject benefits involved consultation with the sureties attorney. 
Even if the adjuster were not protected by this privilege, it is difficult to conceive of an 
adjuster willingly stating under oath that they would not have paid the PPI benefit but for the 
intervention of claimant's counsel- such could be considered an admission of bad faith 
practices by the surety, or subject the surety to penalties pursuant to I.C. 72-804. 
That issue aside, implicit in Commissioner Baskin's question is the notion that claimants' 
attorneys would have to go to hearing to examine the adjuster in an attempt to establish their 
right to attorney fees in each and every PPI case in which the Commission denies fees. No 
claimants' attorney in the state could afford the enormous investment of time and costs that such 
a policy would require. Indeed, as the record reflects, Claimant's Counsel has long since eaten 
up the contested attorneys fees in dispute here with the time and efforts spent on this matter prior 
to hearing. 
5. The Commission May Not Require "Absolute Proof" 
Commissioner Baskin insightfully raised the issue of burden of proof in the context of 
whether Claimant's Counsel should be required to prove the causal link between his 
17 See also Seiniger Affidavit, ,110 
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representation and the payment of benefits by demonstrating nothing less than that without his 
representation, the benefits would not have been paid. "I think it does veer into the speculative to 
say, well, if Mr. Seiniger had not been retained in this case the surety may not have obtained the 
rating as quickly as it would have." (Transcript, p. 14, Line 20) 
The Commission appears to have taken the position that Claimant's Counsel must 
"prove" that without Claimant's Counsel's assistance, the surety would not have paid the PPI. 
Besides the fact that the attorney is required to prove a negative, this burden is a logically 
impossibility for Claimant's Counsel to meet. Consider this example: Can you prove that if your 
doctor had not given you that flu shot last winter, you would not have avoided the flu? Of course 
not, because whether you catch the flu depends on a host of factors besides the flu shot, such as 
whether you were exposed to the virus, your degree of pre-existing immunity, and how much 
sleep you get. Does the Commission believe that at the end of the winter, if they did not catch the 
flu, they should not have had to pay their doctor for that flu shot? After all, in retrospect there is 
no "proof' that his service was primarily and substantially responsible for them avoiding the flu! 
The adjuster involved might well have relented and paid the benefit because he or she "got into 
the Christmas spirit", or began to worry about the affect of callousness and insensitivity upon his 
or her soul- a consideration not unworthy of reflecting on in the estimation of Claimant's 
Counsel, and one to which Mr. Seiniger has often obliquely appealed. 
This analogy demonstrates why the law only requires a preponderance of the evidence to 
support a claim for attorney fees, and not some kind of higher level proof or sine qua non 
"absolute proof." So although Claimant's Counsel cannot absolutely "prove" that without his 
representation the Claimant would not have received PPI benefits, the preponderance of the 
evidence shows that with the Claimant hired skilled counsel, of good reputation and long 
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experience in Worker's Compensation cases, and that after retaining Claimant's Counsel's 
representation, the Claimant did receive benefits that the Defendants did not dispute To prove 
more, without the Defendants stipulating that they would otherwise have withheld payment of 
benefits for an undisputed impairment rating if only to put pressure on the claimant to settle his 
or her entire case on a lump sum basis, would require speculation. 
6. The Commission May Not Apply Different Standards to Different 
Benefits, in Violation of Curr 
In terms of Curr 's requirements for clear guidelines, the next question is whether the 
Commission may "cherry-pick" benefits to which it will apply its interpretation of the "primarily 
or substantially" standard, i.e. whether it must apply the same level of proof and the same 
standards to requests for attorney fees based on disability benefits obtained as it applies to 
impairment benefits obtained. 
At hearing, Counsel stated that it "sort of seem[ s] to be a tacit, de facto position of 
the Commission that, well, with respect to the impairment rating, we are going to require 
them to show that it was disputed, but with respect to the disability above impairment, we 
are not going to really require that. And the reason that I'm saying that is that we have 
been -- if I may say so -- hassled by the people who do the informal [determinations] for 
years now and we have never once been asked to demonstrate that there was a dispute 
with respect to the PPD benefits or that ... they were awarded substantially and primarily 
as a result of our efforts ... the definition of the available funds as including only those 
activities that primarily and substantially produce these [benefits are] not clear guidelines, 
because ... they couldn't possibly be clear guidelines if they are being applied in 
different circumstances different ways by the Commission." (Transcript, p. 36, Line 10, 
thru p. 37) 
Claimant's Counsel submits that the Commission may not apply the "primarily and 
substantially" standard, facially applicable to all benefits to disallow attorney fees on the PPI, to 
certain selected categories benefits to the exclusion of others. To do so arbitrarily discriminates 
based on the type of benefit obtained, and this would be a direct violation of Curro 
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E. CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S ATTORNEY FEE REQUEST Is 
REASONABLE As DEFINED By CURR 
When a potential client first consults an attorney, it is never clear what benefits, if any, 
the claimant will ultimately actually be paid or denied. There are many unknown and 
unknowable factors, and many potential defenses that the surety could raise. The risk of no 
recovery is great. These risks are set forth in detail in the Seiniger Affidavit, , 41 et. seq. 
1. "Reasonableness" is determined by the perspective of the parties at the 
time of contracting and may not be determined in hindsight based upon the 
outcome of the case 
Given the risks and the unknowable factors, the Supreme Court recognizes that 
"Reasonableness [of a fee agreement] ... derives from the totality of the circumstances from the 
perspective ofthe parties at the time that the fee agreement was made." Curr at 690. For 
example, if at the time of contracting for an attorney the contracting parties had reasonable 
concerns that legal counseling or advocacy might be needed to address existing or potential 
disputes or issues, the benefit of hindsight may not be used for a finding that it was unreasonable 
to so contract. The Commission's present stance ignores this legal principle. Additionally, in 
most circumstances, unless a benefit has been guaranteed to a claimant, the attorney must 
speculate as to what events, nascent in the womb of time, may give rise to a denial of that 
benefit. No experienced counsel would ever guaranteed a client what will ultimately transpire in 
a case, and if the attorney were not retained, doing so might well be malpractice. 
Moreover, under the Commission's current approach, an attorney trying to decide 
whether to take a case has to do the following: 
• Speculate as to whether the injured worker will eventually have a PPI rating. (That is a 
lot to ask, given that "it is impossible for a layman or even for a physician to know, or to 
accurately predict, whether an injured worker will ultimately have an impairment rating, 
or what the percentage of that rating might be, until the injured worker has completed his 
or her medical treatment." Affidavit of Dr. Richard Radnovich, attached as Exhibit 10 to 
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Seiniger Affidavit.) 
• Speculate as to whether the surety will dispute the rating. (Even the surety itself probably 
doesn't know whether it intends to dispute any eventual rating.) 
• Speculate as to whether, if disputed, it will be possible to prevail at a hearing so that the 
claimant will actually receive benefits from which the attorney can take a fee. (That is a 
lot to ask, given that no one knows what will be the testimony~ofthe physicians.) 
By analogy, this would be like requiring a physician, at the very first appointment, to predict 
how much medical help the patient will need, what infections or other medical complications 
mayor may not crop up during treatment, how long it will take to get better, and what will be the 
end result of treatment. The medical concept of "working diagnosis" speaks to the problem of 
even establishing a finn diagnoses at the earliest stages of medical treatment. 
If benefits can be guaranteed as of the date of the formation of the attorney-client 
relationship, the Commission should adopt a procedure whereby the Claimant simply comes to 
its staff, explains the facts as he or she understands them, and the Commission will guarantee 
that the benefits will be paid. As the saying goes: ''Not in my lifetime." 
This is why a hindsight-based approach is prohibited by the Idaho Supreme Court. In the 
instant case, the evidence shows that Claimant thought she needed help, Claimant's Counsel 
agreed to help her, and did provide legal services to her - for years. That more than meets the 
reasonableness test of Curro The Commission may not lawfully second-guess the parties' 
decisions through the denial of a claim for attorney fees essentially upon a categorical basis. 
F. THE SUPREME COURT SPECIFICALLY ALLOWS A REASONABLE 
CONTINGENCY FEE 
"This Court has recognized that a reasonable contingent fee must be 'sufficiently high to 
compensate the lawyer not only for the reasonable value of the time he or she anticipates 
devoting to the particular lawsuit, but also for the time devoted to other lawsuits undertaken on 
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the same basis but unsuccessful in result. '" Curr, at 693. In other words, Idaho specifically 
allows attorneys' contingency fees to compensate claimants' attorneys for the risk factors 
referenced above, in addition to the value of their time. This applies to the instant case. 
G. THE COMMISSION'S ApPROACH CREATES ETHICAL PROBLEMS 
FOR ATTORNEYS 
The Commission's approach creates a myriad of serious ethical concerns for both 
claimants' attorneys and defense attorneys, not the least of which is the obligations of defense 
counsel regarding communications with a represented party when informed by claimant's 
counsel that the scope of his representation is limited to disputed matters. These need not be 
repeated here, as they are set forth in great detail in the Seiniger Affidavit, Par. 38,85, 111-118 
(see also Transcript, p. 31 Line 4 et seq.) 
H. THE COMMISSION Is ACTING IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 
AND IN VIOLATION OF THE ATTORNEYS RIGHT To PRACTICE HIS 
PROFESSION 
The Commission has been interpreting or applying IDAP A 17.02.08.033 in such a way 
that it brings about the following results, all of which are against public policy: 
• Claimants are less likely to be able to find counsel to take their case. 18 
• Attorneys are discouraged from taking workers' compensation cases because the 
Commission does not honor their fee agreements with their clients. 
• The attorney-client relationship is damaged by the Commission's creation of a conflict of 
interest between attorney and client each time the Commission finds the requested 
attorney fee to be unreasonable, and by the implication in each such instance that the 
attorney acted unfairly, unethically, or unreasonably.19 
• The confidence of claimants and attorneys in the legal system is undermined when the 
Commission, via its website and its publications (see discussion infra), strongly 
encourages claimants to seek legal advice, but at the end of the case tells claimants and 
18 For legal authority on the importance of workers being able to obtain counsel, see Seiniger Affidavit, Exhibit 5. 
19 The latter is a violation oflaw as well as public policy, in that the Commission may not make suspect an 
attorney's "integrity in the eyes of their clients." Curr at 692. 
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attorneys that it will not honor their fee agreement, and/or tells them that portions of the 
attorney's services were of no value, not timely, or not of consequence.20 
• When attorneys discontinue taking workers' compensation cases because the Commission 
does not honor their fee agreements, and when as a result claimants are unable to find 
counsel to take their case and as a result do not receive their full benefits under the 
workers' compensation law, the burden of medical and financial care for these unassisted 
claimants shifts from the insurers who collected employers' premiums to various public 
welfare and private charity organizations.21 
A related set of public policy concerns is whether the Commission should be prohibited 
from interpreting or applying IDAP A 17.02.08.033, including especially the "dispute" language 
of .Ol(a), in such a way that one or more of the following results: 
• The plaintiffs bar is encouraged to work toward finding ways to foster, or at least to 
demonstrate and document, that there was a "fight, contest, or dispute" between the 
claimant and defendants. 
• The more reputable22 attorneys are penalized, because they are less likely to have benefits 
disputed by the surety, and therefore, less likely to receive approval from the 
Commission for their attorney fees (and less likely to take on injured workers' cases in 
the future). 
• The surety is essentially put in charge of determining how much a claimant's attorney 
will be paid, because attorney fees are based more on the surety's decisions of what to 
"dispute" than on the parameters of Curr or any of the factors enumerated in Rule 1.5 of 
the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct regarding the value of the attorney's services. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that public policy favors ensuring that claimants have 
access to counseL 23 Claimant's Counsel submits that the Supreme Court has never intended, nor 
would public policy favor, depriving Idaho's injured workers of their constitutional right to seek 
20 Seiniger Affidavit, Exhibit 27, "Statement of Reasons for Denial" offees on the Drotzman claim, page 1, par. 5. 
2! Put another way, injured workers who do not receive their full medical and income benefits due to lack of access 
to legal counsel do not just disappear; they still need help, so they surface at emergency rooms for medical care and 
welfare departments for income problems. The net cost to society is same---it is just that the cost of caring for 
injured workers is shifted from insurance companies who are protected from having to pay on policy claims (even 
though they collected premiums) to other governmental and charitable institutions. This shifting of the cost is clearly 
counter to public policy. 
22 Seiniger Affidavit, , 33 et seq. 
23 The Curr Court noted that "two general philosophies for the Commission to consider" are to "encourage claimants 
to pursue rightful legal claims and attorneys to take on such claimants' interests. Hogaboom, 107 Idaho at 17, 684 
P.2d at 994." Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 693, 864 P.2d 132, 139 
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the advice and advocacy of counsel at every stage of a worker's compensation matter. 24 
In addition, the Commission's interpretation and application of its IDAPA rules leads to 
results, including those listed above, that are contrary to the legislative intent of "sure and certain 
relief for injured workmen" (I.C. 72-201) in enacting the worker's compensation law, and 
contrary to the delegation of power under I.C. 72-508 to "promulgate reasonable rules and 
regulations for effecting the purposes of this act. ,,25 
I. THE HEARING HELD PURSUANT To 17.02.08.033.03(B) WAS NOT 
A DE Novo HEARING AND DEPRIVED CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL OF A 
MEANINGFUL HEARING AND THE RIGHT OF CRoss-ExAMINATION 
After the Commission failed to comply with its own rule in IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(a) 
that "Commission staff will notify counsel in writing of the staffs informal determination, which 
shall state the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable." Therefore, 
Claimant's Counsel made every reasonable effort to discover the legal or factual basis for the 
ORDER so that he could prepare for the hearing. These were unsuccessful with the Commission. 
The Commission declined to rule on Claimant's Counsel's MOTION FOR FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW flied September 18,2009, where the grounds for 
said Motion were that the Commission staff did not "notify counsel in writing of ... the reasons 
for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable" pursuant to IDAP A 
17.02.08.033.03(a). The Commission declined to allow Claimant's Counsel to take a deposition, 
notice of which was filed on September 18,2009, of Scott McDougall, the Commission staff 
member who issued "the staffs informal determination ... that the requested fee is not 
24 At hearing, defense counsel Alan Hull made an excellent argument on many of these public policy issues. 
(Transcript, p. 6, Line 14, et seq.) 
25 "Without clear guidelines nestled in appropriately promulgated regulations, attorneys' actions are plagued by 
doubt, which may have a chilling effect on the underlying purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act that the 
Commission is constrained to promote." Curr at 691-692. 
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reasonable." The Commission declined to rule on Claimant's Counsel's MOTION TO 
PRODUCE COMMISSION'S CLAIM FILE OF CLAIMANT filed September 18,2009, and 
declined to produce said file. On Nov. 3, 2009, Claimant's Counsel subpoenaed four witnesses 
(employees of the Commission26) to testify at the hearing, and spent much time preparing to 
examine the witnesses. At the hearing itself, Claimant's Counsel was surprised to learn that he 
would not be allowed to examine the witnesses, even though there had been no motion to quash 
and no notice of any kind that the Commission declined not allow their testimony. 
The Commission failed to follow its own rule in IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03(a) Although the 
rule requires that Counsel be notified "in writing" of ''the reasons for the determination that the 
requested fee is not reasonable," the letter from Commission staff 27 does not list any reasons, 
nor does the ORDER itself. This is a violation of Claimant's Counsel's and the Claimant's 
constitutional right to due process and notice and opportunity to be heard.28 
Commissioner Baskin acknowledged the Commission's ex parte decision-making when 
he stated at the hearing that ''we are prepared at this time to entertain any additional argument or 
receive any additional testimony or facts that you wish to offer in support of the claim for 
attorney's fees." (Transcript, p. 3, Line 22) (emphasis added) Clearly, the purpose of the hearing 
was to address the findings of unreasonableness that the Commission has already made, and to 
consider additional evidence, implying that previous evidence, supplied by unknown witnesses, 
26 There is no legal basis for refusing to testify, as the employees subpoenaed (the manager of the benefits section 
and his staff members known as compensation consultants) do not perf{)rm any judicial, quasi-judicial, or other 
privileged functions in making the staffs informal determination pursuant to 17.02.0S.033.03(a), as shown by their 
job descriptions, of which the Commission can take judicial notice. 
27 Seiniger Affidavit, Exhibit 13. 
28 "In order to justifiably modify attorney fee agreements in the interest of public welfare, the Commission must 
afford due process to the contracting parties, i.e., notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time." Curr 
at 692. Moreover, since the "due process" requirement applies to both parties, the Claimant, too, should have had 
notice and an opportunity to be heard on whether she wished the contract to be enforced on its terms, before the 
ORDER was entered. 
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would be considered.29 Moreover, because Claimant's Counsel were denied a statement of 
reasons for the initial finding that their fees were unreasonable, they went to hearing completely 
in the dark as to what evidence had already been considered by the Commission and unable to 
cross-examine those who provided that evidence. 
The net result is that Claimant's Counsel was forced to appear at hearing without any 
information as to the factual or legal basis for the Commission's ex parte ORDER, and certainly 
without any knowledge as to the contrary evidence that Commission staff must have had in order 
to have found that the preponderance of the evidence went against Claimant's Counsel's position 
(see discussion supra). This is a violation of Claimant's Counsel's constitutional right to due 
process and notice and an opportunity to be heard.3o \Vhile it might be inferred that the initial 
order finding that Claimant's Counsel's claim of attorneys fees were declined solely upon the 
basis that benefits for the impairment rating were not denied by the Defendants, without a 
statement of reasons as required by the rule, Claimant's Counsel is completely in the dark as to 
any other reason for the denial of those fees, and therefore must go to hearing in the dark. 
J. THE COMMISSION Is PROHIBITED FROM ENCOURAGING CLAIMANTS 
To SEEK LEGAL ADVICE, AND THEN REFUSING To ALLOW THE LEGAL 
ADVISORS To BE PAID 
What is the Commission stance on the issue of "compensat[ing] an attorney for acting 
solely as a counselor and ... efforts that do not generate monetary awards such as obtaining 
permission for medical care or procuring an impairment rating ... "? Curr at 692. Its regulations 
29 Claimant's counsel sought to depose the Commission staff members involved in the determination confirmed by 
the Commission in its initial order and to subpoena them to hearing, but were denied the opportunity to do so by 
order of the Commission. 
30 "In order to justifiably modify attorney fee agreements in the interest of public welfare, the Commission must 
afford due process to the contracting parties, i.e., notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time." Curr 
at 692. 
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and their application are at odds with the information provided on its own web site.:31 
There are many reasons for a dispute to arise in a claim. These disputes can 
sometimes center around complicated legal issues. The assistance of an attorney 
may be needed. 
If an injured worker (claimant) has a disagreement with the insurer/employer that 
cannot be resolved informally, the claimant can use the formal judicial process. 
Due to the complexity of the judicial process, it is recommended that you 
contact an attorney. 
After filing the complaint, the case must be prepared and presented to the Hearing 
Officer. Some typical steps are listed below but this is not a complete list. If you 
have questions, you may want to consult an attorney. 
Some costs may be incurred in preparing for and attending a hearing. If you have 
questions for [sic] concerns about costs and expenses you may want to seek legal 
counsel. 
Legal representation is not required to file a Complaint with the Industrial 
Commission. However, due to the complexity of the judicial process, you may 
wish to consider legal counsel. 
If your employer does not have workers' compensation insurance and you believe 
that you should receive workers' compensation benefits, you may contact an 
Idaho Industrial Commission Compensation Consultant by calling toll free 1-800-
950-2110 VITDD; or consult with an attorney. 
Industrial Commission employees can assist you with many of your questions or 
concerns about workers' compensation. However, they cannot provide you with 
legal advice. If you believe that you need legal advice, you should consult an 
attorney. 
If you choose to formally contest the decision of your employer or the employer's 
insurance company, you may want to consult an attorney. 
You may obtain a copy of the Complaint Form from the Industrial Commission or 
your attorney. 
To obtain a date for your hearing, you or your attorney must file a "Request for 
Calendaring" with the Idaho Industrial Commission.32 
Over and over again, the Commission officially recommends that claimants seek legal 
31 Exhibits 16-18,23-24 (bold emphasis added on all quotes) 
32 See also the "Facts for Injured Workers" pamphlet. Seiniger Affidavit, Exhibit 17. Also, the "General Information 
on Representing Yourself in a Workers' Compensation Case" (Seiniger Affidavit, Exhibit 23) pamphlet says: 
1. The materials you have received are not a substitute for legal advice from an attorney. 
2. Workers' compensation laws and Industrial Commission rules are complex ... 
4. It is a good idea to talk to an attorney before proceeding on your OWO. 
MY CHECKLIST 0 I understand it would help me to talk with an attorney about my case. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 OPENING BRIEF 
(208) 345-1000 
PAGE 26 OF 29 
/CJq 
advice; warns claimants of the complexity of the law; and officially urges claimants to talk to an 
attorney. Does the Commission intend for the public to assume that legal advice is free? Does 
the Commission intend for attorneys to assume that they are required to provide legal advice for 
free? (See the oath taken by attorneys not to decline representation based on personal 
considerations or because a client cannot pay. ) We assume not. 
What, then, does the Commission intend by its recommendations? The only logical 
interpretation is that the Commission expects that a claimant will contract with an attorney for 
legal advice, and then pay the attorney pursuant to that contract. Under that interpretation, it 
must be presumed that the Commission intends to honor the parties' contract as required by 
constitutional law. 
But the Commission does not stop with just recommending that a claimant seek legal 
advice, it goes into detail of how and where to obtain it: 
4. It is a good idea to talk to an attorney before proceeding on your own. You 
may contact the Idaho State Bar at 208-334-4500 for a referral. Information 
about obtaining an attorney may also be found at www2.state.id.us/isb.33 
The information contained in this pamphlet is general in nature and is not 
intended as a substitute for legal advice. Changes in the law or the specific facts 
of your case may result in legal interpretations which are different than those 
presented here. 
The Idaho State Bar can provide you names of lawyers in your area 
who are familiar with workers' compensation issues and related matters. The 
Idaho State Bar is located in Boise, Idaho, and can be reached by calling 1-
208-334-4500 or toll-free at 1-800-221-3295.34 
33 Exhibit 23, "General Information on Representing Yourself in a Workers' Compensation Case" 
34 Exhibit 17, "Facts for Injured Workers" (emphasis added in all quotes). Here are more from the IIC website: 
Can the Industrial Commission recommend a workers' compensation attorney? 
It is not appropriate for the Commission to recommend counsel. However, you can call the Idaho State 
Bar Lawyer Referral Service at (208) 334-4500 or look in the Yellow Pages in the Attorneys - Workers' 
Compensation section. 
The information contained in this web page is general in nature and is not intended as a substitute for legal 
advice. Changes in the law or the specific facts of your case may result in legal interpretations, whlch are different 
than presented here. 
The Idaho State Bar can provide you names of lawyers in your area who are familiar with workers' 
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Apparently, it is so important to the Commission that injured workers consider getting legal 
advice before proceeding on their own that the Commission tells them exactly how to go about 
getting a lawyer. Moreover, the Commission also makes it clear that its staff cannot give legal 
advice: 
Industrial Commission employees can assist you with many of your questions or 
concerns about workers' compensation. However, they cannot provide you with 
legal advice. If you believe that you need legal advice, you should consult an 
attorney. Ibid 
Again, the Commission makes it clear that the only way for claimants to get legal advice 
is from an attorney. Let us apply all of this to the instant case. The Commission, via its website 
and pamphlets, tells people like Claimant Laurel Kulm to seek legal advice. Laurel seeks advice 
from Seiniger Law Offices. So far, it is clear that Laurel did nothing wrong, because the 
Commission says that she is doing what it wants Claimants to-do. Laurel signs a contract with 
Seiniger Law Offices in which she agrees to pay them for their services, but rather than require 
an hourly fee,35 Seiniger agrees to take a risk and accept a contingency fee on PPI benefits. 
Again, the Commission never says that the legal advice should be free, so neither Laurel nor 
Seiniger Law Offices did anything wrong by signing this contract. Laurel asks her attorney for 
advice and he provides it. Again, this is exactly what the Commission says it wants. 
How is it, then, that several years later, the Commission staff is prepared to :find that in 
retrospect, Laurel should not have sought advice, Seiniger should not have provided it, and 
therefore Seiniger should not be paid? What, exactly, did Laurel or Seiniger do that was different 
than what the Commission specifically said they should do? In sum, public policy and 
fundamental fairness prohibits the Commission from encouraging claimants to seek legal advice, 
compensation issues. The Idaho State Bar is located in Boise, Idaho and can be reached by calling ... 
35 It is not even clear that a claimant could agree to pay an hourly fee out of the benefits that she receives for an 
impairment rating. 
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and then preventing their legal advisors from getting paid. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Commission should approve all of Counsel's attorney 
fees as set forth in the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement. 
Dated January 19, 2010. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
.' 
Andrew Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
V.CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on January 19,2010, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document 
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250 South 5th, Ste. 700 
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VIA Fax: (208) 344-5510 
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BEFORE THE INDLSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
LAURELKULM, ) 
) 
Claimant, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) IC 2006-012770 
MERCY MEDICAL CENTER, ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Employer, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) RELATING TO COUNSEL'S 
and ) REQUEST FOR APPROVAL 
) OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
INDUSTRIAL CLAIMS MANAGEMENT, ) 
) FI LED Surety, ) 
) MAY-2 0 2010 
Defendants. ) 
INlJlJSTRIAL COMMISSION 
This matter came before the Commission at the request of Seiniger Law Offices 
(hereinafter, Counsel) following an informal determination by Commission staff on the issue of 
attorney's fees payable to Counsel from the proceeds of a lump sum settlement agreement. 
Hearing was held on November 23, 2009, at which time the Industrial Commission entertained 
argument from Claimant's Counsel and counsel for Defendants in support of Counsel's claim for 
attorney's fees. As well, the Commission received and considered the affidavits of Counsel and 
Claimant, and the various attachments thereto, offered in support of Counsel's claim for 
attorney's fees. Finally, the Commission has reviewed and considered Counsel's closing brief, 
filed with the Commission January 20,2010. 
Per the October 13, 2009 Notice of Hearing, the following Issue IS before the 
Commission for determination: 
"The extent and degree of claimant's attorney's entitlement to an attorney fee on 
funds paid to claimant subsequent to her attorney's retention, including, inter alia, 
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whether those funds constitute "available funds" subject to a "charging lien" 
under the applicable regulation." 
I. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. At all times relevant hereto Claimant, Laurel Kuhn, was an employee of Mercy 
Medical Center, Employer herein. 
2. Mercy Medical Center insured its workers' compensation obligations under a 
policy issued by Indemnity Insurance Company of North America (hereinafter, Surety). 
Industrial Claims and Management was the third party administrator for Surety in the state of 
Idaho. 
3. On or about November 2, 2006, Claimant suffered an industrial accident arising 
out of and in the course of her employment with Employer. 
4. As a consequence of the subject accident, Claimant contended that she suffered 
injuries to her low back and lower extremities. 
5. Medical evidence established that Claimant suffered from pre-existing low back 
problems for which she had received chiropractic treatment. Claimant's pre-injury medical 
history was also significant for bilateral meniscus tears and repairs in the summer of 2006. 
6. Although Claimant's knee discomfort largely returned to its pre-injury level, her 
low back complaints persisted. An April 5, 2007 MRl demonstrated the presence of a moderate 
sized disc herniation at L3-L4, with possible mass effect on the descending right L4 nerve root. 
7. Following her review of the April 5, 2007 MR.L Nancy Greenwald M.D., 
proposed that in order to ascertain whether Claimant's low back injury was causally related to 
the subject accident, it would be prudent to review all of Claimant's past chiropractic records. 
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8. Concerned that she was getting the "runaround", from the workers' compensation 
adjuster assigned to her case, and because she had been told that her injury might not be covered 
due to the' possibility that her condition was related to a pre-existing degenerative condition, 
Claimant decided to retain the services of Seiniger Law Offices, P.A., to represent her interests 
in her workers' compensation claim. 
9. On or about June 1, 2007, Claimant executed a contingent fee agreement with 
Seiniger Law Offices, P.A., which provided, inter alia: 
"2) For their representation of Client, Attorneys will be paid a fee which will be 
in lien upon the cause of action and will be equal to a portion of all amounts 
recovered by way of settlement, or award including attorney fees, and including 
sums recovered in satisfaction thereof from any third party. That portion will be 
as follows: 
i) Twenty-five percent (25%) of all amounts obtained for Client after 
execution of this agreement if the case is settled before a hearing. If 
Client is receiving temporary disability benefits at the time of the 
execution of this agreement, Attorney will not take a percentage of that 
benefit until such time as the surety discontinues or threatens to 
discontinue payment of said benefit; if Client has received an impairment 
rating which has been admitted and is being paid, Attorney will not take a 
percentage of the balance of the impairment rating unless it is later 
disputed. 
ii) Thirty percent (30%) of such amounts after a hearing and the 
claim is resolved without the filing of an appeal by either party; 
iii) Forty percent (40%) of such amounts if the claim is resolved after 
an appeal has been filed by either party; 
Attorney will take a percentage of any benefits obtained by Client with 
respect to permanent partial impairment if a rating is given after the parties 
execute this agreement. In the event that there are attorney fees awarded against 
the defendant(s) by the commission Attorney shall be entitled to be paid those 
attorney fees or the percentage calculated above, whichever is greater." 
10. At the instance of Counsel, Claimant was evaluated by Richard Radnovich; D.O. 
In his report of June 7~ 2007, he diagnosed Claimant as suffering from lumbar spondylosis with 
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right-sided L3-L4 disc protrusion, and lumbar and radicular pain secondary to that protrusion. 
Importantly, he also proposed that Claimant's condition was, more likely to not, related to the 
industrial accident of November 2,2006. Although Dr. Radnovich noted that Claimant was still 
receiving medical treatment for her condition, including occasional epidural steroid injections, he 
nevertheless proposed that Claimant was entitled to a 12% whole person PPI rating under the 
applicable edition of the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. 
11. By letter dated June 6, 2007, Dr. Greenwald reported that she had had the 
opportunity to review and consider Claimant's pre-injury and chiropractic records. Following 
her review of those documents, Dr. Greenwald concluded Claimant's low back ccmdition was 
either related to the industrial accident, or to a near fall Claimant suffered following a physical 
therapy visit prescribed for Claimant as a result of the subject accident. 
12. On August 2, 2007, Claimant was seen for the first time by Beth Rogers, M.D. 
Dr. Rogers proposed that Claimant's lumbar spine radiculopathy was causally related to the 
November 2, 2006 accident. With respect to Claimant's bilateral knee complaints, Dr. Rogers 
proposed that Claimant was close to her baseline pre-injury condition. Dr. Rogers recommended 
a right L4 transforaminal epidural steroid injection for treatment of the right L4 radiculopathy. 
She felt that Claimant might require a brief course of directed physical therapy following the 
injection. In the interim, she gave Claimant modified duty restrictions, with no repetitive 
bending, no rapid walking, and no lifting greater than 15 to 20 pounds. 
13. Claimant was seen by Dr. Rogers on November 7,2007. On the occasion of that 
visit, Dr. Rogers noted that Claimant's right leg pain and overall back pain was much improved. 
Dr. Rogers concluded that Claimant's L3-L4 disc protrusion with right L4 radiculopathy had 
resolved with non-operative treatment. Dr. Rogers proposed that Claimant was medically 
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stable, and entitled to a 5% permanent partial impairment (pPI) rating per the applicable edition 
of the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. Dr. Rogers gave Claimant 
permanent work restrictions to avoid lifting more than 50 pounds. 
14. Following Dr. Rogers visit with Claimant of November 7, 2007, but before the 
execution of the April 28, 2009 Lump Sum Settlement Agreement, Surety paid to Claimant, and 
her attorney, a 5% PPI rating, i.e. 25 weeks at $310.75 per week or $7,768.75. 
15. Claimant's Counsel took a 25% fee on the PPI rating, or $1,942.19, and disbursed 
the balance of the rating to Claimant. 
16. In support of Claimant's claim for disability in excess of the physical impairment, 
Counsel engaged the services of Mary Barros-Bailey, a private vocational rehabilitation 
counselor. In her report of August 22, 2008, Ms. Barros-Bailey proposed that Claimant had 
sustained permanent partial disability (PPD) in the range of 7 to 10% of the whole person, 
inclusive of impairment. This opinion was rendered under the assumption that the 50 pound 
lifting restriction imposed by Dr. Rogers was Claimant's only extant physical 
limitation/restriction. 
17. In a report dated October 10, 2008, Ms. Barros-Bailey issued a revised disability 
evaluation based on additional information provided by Dr. Radnovich concerning Claimant's 
permanent limitationslrestrictions. Based on the limitationslrestrictions recommended by Dr. 
Radnovich, Ms. Barros-Bailey proposed that Claimant had suffered a permanent partial disability 
(PPD) in the range of22% of the whole person, inclusive of impairment. 
18. Subsequent to the preparation of Ms. Barros- Bailey's report of October 10,2008, 
but before the execution of the subject Lump Sum Settlement Agreement, Surety voluntarily paid 
disability benefits to Claimant and her attorney, in the amount of $5,438.13. 
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19. Prior to the execution of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement, Claimant's 
Counsel took a 25% attorney fee against PPD benefits of$5,438.13, or $1,359.53, and disbursed 
the balance of the PPD award to Claimant. 
20. Total attorney fees taken prior to the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement equaled 
$3,301.72. Total costs taken prior to the execution of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement 
equaled $1,394.37. 
21. At some point prior to June 26, 2009, the parties agreed to resolve remaining 
extant issues by way of Lump Sum Settlement Agreement. Pursuant to the terms of the Lump 
Sum Settlement Agreement filed with the Industrial Commission on June 26, 2009, Claimant 
agreed to resolve all remaining issues for the additional sum of$13,OOO. 
22. The Lump Sum Settlement Agreement further provided that Claimant would pay 
her attorney a 25% fee on the additional monies paid pursuant to the Lump Sum Settlement 
Agreement ($13,000 x 25% = $3,250). 
23. Contemporaneous with the preparation of the proposed Lump Sum Settlement 
Agreement, Counsel submitted his Form 1022, Report of Expenses and Statement of Claimant's 
Counsel, filed with the Commission on or about May 5, 2009. That document reflects that 
Counsel took fees against the benefits paid prior to the execution of the Lump Sum Settlement 
Agreement in the amount of $3,301. 72. However, the Form 1022 report does not contain an 
itemization of the type of benefits against which Counsel asserted an attorney fee claim prior to 
the execution of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement. 
24. In the Form 1022 Report, Counsel also stated, inter alia: ''Before Counsel was 
retained, Defendants denied, discontinued, or disputed Claimant's right to additional medical 
benefits and treatment, time loss benefits, and impairment compensation, and disability beyond 
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impairment, and retraining and attorney fees. Subsequent to retaining Counsel, Claimant 
received additional medical treatment and time loss benefits and impairment compensation and 
disability beyond impairment compensation." 
25. The proposed Lump Sum Settlement Agreement, supported by Counsel's Form 
1022, was submitted to the Industrial Commission, Benefits Department, for review and 
evaluation. Thereafter, Counsel also submitted a Memorandum of Law in Support of Form 
1022, filed with the Commission on July 24,2009, along with the supporting affidavit of Andrew 
Marsh, also filed with the Commission on July 24,2009. 
26. The supporting affidavit of Andrew Marsh contains itemization information that 
was absent from the Form 1022. Specifically, the affidavit reflects that attorney fees taken on 
benefits paid prior to the execution of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement were calculated as 
follows: 
a. PPI benefits of$7,768.75 times 25% equals $1,942.19 
b. PPD benefits of$5,438.13 times 25% equals $1,359.53 
c. Total attorney's fees taken prior to Lump Sum Settlement $3,301.72 
27. By letter dated August 12,2009, Counsel provided the Benefits Department with 
Claimant's "Workman's Compensation Summary", a document prepared at or around the time 
Claimant first retained the services of Seiniger Law Offices, P .A., which document purports to 
synopsize some· of the concerns that led Claimant to believe she would benefit from the 
assistance of Counsel. 
28. By letter dated September 3, 2009, Scott McDougall, Manager of the Industrial 
Commission Claims and Benefits Department, advised Counsel that Commission staffhad made 
an initial determination that the settlement was in the best interest of the parties, except for that 
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portion of the agreement which memorialized attorney's fees taken on benefits paid prior to the 
execution of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement. In this regard, the letter states: 
"The Industrial Commission (Commission) is in receipt of the proposed 
settlement agreement referenced above. In our review of the proposed settlement, 
the Commission has also considered your letters and attachments of May 5, July 
24, and August 12 regarding your representation of the claimant and your 
proposed fees. The Commission staff has made an initial determination that the 
settlement is in the best interests of the parties, except for the portion of the 
requested fees related to benefits in excess of the $12,223.13 Lump Sum 
Consideration, which have not been found to be reasonable per IDAP A 
17.02.08.033. 
Please be aware that this is an initial determination, and, in accordance with 
IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03, you may request a hearing on the matter within 14 days. 
Also in accordance with this rule, the Commission will shortly be issuing a partial 
order releasing available funds, and fees which have been determined to be 
reasonable." 
29. On or about September 4, 2009, the Industrial Commission entered its Order 
Partially Approving the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement. Adopting staff's recommendation, 
the Commission stated, inter alia; 
'1t is further ordered that the Commission approves the request for attorney fees 
and costs as those services related to the lump sum consideration. The total lump 
sum consideration amount is $12,223.13. Fees from that amount have been 
requested at 25%, which is reasonable. Fees and costs amount to $3,055.78 and 
$10.00 respectively, for a total of $3,065.78. However, Attorney has previously 
withheld $3,301.72 as fees, un-itemized as to the specific benefits obtained other 
than "Benefits, paid prior to Lump Sum .. " Such fees have not been substantiated 
to the Commission as reasonable in accordance with IDAP A 17.20.08.033. Thus, 
no fee proceeds from the settlement shall be made payable to Attorney. Surety 
will release to Attorney $10.00 for costs. Further, inasmuch as the fees previously 
taken exceed by $245.94 those fees found reasonable, Claimant's attorney shall 
reimburse the trust account for this claimant the amount of $245.94. 
It is further ordered that the Surety release to Attorney the sum of $3,250.00, 
which is the balance of the amount of proceeds of the Lump Sum Agreement 
requested for unsubstantiated attorney fees. This amount shall be held in trust by 
Attorney pending further order of the Commission." 
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30. . Claimant filed a Motion to Reconsider the Industrial Commission's Partial 
Order, as well as a Request for Hearing on the Partial Order pursuant to IDAP A 
17.02.0S.033.03.b. 
31. A telephone conference was held between the parties on October 6, 2009, at 
which time various motions filed to that date by Claimant were discussed, and the issues to be 
heard at the November 23,2009 hearing were identified. 
II. 
COUNSEL'S CONTENTIONS 
In addition to the issues identified in the October 13, 2009 Notice of Hearing, Counsel 
has identified a number of additional issues, as set forth in his November 22, 2009 Statement of 
Issues for Attorney Fee Hearing, filed with the Commission on November 23, 2009, the day of 
hearing. In addition to the issue of whether or not Counsel has met his burden of proving 
entitlement to attorney's fees on monies paid prior to the execution of the Lump Sum Settlement 
Agreement, Counsel raises a number of constitutional challenges to the current attorney fee 
regulations. Counsel also challenges the manner in which staff made its initial determination, as 
set forth in Mr. McDougall's letter of September 3, 2009. Counsel asserts, inter alia, that staff 
improperly failed to articulate the basis for its determination that the requested fee was not 
reasonable. Finally, Counsel raises a number of policy considerations arguing against 
Commission rules which limit fees from workers' compensation benefits. 
As developed below, the Industrial Commission declined to approve the requested 
attorney's fees on sums paid prior to the execution of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement 
because Counsel failed to adduce evidence tending to demonstrate that the requested fees were 
reasonable under the applicable regulation. Specifically, the Industrial Commission declined to 
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approve the fees in question because Counsel failed to demonstrate that the fund against which 
fees had previously been taken constituted "available funds" against which a "charging lien" 
could be asserted. Central to this question is the issue of whether or not Counsel was "primarily 
or substantially" responsible for securing the fund from which he subsequently took a fee. 
Although the question of whether or not Counsel's efforts were "primarily or 
substantially" responsible for securing the fee from which he hopes to be paid was the basis of 
the Commission's decision, Counsel has elected to concede that his services were not "primarily 
or substantially" responsible for securing the PPI award from which he previously took a fee: 
"For purposes of these proceedings only, and without waiving the right to raise 
the constitutionality of the applicable IDAP A attomeys fees rules on appeal, 
Seiniger Law Officers stipulates that its attomeys were not 'primarily or 
substantially' responsible for securing the PPI benefit involved-whatever 
'primarily or substantially' may mean in the context of defining 'available funds' 
as those terms are used in the relevant IDAP A rules." 
Claimant's Counsel's Opening Brief, p. 4. 
Rather, Counsel contends that he is entitled to an award of attorney's fees consistent with the 
terms of the Contingent Fee Agreement executed. by Claimant, the regulatory scheme 
notwithstanding. 
Even though Counsel has chosen, for purposes of the instant proceeding, to concede that 
his services were neither primarily nor substantially responsible for securing the PPI award from 
which he has taken his fee, the Commission feels constrained to address this issue, inasmuch as it 
is the Commission's interpretation of those regulations which informed its decision to deny the 
fees in question. As well, we will attempt to address the other challenges made by Counsel to 
the Commission's process for reviewing attorney's fee issues on lump sum settlement 
agreements. 
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ill. 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
Although Counsel initially posits that the Industrial Commission does not have 
jurisdiction to consider constitutional challenges to the provisions of the Workers' Compensation 
Act, or regulations implementing the same, he has nevertheless devoted considerable energy to 
discussing the constitutional issues relating to the Commission's actions in the matter, as well as 
the alleged unconstitutionality of the current regulations relating to the payment of attorney's 
fees on llunp sum settlement agreements. Counsel argues that even though the Industrial 
Commission does not have jurisdiction to consider constitutional challenges to its statutes or 
regulations, it is nevertheless bound to apply and follow Supreme Court decisions treating 
constitutional issues that may arise in the application of the Workers' Compensation Laws. 
Counsel aSserts that in adopting the current provisions of IDAP A 17.02.08.033 et. seq., and in 
applying those regulations to the facts of the instant matter, the Commission has erroneously 
conclude~ that Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993) has been overruled by Rhodes 
v. Industrial Commission, 125 Idaho139, 868 P.2d 467 (1993), Mancilla v. Greg, 131 Idaho 685, 
963 P.2d 368 (1998) and Johnson v. Boise Cascade Corporation, 134 Idaho 350, 2 P.3d 735 
(2000). According to Counsel, that the Industrial Commission does not have jurisdiction to 
consider constitutional challenges to its statute, in no way abrogates its responsibility to apply 
the direction contained in Curr v. Curr, supra. 
The Commission agrees that Curr v. Curr, supra, gave direction to the Commission 
concerning the constitutionality of the process utilized by the Commission, at that time, to 
approve attorney's fees on lump sum settlement agreements. That case makes it clear that the 
Industrial Commission may not, sua sponte, modify attorney fee agreements without first 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RELATING TO COUNSEL'S 
REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY'S FEES - 11" 
enacting guidelines upon which the Commission will base fee modifications, and without 
providing counsel an opportunity for a meaningful hearing before the Commission makes a 
decision to modify the agreement. Notably, Curr does not endorse an outright prohibition of 
Commission modification of attorney fee agreements. Instead, the case makes it clear that such 
modifications can only be undertaken in the context of an appropriately adopted regulation 
which affords proper notice to counsel and an opportunity to be heard. 
Curr was decided in 1991. To comply with Curr, and after an extensive public process, 
the Commission adopted formal regulations treating claimant's attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 72-508. Those regulations were to take effect on December 1, 1992. Howe'ler, in the 
interim, members of the Claimant's bar sought a writ of prohibition restraining the Industrial 
Commission from implementing the provisions of the former IDAP A 17.01.01.803.d, a true and 
correct copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix A. That challenge was treated in Rhodes v. 
Industrial Commission, 125 Idaho 139, 868 P.2d 467 (1993). 
Although Counsel acknowledges that the Rhodes Court determined that the 25% cap on 
attorney's fees passed constitutional muster, he argues that the decision should be limited to that 
particular finding, and that nothing in the decision supports the conclusion that the Court found 
all of the other provisions of the regulation to be constitutional. Specifically, Counsel argues that 
the Rhodes Court's narrow holding that the 25% cap is constitutional lends no support to the 
proposition that the current regulation treating "available funds" is constitutional. 
In response to this argument, it is first notable that nothing in the majority opinion 
suggests that the Court's finding concerning the constitutionality of the regulation was limited 
only to that portion of the regulation treating the 25% cap on attorneys' fees. The petitioner's 
brief in that case makes it clear that the writ of prohibition was sought against the entirety of 
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IDAPA 17.01.01.0803.d. See, Petitioner's Brief in Support of Alternative Writ of Prohibition and 
Peremptory Writ of Prohibition, p. 2. Indeed, in the subsequent case of Mancilla v. Greg, 131 
Idaho 685, 963 P.2d 368 (1998) the Court commenced its discussion of the current IDAP A 
17.02.08.033, et seq, by noting that the constitutionality of the prior attorney fee regulation had 
been upheld in Rhodes, on the basis that the regulation was a reasonable interpretation of the 
power vested in the Commission pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-803. Nothing in 
Mancilla suggests that it was only a small portion of the regulation that was subjected to 
constitutional scrutiny in Rhodes. 
Second, even if it be assumed that the Rhodes majority intended to address only that 
portion of the regulation which capped attorney's fees at 25%, it seems clear that in considering 
this issue, the Court necessarily considered the nature of the fund subject to the 25% cap. In 
support of his argument, Counsel quotes the regulation interpreted by the Rhodes Court as 
follows: 
"4. Maximum attorney fee to be charged by a claimant's counsel. 
... [A ]ny contingent fee agreement between counsel and a claimant in a workers' 
compensation case shall provide that the amount of attorney fees will not exceed 
25% ... [or] after hearing, ... up to 30%. Rhodes at 143. 
Claimant's Counsel's Opening Brief, p. 8. 
Without Counsel's redactions, the language of the former IDAPA 17.01.01.803.d (4) actually 
reads as follows: 
"Maximum attorney fee to be charged by a claimant's counsel. After the 
effective date of this regulation, any contingent fee agreement between counsel 
and a claimant in a workers' compensation case shall provide that the amount of 
attorney fees will not exceed 25% of any new money received by the claimant, 
whether such new money is acquired pursuant. to a Lump Sum Settlement 
Agreement, other Agreement, Mediation, or an Award of the Commission. 
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a. Provided, however, that after hearing by the Commission and upon its own 
motion, the Commission may award attorney fees up to 30% of new money 
awarded. 
b. In cases where a claimant is deemed totally and permanently disabled, 
attorney fees may be deducted from no more than 500 weeks of workers' 
compensation benefits. 
(Emphasis added). 
The portion of the regulation arguably at issue in Rhodes did not simply cap attorney's fees at 
25%. Rather, the provisions of paragraph 4 capped attorney's fees at 25% of "new money". 
New money is defined at the former IDAP A 17.01.01.803.d (3) as follows: 
'''New money' as used herein shall refer to monetary benefits to the claimant that 
counsel is responsible for securing through legal services rendered in connections 
with the client's workers' compensation claim." 
Accordingly, in considering the constitutionality of the cap on attorney's fees, the 
Supreme Court had before it, and necessarily considered, the constitutionality of a regulation 
which capped attorney's fees at 25% of "new money." The "new money" provision of the 
former regulation is the direct antecedent of that portion of the current regulation which caps 
attorney fees at 25% of "available funds." From the Rhodes decision, the Industrial Commission 
can discern nothing in the language of that case that would suggest that the former provision 
limiting an award of attorney's fees to 25% of "new money" did not pass constitutional muster. 
There is nothing in Rhodes that argues against a conclusion that the successor language to the 
"new money" provision of the former regulation is anything but constitutional. 
Finally, even if it be assumed that the majority in Rhodes only intended to narrowly 
address the constitutionality of a 25% cap (not a 25% j::ap on "new money"), it would seem that 
the constitutional analysis applied to that portion of the regulation would also apply to the 
balance of the regulation. In Rhodes, supra, the Court applied a rational basis test to assess 
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whether the regulation bore a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. The Court 
found that there was a rational relationship between the legitimate legislative purpose to foster 
sure and certain relief for injured workers and the attorney fee regulation. The limit imposed by 
the regulation furthers the purpose by making the cost of attorneys paid from new money less 
burdensome. The Court also concluded that the regulation satisfied due process analysis for the 
same reason. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the Court's analysis was limited to consideration of whether a 
25% cap is constitutional, the application of the rational basis test to the balance of the statute 
would seem to yield the same conclusion that the Court reached concerning the 25% cap. 
Therefore, nothing in Rhodes seems to suggest that the Court found, or would find, that only 
certain of the provisions of the former IDAP A 17.01.01.803.d are constitutional. 
Contrary to the assertions made by Counsel, the Commission has not determined that 
Curr v. Curr, supra, has been overruled by Rhodes, Mancilla and/or Johnson. Rather, it appears 
that after Curr, the Industrial Commission followed the direction of the Supreme Court, and 
adopted a regulatory scheme pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-508 that addressed the shortcomings 
noted in Curro Moreover, it is apparent that in considering the regulation adopted by the 
Commission in 1992, the Rhodes Court found either the entire regulation, or, at the very least, 
that portion of the former regulation that is the direct antecedent to the provisions of the current 
regulation which are at the heart of the instant dispute, to be constitutional. 
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IV. 
APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF IDAPA 17.02.08.033 
TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
With an effective date of July 1, 1994, the Industrial Commission adopted the current 
IDAP A 17.02.08.033 et seq, pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-508. A true and 
correct copy of that regulation is attached hereto as Appendix B. The current regulation 
preserves the notion of a 25% cap on attorney's fees, but instead of applying that cap to "new 
money", the current regulation allows attorneys to take a 25% fee on "available funds". Per 
IDAP A 17.02.08.033(a) "available funds" is defined as follows: 
"Available funds" means a sum of money to which a charging lien may attach. It 
shall not include any compensation paid or not disputed to be owed prior to 
claimant's agreement to retain the attorney. 
Therefore, available funds do not include (a) compensation paid to Claimant prior to the 
retention of Counselor (b) compensation which is not disputed to be owed prior to the retention 
of Counsel. Counsel acknowledges that the definition of available funds unambiguously 
specifies that money paid to claimant prior to the retention of Counsel does not constitute 
available funds. Therefore, Temporary Total Disability (TTD) or PPI benefits paid to an injured 
worker before he or she retains an attorney can never constitute available funds which might 
later form the basis of an award of attorney's fees. However, Counsel argues that what 
constitutes compensation "not disputed to be owed" prior to the retention of counsel is 
ambiguous. In his brief, Counsel identifies a number of meanings that may be ascribed to the 
regulatory language. However, we think that what is clearly intended by this portion of the 
definition of available funds is that if the evidence establishes that employer/surety 
acknowledged responsibility for a particular benefit payable under the Workers"Compensation 
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Laws prior to the retention of Counsel, these benefits do not constitute available funds for 
purposes of regulation. For example, let us assume that prior to the retention of Counsel, surety 
acknowledged responsibility for the payment of TID benefits during claimant's period of 
recovery. Those payments would not constitute "available funds" even though their payment 
continued after the retention of CounseL However, if, subsequent to the retention of counsel, a 
dispute arose concerning claimant's ongoing entitlement to TTD benefits, such that surety denied 
responsibility for further payment, any funds eventually paid as a result of counsel's efforts to 
reinstate TTD benefits would constitute available funds. We think that the language of this 
portion of the regulation is clear, and provides a well understood rule that an attorney is not 
entitled to assert a claim against benefits, responsibility for which was acknowledged by surety 
prior to the retention of counseL 
The definition of available funds, however, does not address that class of benefits, the 
entitlement to which does not arise until after the retention of counseL These benefits do not 
constitute compensation "not disputed to be owed" prior to the retention of counsel. For 
example, let us assume that at the time of counsel's retention on an accepted claim, claimant was 
still in the period of recovery, and was receiving TTD benefits. Let us further assume that at 
some point in time after counsel's retention, claimant's treating physician declared claimant to be 
medically stable and awarded claimant an impairment rating. Finally, let us assume that this 
impairment rating was promptly paid by surety, without dispute. In this hypothetical, the PPI 
award, though not disputed by surety, was also not disputed to be owed prior to the retention of 
counsel. Since the entitlement to the PPI award was not ascertained until after counsel's 
retention, it would be impossible for surety to acknowledge responsibility for the payment of this 
benefit prior to the retention of counseL Technically, then, such a fund of money constitutes 
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«available funds" for purposes of the regulation. Indeed, it is exactly this scenario, or one of 
many permutations thereof, which forms the basis of attorney fee disputes in most settled cases, 
as in the instant matter. 
Although this interpretation of "available funds" seems to be mandated by the provisions 
ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01(a), it is worth noting that certain language in Mancilla v. Greg, 131 
Idaho 685, 963 P.2d 368 (1998) suggests that the Idaho Supreme Court may read the regulation 
more narrowly. As discussed in more detail below, in Mancilla, a non-disputed impairment 
rating was generated by claimant's treating physician after claimant retained the services of 
attorney Pena The Industrial Commission declined to approve an award of attorney's fees on 
the PPI rating, concluding that Pena's services were not "primarily or substantially" responsible 
for obtaining the PPI award. The Court affirmed the Commission's decision in this regard, 
ruling that there was substantial and competent evidence supporting the Commission's 
conclusion that Pena's efforts were not "primarily or substantially" responsible for securing the 
fund from which he hoped to be paid. However, the Court also noted that because Pena 
conceded that the PPI rating was not disputed, this concession, too, supported the conclusion that 
the rating could not constitute "available funds". In this regard, the Court stated: 
"This testimony is also significant because it supports a conclusion that however 
the PPI rating came into existence, the rating and amount of the award were never 
disputed. According to IDAP A 17.02.08.033.01.a and 01.e, "undisputed funds 
cannot be used to satisfy claims for attorney's fees." 
Therefore, the Court's opinion suggests that even if claimant's entitlement to non-
disputed funds arose after the retention of counsel, such funds cannot constitute "available 
funds" for purposes of the attorney fee calculation. The quoted portion of the decision is not 
critical to the affirmation of the Commission ruling, since the Court clearly held that there was 
substantial and competent evidence supporting the Commission conclusion that counsel's efforts 
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were not primarily or substantially responsible for securing the fund from which he had 
previously taken a fee. 
Whether the quoted language is dicta may not be of any particUlar significance in light of 
the further restrictions on attorney's fees created by the definition of "charging lien". The term 
"charging lien" is defined at IDAP A 17.02.08.033.01.c as follows: 
"Charging lien" means a lien, against a claimant's right to any compensation 
under the Workers' Compensation laws, which may be asserted by an attorney 
who is able to demonstrate that: 
1. There are compensation benefits available for distribution on 
equitable principles; 
11. The services of the attorney operated primarily or substantially to 
secure the fund out of which the attorney seeks to be paid; 
lll. It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from 
compensation funds rather than from the client; 
IV. The claim is limited to costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred 
in the case through which the fund was raised; and 
v. There are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition 
and application of the charging lien. 
Although IDAPA 17.02.0S.033.01.a, specifies that a charging lien may attach to 
"available funds", it is apparent from a review of the definition of "charging lien" that that term 
further constrains the available funds that may be subject to a claim of attorney's fees. 
Importantly, a charging lien can only attach to available funds where it is demonstrated that the 
services of the attorney operated "primarily or substantially" to secure the fund out of which the 
attorney seeks to be paid. (See, IDAP A 17.02.0S.033.01.c.ii.) This is but one of five 
requirements that must be satisfied before a charging lien can be said to exist against "available 
funds". As important is the fact that these requirements are not in the disjunctive. Per the 
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language of the regulation, all of these requirements must be satisfied before a charging lien can 
be said to exist. 
This construction of the regulation finds support in two subsequent Idaho Supreme Court 
decisions. See, Mancilla v. Greg, l31 Idaho 685, 963 P.2d 368 (1998) and Johnson v. Boise 
Cascade Corporation, 134 Idaho 350, 2 P.3d 735 (2000). 
In Mancilla, Mancilla suffered an amputation injury to his right thumb on October 12, 
1993. In December of 1993, Mancilla was released by Dr. Rockwell to return to work at his pre-
injury job. Following his release to return to work, surety terminated Mancilla's TID benefits. 
On February 24, 1994, Mancilla entered into a contingency fee agreement with Pena. Shortly 
thereafter, Pena contacted Dr. Rockwell to express his concern about Mancilla's ongoing 
difficulties. Thereafter, Dr. Rockwell examined Mancilla again, and reversed his previous 
decision to releaSe Mancilla to unrestricted work activities. On April 5, 1994, Dr. Rockwell 
awarded claimant an 11 % PPI rating for his injuries. Surety did not dispute the rating and paid 
it. Pena took a 25% attorney fee against the $11,632.00 PPI award. Thereafter, Pena and surety 
came to an agreement concerning the resolution of the balance of the issues involved in 
claimant's case. The parties executed a lump sum settlement agreement, which memorialized 
the past payment of the PPI award and other benefits, and proposed the payment of an additional 
$12,125.00 to claimant to resolve the matter. The lump sum settlement agreement was submitted 
to the Commission for approval pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-404. The Commission questioned 
whether Pena was primarily or substantially responsible for securing the PPI award. After a 
hearing on the issue, the Commission issued an order denying Pena a fee from the PPI award. 
Pena appealed. 
In discussing the current statutory scheme, the Court stated: 
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"The authority granted to the Commission under Section 72-803, to "approve" 
attorney fees, does not conflict with the judicial penumbra. The regulation under 
challenge, promulgated to foster ease, utility, and predictability in the application 
of Idaho Code § 72-803, in tum does not overstep the legislative bounds of Idaho 
Code § 72-803, read in pari materia with the entire Workers' Compensation Act. 
See, Heese v. A&T Trucking, 102 Idaho 598, 600, 635 P.2d 962, 964 (1981) 
(various provisions of Workers' Compensation Act must be read in pari materia). 
The regulation is not a fee schedule. It is a framework establishing uniform 
grounds for fee approval. The language of Idaho Code § 72-803 contemplates 
that the Commission will monitor the appropriateness of fees on behalf of 
claimants, and therefore the regulation provides a reasonable interpretation of the 
power vested by Idaho Code § 72-803. 
In this case, the operative word in Idaho Code § 72-803 is "approve." Rhodes 
argues that the word "approve" means simply that, to approve. It does not mean 
to "regulate." Given the broad empowerment provided by Idaho Code § 72-508, 
coupled with the purpose underlying the Workers' Compensation Act., i.e., to 
provide "sure and certain relief for injured workmen and their families," Idaho 
Code § 72-201, we cannot agree with Rhodes' contention. The absence of the 
word "regulate" in Idaho Code § 72-803 is not legally significant and does not 
exact a reading that the legislature intended to confine the Commission's 
regulatory authority. "The Workers' Compensation law is to be liberally 
construed with a view to effect its objects and promote justice." Mayo v. Safeway 
Stores, 93 Idaho 161, 166,457 P.2d 400, 405 (1969). Accordingly, we hold that 
the word "approve" is sufficient to establish the proper delegation of the power to 
regulate attorney fees." 
(footnotes omitted). 
In considering whether to uphold the Commission decision that Pena failed to adduce 
evidence and that his efforts had "primarily or substantially" secured the PPI award, the Court 
found it significant that the evidence demonstrated that it was Dr. Rockwell who initiated the 
determination of claimant's PPI award and that Pena simply agreed that the impairment rating 
was fair. The decision also addresses one of the points raised by Counsel in the instant matter. 
Counsel asserts that staff's initial determination places him in the difficult position of being 
required to prove a negative. He argues that it is impossible for him to show what might have 
happened (or what might not have happened) had he not become involved in the case, and that, 
therefore, a presumption should exist that he is entitled to an award of fees on any non-disputed 
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monies paid to Claimant following the retention of Counsel. After all, who is to say that the 
Surety's decision to pay an impairment rating is not the result of Surety's conclusion that it 
would be pointless to decline to pay the rating since Claimant has retained an attorney who 
would assuredly take surety to task for its recalcitrant behavior? Pena made the same argument 
in Mancilla: 
Further evidence that Pena did not primarily and substantially secure the PPI 
benefits is his testimony that it was "possible" his client would have received no 
more benefits had Pena not become involved: 
... I submit to you the possibility that Mr. Mancilla, had I not been able to s'ee 
him, would be in Mexico right now and would have never received one more 
penny other than the first few weeks of total temporary disability payments. 
Here, Pena seems to suggest that because neither he nor the Commission can 
predict what may have happened had Pena not become involved in the case, the 
Commission should allow fees from all benefits, including the PPI, which were 
awarded after he was retained. The Commission found this argument to be 
speculative at best, and that an award of attorney fees upon such conjecture would 
be inconsistent with the requisites of attorney charging liens pursuant to the 
Commission's rule. IDAPA 17.02.08.033." 
131 Idaho 685. 
Therefore, Pena was unable to prove that his efforts were primarily or substantially 
responsible for securing the PPI award simply by speculating that surety might not have been 
inclined to pay the award absent his appearance as counsel in the matter. Recognizing that it is 
Counsel who bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the assertion of a 
charging lien, there is nothing untoward about the Commission's rejection of such specUlation. 
In truth, however, Mancilla could be seen as a close case. Although it is difficult, at this 
remove, to appreciate what the subtle factual nuances of that case might have been, it seems 
arguable that the case could have gone a different way. It will be recalled that prior to Pena's 
retention, Dr. Rockwell had released claimant to return to work without limitation. Claimant 
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attempted to return to work, but found that he continued to experience discomfort in his hand. 
He was, in fact, unable to perform his job duties, and was discharged by his employer. As well, 
TID benefits were curtailed. This evidently proved too much for Mr. Mancilla, who decided to 
leave Idaho and return to Mexico. There, the matter would surely have ended, but for the 
intervention of a friend who persuaded Mancilla to retain Pena. It was Pena who contacted Dr. 
Rockwell and persuaded him to see claimant again. It was as a result of that visit that Dr. 
Rockwellgave claimant an impairment rating. Could it not be argued that Pena's intervention 
was responsible, in some sense, for the acquisition of the 11 % PPI rating? The real question, of 
course,is whether it could be said that Pena's actions were "primarily or substantially" 
responsible for Dr. Rockwell's generation of an impairment rating. On the facts before it, the 
Commission found that Pena did not meet his burden of proof However, neither the 
Commission's nor the Court's decision provides practitioners with much guidance on the 
standard that must be satisfied before one can be said to have "primarily or substantially" 
secured the funds from which a fee may be paid. 
In Johnson v. Boise Cascade Corporation, supra, Johnson suffered a partial left foot 
amputation in the course of his employment. He had two surgeries on his foot before he retained 
the services of Pena on July 28, 1995. Thereafter, on August 7, 1995 and August 19, 1995, 
claimant had additional surgeries, eventually resulting in the amputation of his left leg below the 
knee. Boise Cascade, a self-insured employer, accepted responsibility for the payment of 
medical and other benefits associated with surgeries one and two. However, the company denied 
responsibility for the payment of medical and other benefits associated with surgeries three and 
four. 
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In November of 1995, Pena met with representatives of the company and demanded 
payment for the medical bills associated with the third and fourth surgeries. In turn, Boise 
Cascade retained outside counsel, who reviewed the file. Very shortly thereafter, the company 
acknowledged responsibility for the payment of the medical expenses associated with surgeries 
three and four. Time passed, and in February of 1996, claimant's treating physician pronounced 
claimant medically stable, and gave him a 28% whole person rating for his work related injuries. 
Thereafter, the parties entered into a lump sum settlement agreement, under the terms of which 
the parties agreed that claimant would receive $75,000 to resolve all outstanding issues, inclusive 
of the $30,877 PPI award. Pena asserted a 25% fee against the $75,000 settlement. The 
Industrial Commission declined to approve the fee on that portion of the award representing 
claimant's PPI award. As in the instant matter, the Commission entered a partial order 
approving the lump sum settlement agreement amount, but requiring surety to retain the disputed 
fee pending further proceedings concerning Pena's entitlement to fees on the PPI award. At a 
subsequent hearing, the Commission determined that Pena had failed to demonstrate his efforts 
were primarily or substantially responsible for his client's receipt of the PPI award. 
In support of his position, Pena argued that Boise Cascade initially refused responsibility 
for the entire PPI award, and it was only through Pena's efforts that the company eventually 
agreed to pay the full award. However, the only evidence before the Commission was that Pena 
was, perhaps, responsible for obtaining the company's agreement to pay for the third and fourth 
surgeries. The Court seemed reluctant to acknowledge even this contribution, noting that it 
seemed likely that it was Boise Cascade's counsel that had advised the company to pay for the 
procedures, not Pena. The Court concluded that, on balance, the testimony was only sufficient to 
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support the conclusion that any work Pena did was directed only to encouraging Boise Cascade 
to accept responsibility for the medical bills. 
However, after noting that the third and fourth surgeries did not increase claimant's 
impairment rating, the Court offered the following comment: 
''While Pena may have contributed in some part to Boise Cascade's decision to 
acknowledge responsibility for impairment resulting from the third and fourth 
surgeries, the impairment rating was not increased as a result. We therefore hold 
that substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission's determination 
that Pena was not primarily or substantially responsible for securing Johnson's 
PPI award." 
Let it be supposed that the third and fourth surgeries had resulted in additional 
impairment. Were this the case, would the fact that Pena contributed "in some part" to the 
company's decision to acknowledge responsibility for impairment resulting from the third and 
fourth surgeries have been sufficient to satisfy Pena's burden of proof? In other words, is the 
burden to show that counsel's efforts were primarily or substantially responsible for securing the 
fund from which he hopes to be paid satisfied by a showing that some, but not all, of the 
responsibility for securing the funds is attributable to his efforts? Johnson, like Mancilla before 
it, provides little guidance on what, precisely, is meant by the term "primarily or substantially". 
As discussed above, an attorney's charging lien can only attach to available funds. 
However, a charging lien can only attach where attorney is able to demonstrate, inter alia, that: 
"ii. The services of the attorney operated primarily or substantially to secure 
the fund out of which the attorney seeks to be paid;" 
At issue is the meaning of the language "primarily or substantially". In particular, it is 
important to understand what it is an attorney must do in order to meet his burden of 
demonstrating that his or her efforts were "primarily or substantially" responsible for securing 
the fund out of which attorney hopes to be paid. In order to understand what is meant by the 
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language in question, the Commission must engage in statutory interpretation, the objective of 
which is to derive the intent of the legislative body that adopted the regulation. See, Callies v. 
O'Neil, 147 Idaho 841,216 P.3d 130 (2009); Farber v. Idaho State Insurance Fund, 147 Idaho 
307, 208 P.3d 289 (2009). Thus, statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the 
statute. The provisions of the statute should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in 
the context of the entire document. The statute should be considered as a whole and words 
should be given their plain usual and ordinary meanings. Importantly, in interpreting the statute, 
the Commission must give effect to all words and provisions of the statutes so that none will be 
void, superfluous or redundant. Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Pocatello Chubbuck Auditorium District, 
146 Idaho 202, 192 P.3d 1026 (2008). In construing the statute, words and phrases are assumed 
to have been used in their popular sense if they have not acquired a technical meaning. Meader 
v. Unemployment Compensation Division of Industrial Accident Board, 64 Idaho 716, 136 P.2d 
984 (1943). 
As to the term "substantially", it has been defined as follows: "essentially; without 
material qualifications; in the main; in substance; materially; in a substantial manner", Black's 
Law Dictionary 1428 (6th Edition 1990). See also, State of Idaho v. Christian F. Schmoll, 144 
Idaho 800, 172 P.3d 555 (2007). The term can also, however, mean "considerable in amount, 
value or the like; large", Webster's New International Dictionary 2514 (2nd Edition 1945). 
However, the meaning of "substantially" most naturally conveyed by the phrase "substantially to 
secure the fund ... " is not "secured to a high degree", but rather "secured in substance, or in the 
main" that is, secured to a degree that would satisfy a reasonable person. Pierce v. Underwood, 
457 U.S. 552, 108 S.Ct. 2541 (1988). 
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There is somewhat more difficulty in ascertaining what definition of "primarily" was 
intended, as that term is used in the applicable regulation. The term "primarily" has two 
potentially applicable definitions. On the one hand, it is defined to mean "essentially; mostly; 
chiefly; principally", See, Dictionary.com Unabridged Based on the Random House Dictionary 
(Random House, Inc., 2010); The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 
(Houghton Mifflin Company 4th ed. 2009), as in "They live primarily from farming". On the 
other hand, primarily is also defined as meaning "in the first instance; at first; originally." Ibid. 
If primarily means "essentially; mostly; chiefly; or principally", its meaning is very similar to the 
definition of "substantially", as used in the regulation. In this usage, however, "primarily" may 
implicate a higher standard, or constitute a more difficult burden of proof. If this definition of 
"primarily" is utilized, then the term "primarily or substantially" as used in the regulation is 
problematic. If "primarily" is but a stronger version of "substantially", and if an attorney can 
satisfy his burden by demonstrating that he either primarily or substantially secured the fund 
from which he hopes to be paid, then the term "primarily" is superfluous; if an attorney can 
satisfy his burden of proof by demonstrating that he secured the fund from which he hopes to be 
paid "in the main", or "essentially", then the higher standard of "chiefly" or "principally" 
securing the fund is rendered meaningless. Any time an attorney's efforts were sufficient to 
demonstrate that he had substantially secured the fund from which he hoped to be paid, then the 
term "primarily" becomes mere surplusage, if one assumes that "primarily" is but a stronger 
version of "substantially". 
However, if "primarily" is interpreted to mean "at first; originally; initially", then it is 
possible to give the disjunctive statement "primarily or substantially" some meaning, since 
interpreting primarily in this fashion gives the term a meaning that is different from, or in 
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addition to, the definition that we have attached to "substantially". For example, it is possible 
that an attorney could undertake some action in a particular case that might be deemed to be 
responsible for initiating or originating the fund from which he hopes to be paid, without being 
able to satisfy his burden of showing that his efforts were "in the main" responsible for obtaining 
the fund from which he hopes to be paid. Granted, there is a great deal of overlap between these 
concepts, and a venn diagram of the definitions we have adopted for "primarily" and 
"substantially" would show that "primarily" is a sizable subset of "substantially", and vice versa. 
In summary, in order to meet his burden of proving that his efforts were "primarily or 
substantially" responsible for securing the fun4 from which he hopes to be paid, Counsel bears 
the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he originally, or initially, took 
action that secured the fund, or that his efforts essentially, or in the main were responsible for 
securing the fund, i.e. that his efforts were such that a reasonable person would conclude that he 
was responsible for securing the fund from which he hopes to be paid. 
A few examples may help illustrate the Commission's interpretation of the regulatory 
language: 
1. Claimant suffers an industrial injury, and the claim is accepted by surety. 
Attorney is retained at some point after surety has accepted responsibility for the claim. It is 
clear from the nature of claimant's injuries that she will be entitled to an impairment rating of 
some type. Immediately after being retained, counsel writes a letter to claimant's treating 
physician, requesting of the doctor that he generate an impairment rating for claimant as soon as 
claimant reaches a point of medical stability. Some months later, when claimant does reach a 
point of medical stability, and thus becomes ratable, physician remembers counsel's letter, and 
generates a letter to counsel in which he gives claimant her impainnent rating. Attorney may be 
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primarily responsible for securing the impairment rating, since it was his letter that originated, or 
initiated the rating. However, it is important to note that in order to meet his burden of proof, 
counsel would need to demonstrate that there existed some nexus between his letter to the 
physician and the physician's action. In other words, counsel would need to demonstrate that the 
physician acted because of counsel's letter. On the other hand, attorney's actions probably 
would not be sufficient to demonstrate that his actions "substantially" secured the PPI award, 
since attorney's efforts were not, in the main, or essentially, responsible for obtaining the PPI 
award. There was no dispute that claimant had suffered a significant injury, and there was no 
dispute that she was going to be entitled to some type of an impairment rating. There was no 
evidence that surety contested the rating eventually given by the treating physician. 
2. Claimant retains counsel following an industrial injury, which has been accepted 
by surety. Again, claimant's injuries are of a type which will probably entitle her to an 
impairment rating of some type at the end of the day. Claimant reaches a point of medical 
stability, and surety arranges for an independent medical evaluation (IME) for the purpose of 
assessing claimant's permanent physical impairment. The exam is set to take place in three 
months. Claimant's counsel arranges for his own independent medical evaluation, which he is 
able to secure within the month. The physician he has chosen evaluates the claimant, and 
renders an impairment rating. Surety agrees to pay the rating, reserving the right to curtail 
periodic payments depending on what is shown at the time of surety's scheduled exam. That 
evaluation takes place two months later, and results in the surety's physician coming up with the 
same rating that was given by counsel's physician. Attorney asserts that he is "primarily or 
substantially" responsible for securing the PPI award and proposes to take a fee on the same. 
Counsel cannot satisfy the "substantially" leg of the analysis since claimant was clearly entitled 
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to a rating, and since counsel's efforts did not result in any increase in the rating awarded by 
surety's IME physician. In connection with whether a reasonable person would conclude that 
counsel's efforts were responsible for securing the PPI award, the most important fact may be 
that in this hypothetical, surety had already taken reasonable steps to secure claimant's 
impairment rating independent of anything counsel did. However, could it be argued that 
counsel was "primarily" responsible for securing the rating? Counsel did schedule an earlier 
1MB and, as a result, managed to obtain PPI payments for claimant sooner than she would 
otherwise have received them. However, the benefit secured by counsel's efforts is 
disproportionate to the 25% fee he proposed to take on the entire PPI award. Perhaps counsel is 
entitled to a 25% fee on these PPI payments he managed to obtain for claimant sooner than she 
would otherwise have obtained them. 
3. Claimant retains counsel following a denial of the claim by surety. Surety takes 
the position that claimant did not suffer a compensable accident. Following his retention, 
counsel investigates the claim, interviews witnesses, and is able to identify a co-worker who will 
confirm the occurrence of an untoward mishap/event. He presents this information to surety, 
who reverses its denial, and accepts responsibility for the claim. Thereafter, TID and medical 
benefits are paid. After claimant reaches a point of medical stability, surety arranges for 
claimant to be rated, and immediately pays the impairment rating. Finally, the parties reach 
agreement concerning a lump sum settlement agreement to resolve the remaining issues. 
Counsel asserts a 25% fee against all benefits paid to, or on behalf of, claimant, following the 
surety's agreement to reverse the denial. Fees are payable to attorney either on the theory that he 
originated or initiated the payment of benefits or that he was essentially, or in the main, 
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responsible for securing the benefit. A reasonable person would conclude that it was as a result 
of attorney's efforts in persuading surety to overturn its denial that claimant received benefits. 
4. Claimant suffers a compensable injury that is accepted without question by surety. 
TID and medical benefits are being paid to claimant. However, because claimant knows 
nothing about the workers' compensation system, and is skeptical of anything surety says or 
does, she retains counsel. In due course, claimant reaches a point of medical stability and surety 
immediately requests that treating physician issue an impairment rating. The physician does so, 
and surety immediately pays the rating. Attorney attempts to assert a fee against the PPI rating, 
arguing that had he not become involved in the case, there is no guaranty that surety would have 
continued to act promptly and appropriately in connection with the handling of the claim. 
Attorney asserts that the fact of attorney representation caused surety to ''toe the line" rather than 
drag its feet. Attorney is not entitled to a fee on the PPI award. Attorney bears the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his efforts were primarily or substantially 
responsible for securing the fund from which he hopes to be paid. That burden is not met by 
engaging in speculation as to what might have happened absent attorney involvement. As in 
Mancilla, supra, to approve an award on the basis of this argument would require the 
Commission to engage in pure speCUlation. Having failed to make some affirmative showing of 
the existence of a nexus between his efforts and the creation of the fund in question, attorney has 
failed to meet his burden of proof 
5. Building on the preceding hypothetical, let it be supposed that instead of soliciting 
an opinion on claimant's impairment from her treating physician, surety'arranged for claimant to 
be rated by an independent medical examiner (!ME). This particular examiner is well known to 
the claimant's bar and might charitably be described as having a defense bias. Prior to the 
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scheduled IME counsel spends several hours preparing claimant. Since counsel has made a 
study of this particular defense physician, he knows all the ways that the physician will lay 
certain traps for claimant as a way of marshalling facts that will allow him to assert that 
claimant's SUbjective complaints are not credible. Counsel warns claimant about the importance 
of being forthright and deliberate in describing the nature and extent of her pre-existing 
symptoms. He counsels her about Waddell's signs and tells her how to avoid inconsistencies on 
exant. He counsels claimant that she should count on being observed both before and after the 
exam, either by physician, or by an investigator hired by surety. The IME is performed, and 
claimant is given an impairment rating consistent with her injuries. Absent from the final report 
is any suggestion by the treating physician that claimant was attempting to maximize her 
complaints. Is counsel entitled to assert a fee against the PPI award? This is a close case. On 
these facts, it is difficult to imagine how counsel could meet his burden of proving that his efforts 
were "primarily" responsible for securing the PPI award. The independent medical evaluation 
was scheduled by surety, and was going to take place independent of counsel's efforts. Counsel 
could not be said to have originated or initiated the PPI award. However, it would seem to be a 
much closer question as to whether or not counsel's efforts were essentially, or in the main, 
responsible for securing an appropriate PPI award for claimant. To some extent, it is speculative 
to propose that absent counsel's efforts, the rating that would have been returned by the IME 
physician would have been lower, or given with significant caveats. Certainly, to allow fees 
from the entire PPI rating is to speculate that the rating from the IME physician would have been 
zero absent claimant's preparation. However, upon a rigorous enough showing of counsel's 
familiarity with the IME physician in question, and a showing that the outcome of the IME 
would likely have been different without counsel's intervention, it could be argued that a 
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reasonable person would conclude that counsel's efforts were substantially responsible for 
securing some portion of the award. Again, this is somewhat of a close call, and would require 
of counsel a significant showing. 
Of course, these are but a few of myriad scenarios that might arise, although they are 
representative of scenarios that frequently come before the Commission. It goes (almost) 
without saying that every claim for an attorney's fee will be judged on its own peculiar facts. 
Turning to the facts of the instant matter, the Commission appreciates that Counsel has 
conceded that his efforts were neither primarily, nor substantially, responsible for securing the 
fund from which he expects to be paid. Counsel has, instead, challenged the applicable 
regulation on constitutional grounds. However, since the Commission has not concluded that the 
current regulation is contrary to the court's ruling in Curr, we deem it appropriate to consider 
whether Counsel's actions were primarily or substantially responsible for securing the fund from 
which he hopes to be paid. 
First, a few comments on the Commission's procedure in this matter are appropriate. 
Contemporaneous with Counsel's submission of the executed Lump Sum Settlement Agreement 
for review and approval, he submitted his Form 1022, which contain Counsel's recitation of the 
facts and circumstances underlying his claimed entitlement to an attorney charging lien, all as 
required by IDAPA 17.02.08.033.02. Following receipt of the proposed Lump Sum Settlement 
Agreement, and supporting documents, pursuant to IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03 staff designated by 
the Commission attempted to determine the reasonableness of the requested fee. Of particular 
concern, was one of the averments in Counsel's Form 1022. At paragraph 9 of that document, 
Counsel stated: 
"Before Counsel was retained, defendants denied, discontinued, or disputed 
claimant's right to additional medical benefits and treatment, time loss benefits, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RELATING TO COUNSEL'S 
REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY'S FEES - 33 
and impainnent compensation, and disability beyond impairments, and retraining 
and attorney's fees. Subsequent to retaining Counsel, claimant received 
additional medical treatment and time loss benefits and impainnent compensation 
and disability beyond impainnent compensation." 
The clear import of the quoted language is that prior to the retention of Counsel, Surety 
disputed Claimant's entitlement to PPI benefits, and that as a result of Counsel's actions 
following retention, additional PPI benefits were obtained. In making its informal determination, 
staff attempted to ascertain the factual basis of this averment. Counsel was unable to provide the 
requested information, and by a letter dated September 3, 2009, staff issued its informal 
determination as required by IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03.a.1 That section specifies: 
"Upon receipt of the affidavit or memorandum, the Commission will designate 
staff members to determine reasonableness of the fee. The Commission staff will 
notify counsel in writing of the staff's informal determination, which shall state 
the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable. 
Omission of any information required by Subsection 033.02 may constitute 
grounds for an informal determination that the fee requested is not reasonable." 
As Counsel has noted, the regulation specifies that in notifying Counsel of staff's 
informal determination, staff shall state the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is 
"not reasonable." However, the obligation to notify Counsel of the basis for the determination 
presupposes that staff is able to make an affirmative pronouncement, on the facts before it, that 
the requested fee is not reasonable. Here, no such determination was made because insufficient 
facts were adduced in the course of staff's investigation that would allow it to say, one way or. 
another, whether the requested fee was not reasonable. Instead, staff advised Counsel as follows: 
"In our review of the proposed settlement, the Commission has also considered 
your letters and attachments of May 5, July 24 and August 12 regarding your 
1 Interestingly, in a companion case, treating a similar demand for approval of a requested fee, Counsel offered a 
Form 1022 that contained language identical to that quoted above. At hearing on the motion to approve the 
requested fee in that case, Counsel acknowledged that the quoted paragraph is "boilerplate" and goes into all of his 
Form 1022 recitations even where, in a particular case, surety had not denied or disputed Claimant's entitled to a PPI 
rating prior to Counsel's retention. This may explain why staff was unable to obtain a satisfactory explanation for 
the averments made in the quoted paragraph. 
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representation of the Claimant and your proposed fees. The Commission staff 
has made an initial determination that the settlement is in the best interest of the 
parties, except for the portion of the requested fees related to benefits in excess of 
the $12,223.13 lump sum consideration, which have not been foUnd to be 
reasonable per IDAP A 17.02.08.033." 
In essence, staffs September 9, 2009 informal determination advises Counsel that due to 
incomplete information, staffwas unable to conclude that the requested fee was reasonable. 
That the September 3,2009 letter should be construed in this fashion is further supported 
by the Partial) Order issued by the Industrial Commission on September 4, 2009. That Order, 
rather than referencing any affirmative finding by staff that the requested fee was not reasonable, 
simply references the fact that "such fees have not been substantiated to the Commission as 
reasonable in accordance with IDAP A 17.02.08.033." 
.In addition, Counsel argues that absent a specific articulation of the facts and 
circumstances underlying staffs informal determination, Counsel was not on notice of the issues 
that were of concern to the Commission, and could not, therefore, mount a suitable defense of 
Counsel's position on the issue of attorney's fees. In essence, Counsel argues that he was denied 
due process by virtue of staff s failure to articulate the particular reasons for the issuance of the 
September 3, 2009 letter. Notwithstanding that staffs letter did not constitute a conclusion that 
Counsel's request for fees was not reasonable; Counsel's argument fails for another reason, as 
well. 
As noted, following the issuance of the September 3, 2009 letter, Counsel requested a 
hearing on the matter before the Commission, as provided at IDAP A l7.02.08.033.03.b. 
Thereafter, the Commission held a status conference with the parties on October 6, 2009, at 
which time the parties agreed to set the matter for hearing before the Commission on November 
23, 2009. Importantly, on the occasion of the October 6, 2009 telephone conference, the parties 
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discussed the specific issues to be addressed at the November 23,2009 hearing. Those issues are 
articulated in the Notice of Hearing filed October 13, 2009. Accordingly, Counsel had ample 
notice of the Commission's specific concerns, i.e. whether there was sufficient evidence showing 
that Counsel was "primarily or substantially" responsible for securing the fund from which he 
hoped to be paid. 
At hearing, most of the discussion and argument was devoted to underlying constitutional 
issues which we have previously addressed. Precious few insights were provided on the question 
of whether or not Counsel's efforts were primarily or substantially responsible for securing the 
fund from which he hoped to be paid. However, one serious failing of staff was identified and 
corrected at hearing. Concerning attorney's fees taken by Counsel prior to the execution of the 
Lump Sum Settlement Agreement, the Commission noted, in its Partial Order of September 4, 
2009, that these fees were "un-itemized" as to the specific benefits obtained other than "benefits 
paid prior to the Lump Sum ... ". In fact, Counsel's July 24,2009 affidavit, a document which 
was purportedly reviewed by staff prior to the issuance of the informal determination, does 
itemize the sources of the $3,301.72 in attorney's fees taken prior to the execution of the Lump 
Sum Settlement Agreement. In this regard, the affidavit of Counsel provides: 
"The benefits paid prior to Lump Sum Settlement Agreement (listed in my form 
1022) include PPI benefits of $7,768.75, on which attorneys fees of $1,942.19 
were paid, and PPD benefits of $5,438.13, on which attorneys fees of $1,395.53 
were paid (see demand letters to the surety dated 9/18/08 and 9/28/08, attached 
hereto as Exhibit E and F respectively.)" 
Affidavit of Andrew C. March in Support of Memorandum of Law, p. 3. 
Therefore, fees in the amount of $1,942.19 were taken from the PPI award, and fees in 
the amount of $1,359.53 were taken on PPD benefits which were paid prior to the execution of 
the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement. 
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Concerning the 25% fee assessed by Counsel on the PPD. payments made prior to the 
execution of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement, the Commission now finds that those 
benefits were, assuredly, secured both primarily and substantially as a result of the efforts of 
Counsel. Following the pronouncement of medical stability, Counsel engaged the services of 
Mary Barros-Bailey, a vocational rehabilitation consultant, for the purpose of assessing the 
extent and degree to which Claimant had suffered disability in excess of physical impairment, 
based on her permanent limitationslrestrictions and other relevant non-medical factors. Ms. 
Barros-Bailey eventually generated a report in which she concluded that Claimant had suffered 
disability in the range of 22% of the whole person, inclusive of her permanent partial 
impairment. As noted, Surety began to pay a disability rating, without protest, prior to the 
execution of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement. Because Counsel's efforts in retaining Ms. 
Barros-Bailey were initially, in the main and reasonably responsible for the generation of the 
PPD dollars from which he hoped to be paid, the Commission finds that the requested fees were 
primarily or substantially secured through the efforts of Counsel. 
With respect to the 25% fee of $1,942.19 taken on the PPI award previously paid, the 
Commission is unable to conclude that Counsel's efforts were "primarily or substantially" 
responsible for securing the PPI award. 
As noted, on or about April 26, 2007, Dr. Greenwald reviewed the April 5, 2007 MRI, 
and proposed that in order to understand whether Claimant's disc herniation was causally related 
to the subject accident, further review of pre-injury chiropractic and other records was indicated. 
On May 30,2007, Claimant retained Counsel. Among her reasons for retaining Counsel was her 
concern that she was getting the runaround from Surety. Shortly after he was retained, Counsel 
arranged for Claimant to undergo a medical evaluation by Richard Radnovich, D.O. Dr. 
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Radnovich saw Claimant on June 7, 2007, and proposed that Claimant was entitled to a 12% PPI 
rating. Also on June 6, 2007, Dr. Greenwald concluded that Claimant's low back problems 
were, indeed, related to the subject accident, following her review of pre-injury chiropractic 
records. 
Although Dr. Radnovich had pronounced Claimant medically stable, Claimant continued 
to treat, and Surety continued to pay for treatment, including, inter alia, a transforaminal epidural 
steroid injection. Surety did not accept Dr. Radnovich's impairment rating and declined to pay 
the same. However, on November 7, 2007, Beth Rogers, M.D., one of Claimant's treating 
physicians, pronounced Claimant medically stable and awarded her a 5% PPI rating. Surety 
promptly initiated payment of this rating, but did not agree to pay the average of the 5% and 11 % 
ratings per the usual convention in such cases. 
Against this background, we must ascertain whether Counsel's efforts were "primarily or 
substantially" responsible for securing the PPI award. 
As to the first prong of the test, it does not appear that there is sufficient evidence to 
support a conclusion that Counsel originated or initiated the creation of the PPI award. Although 
it might be argued that it was the action of Counsel in obtaining the Radnovich rating that 
spurred Surety to obtain a rating from Dr. Rogers, it seems just as likely that Dr. Radnovich's 
report had nothing to do with the timing of Surety's actions in obtaining a rating from Dr. 
Rogers. As noted, Claimant continued to treat subsequent to the preparation of Dr. Radnovich's 
rating, and even underwent an additional transforaminal epidural steroid injection before Dr. 
Rogers felt that Claimant was a candidate for an impairment rating. Indeed, it might well be 
argued that Dr. Rogers' rating came in lower than the rating issued by Dr. Radnovich because 
Claimant was in need of firrther medical treatment at the time Dr. Radnovich evaluated her. At 
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any rate, to propose that it was the preparation of Dr. Radnovich's rating that produced the 
Rogers' impairment rating would require the Commission to veer into the realm of speculation 
that was found offensive in Mancilla, supra. On the whole, the evidence fails to satisfy 
Counsel's burden of showing that the PPI award was secured primarily through his efforts. 
Likewise, there is no preponderance of the evidence establishing that Counsel's actions 
essentially, in the main, or reasonably, could be said to have secured the payment of the PPI 
award. There is no way to establish a nexus between Counsel's actions and the creation of the 
PPI award that does not require speculation. The Commission does not believe that a reasonable 
person would conclude that Counsel's efforts were responsible for securing that award. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Industrial Commission approves the prior fee taken in the 
amount of $1,359.53 on the PPD award, but declines to approve the $1,942.19 fee previously 
taken on the PPI award. 
V. 
COUNSEL'S DEPOSITION NOTICES, SUBPOENAS, 
AND PUBLIC INFORMATION REQUESTS 
Counsel argues that he was deprived of a meaningful hearing before the Commissioners. 
After learning of the staff's informal determination, Counsel attempted to depose Commission 
employees, and submitted a pl~thora of public records requests. Counsel also expressed surprise 
that he was not allowed to examine members of the Commission staff at the hearing before the 
Commission, because he had not received a motion to quash the deposition or notice of any kind 
that the Commission declined to allow him to depose Commission employees for the hearing on 
his entitlement to attorney's fees. 
Counsel's argument that he was unaware prior to the hearing before the Commission that 
he would not be able to question Commission staff at the hearing before the Commissioners is 
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disingenuous. On September 18,2009, Counsel submitted Notices of Deposition Duces Tecum 
of Scott McDougall and Sharon DeLanoy which ordered them to appear on October 14, 2009 for 
deposition for the following purpose: 
The complete claim file of the Idaho Industrial Commission for the claim of 
Laurel Kulm, Claimant in the above-captioned matter, including without 
limitation all documents, notes, records and other evidence of the deliberations 
regarding, and reasons for, any determination that any attorney fees requested by 
Claimant's Counsel were not reasonable or not substantiated as reasonable. 
No such depositions occurred on October 14, 2009. Further, legal counsel for the agency 
responded to Counsel's numerous public records requests and Counsel's notices of depositions 
. prior to the hearing. Specifically, on September 29, 2009, legal counsel for the agency informed 
Counsel that there was no authority for release of the information he was seeking by means of a 
deposition or subpoena duces tecum, and that the Commission considered Counsel's request 
contrary to the long-standing legal principle that documents which disclose deliberations of a 
judicial or quasi-judicial body on a decision are privileged and generally not subject to 
discovery. 
Counsel persisted, and drafted four subpoenas that ordered several Commission 
employees to appear at the attorney fee hearing and testify concerning Counsel's constitutional 
concerns. Counsel had these subpoena documents delivered to the Industrial Commission on 
November 5, 2009. Counsel signed the subpoenas himself Idaho Code § 72-709 states: 
(1) The commission or any member thereof or any hearing officer, examiner or 
referee appointed by the commission shall have the power to subpoena to 
subpoena witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, issue subpoenas duces 
tecum, and to examine such of the books and records of the parties to a 
proceeding as relates to the questions in dispute. 
(2) The district court shall have the power to enforce by proper proceedings the 
attendance and testimony of witnesses, and the production and examination of 
books, papers and records. 
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Notably, Counsel does not fall under the categories of persons enumerated in Idaho Code 
§ 72-709 who have the authority to issue subpoenas in Commission proceedings. As such, it is 
unclear why he harbors the expectation that he can draft his own subpoenas and enforce them 
against the Commission. Counsel's actions in this regard are most unusual among workers' 
compensation practitioners before the Commission. Allowing recipients of unfavorable 
outcomes the authority to issue subpoenas on their own accord on Commission staff is contrary 
to Idaho Code § 72-709, and would create many opportunities for mischief Counsel indicated 
that Commission employees would be sanctioned for noncompliance with the subpoenas, yet 
never attempted to collect the penalty from Commission staff. Further, the district court has the 
power to enforce subpoenas from the Commission. Counsel has always had opportunities for 
redress in the district court, but he has not pursued them. Counsel did not attempt to enforce the 
subpoenas from the district court of the 4th Judicial District, Ada County, Boise, Idaho prior to 
the hearing. 
Subsequently, on November 13,2009, Counsel indicated in a letter that he withdrew the 
discovery request served on the Commission. In light of this withdrawal, and that fact that the 
Commission never approved Counsel's notices of subpoenas duces tecum, or the subpoenas on 
four Commission employees to testify at the hearing before the Commission, as the 
Commission's procedures do not entitle Counsel the right to do so, the Commission considered 
the matter closed. Instead, Counsel pursued a series of public record requests. Legal counsel for 
the agency addressed Counsel's public requests. Counsel's brief makes it evident that he was 
dissatisfied with the outcome of his public records requests. However, Counsel has failed to take 
the laboring oar to appeal any of the public records determinations made by the Commission in 
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the district court of the 4th Judicial District, Ada County, Boise, Idaho within the applicable 
timeframe. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
The Commission is aware of its obligation to abide by decisions of the Idaho Supreme 
Court which address constitutional issues relating to the administration of the Workers' 
Compensation Laws. For the reasons stated above, the Commission is of the view that its 
procedures and its current regulations pass constitutional muster. Nor does the Commission 
believe that the current regulatory scheme is ambiguous. Applying commonly used definitions 
of the terms at issue yields an understandable rule to be applied in determining whether 
attorney's fees are awardable in a given case. Of course, the rule is not perfect, and its 
application over the years may, indeed, have resulted in a disinclination by members of the bar to 
practice in this area of the law. As well, the current rule may make' it impossible for certain 
injured workers who desire counsel to find someone who is willing to take their case for the 
small recompense that the particular facts of that case may offer. Finally, it is undeniable that 
the current regulation impinges upon the right of an injured worker, and his or her attorney, to 
make their own agreement as to how counsel should be compensated. All of these concerns, and 
others that have been expressed, are legitimate and have been considered over the years by both 
the Industrial Commission and the Idaho Supreme Court. However, at the time the current 
regulation and its predecessor were adopted, it was felt that overriding policy considerations 
warranted the adoption of rules limiting attorney's fees chargeable on workers' compensation 
cases. While it is arguable that some of the provisions of the current regulation would benefits 
from refinement, at present the regulation is what it is, and in fairness to all, the Commission is 
bound to apply its plain language. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
~ 
DATED this £0 day of May, 2010. 
INDUSTRIAL CO:M:MISSION 
ATTEST: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on thea~y of ~ . 2010 a true and correct copy of 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS~ RELATING TO COUNSEL'S 
REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY'S FEES was served by regular United States 
Mail upon: 
BRECKSEINIGER 
942 WMYRTLE ST 
BOISE ID 83702 
cs-mlcjh 
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IDAPA 17.C1.Cl.S03.D 
REGULATION GOVERNING ATTORNEY FEES 
IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION P~bCEEDING8 
In order that the Idaho Industrial com:m.ission (llcommission") may 
properly and fairly discharge its responsibility pursuant to Idaho 
Code Sections 72-803 and 72-404, the Commission hereby promulgates 
the fol.lowing administrative regul.ation pursuant to Idaho Code 
section 72-508. ----
The Commission substitutes this regulation for the Informal. 
Administrative Rules (IAR) 72-803.1., "Reporting of Attorney Fee and 
Associated Expenses··- in LUlI1p SUll1 Proceedings," and IAR 72-803.2 , 
liRe: Attorney- Fees in Workers I compensation Actions," dated 
January 9, 1990. 
1. Idaho Code section' 72-803 provides: 
"Claims of attorneys and physicians for medical and 
related services -- Approval. -- Claims of attorneys and 
claims for medical services and for medicine and related 
benefits shall be subject to approval by the commission. II 
2. Idaho Code Section 72-404 provides: 
"Lump SUllt pa.yments. -- Whenever the commission determines 
that it is for the best interest dfall parties, the 
liability of the employer for compensation may, on 
application to the cononission by any party interested, be 
discharged in whole or in part by the payment of one or 
more lUllip sums to be determined, with the approval of the 
commission. " 
3. "Nev Koney" defined. "New money" as used herein shall refer 
to monetary· benefits to the ciaimant that counsel is responsible 
for securing through legal services rendered in connec'tion with the 
client's workers' compensation cl.aim. 
4. Maximum attor'ney fee to be charged br a claimant's counsel. 
After the effective date of this regulation, any contingent fee 
agreement between counsel and a claimant in a workers' cOlI1pensation 
case shall provide that the amount of attorney fees will not exceed 
25% of any .new money receive~ by the claimant, whether such new 
moriey is acquired pursuant to a Lump SUlI1 Settlement Agreement, 
other Agreement, Mediation, or an Award of the CommiSsion. ' 
a. Provided, however, that. after hearing by the coll1ll1ission 
and upon its own motion, the commission may award attorney 
'!ees tip to 30% of new money awarded. 
b. In cases where a claimant is deemed totally and 
permanently disabled, 'attorney fees may be deducted from no 
more than 500 weeks of workers' compensation benefits. 
!DAPA-17.01.01.803.D Effective 12/1/92 1 • 
.. : ....... ~: .. - ..... -
AppenrlixA 
IDAl?A 17.01.01.a03.D 
5. Fea agreements between a claimant and counsel shall be in 
writing. All fee agreements shall be' in writing and shall be 
signed by the claimant and claimant's counsel. A disclosure 
statement in substantially the form prescribed in Appendix II of 
this regulation 'shall be provided to clai1llant at the time of 
signing the fee agreement. 
6. Reporting of all attorney fees and associated ~E!nses in Lump 
SUlll Settlement proceedings. Attorneys representing any party to a 
Lump Sum Settlement Agreement or other Agreement subIUi tted to the 
comm.:ission for its approval shall set forth in the Lump Sum 
Settlement Agreemen'l;:_or other Agreement, or by letter or memorandum 
accompanying such Agreement, the following: '. 
a. the date upon which counsel became involved in the case; 
b. the issues then, and subsequently/ in controversy; 
c. the total amount of benefits which clanant I s counsel 
cofltends constitute "new money" as defined above and an 
itemization of those benefits; 
d. all information included in and substantially in the 
format of Appendix I hereto. 
7. Request for Rearing regarding fee disputes between counsel and 
client. Where a dispute arises between a counsel and a client 
regarding the appropriateness of an attorney fee in a workers' 
compensation proceeding, either the counsel or the client may file 
with the Commission a Request for Hearing :regarding the fee di.spute 
and the Commission, upon receipt of such a Request; shall schedule 
a hearing on the matter. 
8. Request for Rearing regardiilg fee dispute between counsel. and 
the Commission.. 'Where the commission, upon re.viewof the file and 
a LUlllp Sum Settl.ement Agreement or other Agreelllent submitted for 
its approva~, concludes that the attorney fee s.et forth therein 
exceeds the amount allowed in (2) ahc;Ive, commission staff shall 
notify claimant' s counse~ in writing of the commission's 
calculations, and where claimant's counsel disputes the 
commiss~on's calculations, claimant's counsel. may fi~e with the 
commission a Request for Hearing for the purpose of presenting 
evidence and argument on the matter. Upon receipt of such a 
Request, the Commission shall schedule a hearing on the matter. 
IDAPA 17.01.0L803.D Effective 12/1/92 2. 
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NOTICR or PROPOSED RULt 
DOCKET NO. 17-0208-9401 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
RULES·COVERNINO APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY FIES 
IN WOlI.KERS' COMPBNSATION CASES 
ACTION. The action, under Pocket No. 17-0208-9401 conc.rna the 
adoption of rule. q.overninqthe .pprov!ll by the Indultrhl Com-
minion of attorney tau in w.ork.rli' oOllpanutton 0 .... , IDAPA 
1'7, Title 02, Chap.ter 08, !luI .. Dovamin'l Approval ot. Attorney 
Fe •• in Workera' Oompen,.tion C ....... 
AUTHORITY, In compliance. with Seot1on 67-5221(1). Idaho Cod •• 
notic. i. her.by q1van that th1 •• qencY·ha. prapo •• d rule-lIIak1n'l. 
The .. ction 1. authorb..d pul'luant to hcttl/nl 72-404. 508. 707, 
735 IJjd 803, Idlho Coda. 
PUSLIC IIl!.\l\INO· SClIIDULE, Public hearing! •. ) ooncerning thh rule-
making will be h.ld aat.ollowl' 
Purauant to S.ct10n 67-5222(2), Idaho COde. an opportunity for 
public h •• ring. "ill be hald if requ .. tad in "r.tting by tw.nty-
t.1ve (25)ptl'lon. a politioal _uhdiVidon, or an agency. .The 
r.qu .. t mult be made within fllurt .. n (14) day. of thlldata ot 
pUblication ·of thl .. noti"e in the Bullet;ln, or w1thin fourt.en 
(14) day_ prior to the end of the COllll1lent perl;>d. whichever h 
lat.r. 
The h.aring eite(e) will be acea •• lble to tho phy.i~ally di.-
ablad. Interpr.ter. for per80n. with h.ar1n'l 1mpa1~lInt. and 
b~a111.d or taped information· £&r par.ona with vi.ual impair.enta 
clt.ll be proVided upon live. daye' !:Iotioe. for a"rlt.llg.mants contact 
the und.rsign.d at (208) 334-6000. 
DESCRIPTI~ SUMMARY, Th. follo"ing i. a .tatem.nt in nont.chni".l 
lanquag. of the lIub.tlt.llce ot. the rul., 
Thi. rule goyem. the Indu.trial 00lllll1,.10n'. approval of a 
claimant '·8 attom.y·fa .. in worker.' comp.Mation matters. pro-
videa tor an attorney'e ch.rl/incz liall.. It.IId provide. a dhput. 
r .. olution ... chani ... to r •• olve dilJput .. relat.d to • claimant'. 
attorney f ••• in worker.' compen •• tion •• tter •• 
ASSISTAllCE ON 'rRClINICAL QUl!STIONS, E'or .. s1.tance on t.chnical 
que.:ti:on.· 'loncunilig thia temporary ruleb contact Iltoputy Attorney Genual I. SCcjtt lIanon, at (208) 334-60 .0. • 
Anyone lIIay aublli t wri tt.n c.o'M"inta regarding this rule. All 
written ao~ent. and data "onc.ming the rule mu.t b. dir.oted to 
the under'i'llled and mUlt b. postmarked or delivered on or before 
May 27. 1994. 
BULLETIN -- 776 
DATED this 23nd day of March 1994. 
E. Scott Harmon, Deputy Attorney OBneral 
317 Main Street, Statehouse Mail 
Bohe, Idaho 83720· 
. Phone, (20B) 334-6000 
rax, (208) 334-2321 
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CQI1lPENSATIQN CASES ( ) 
SlL. Iwthgrtty and nofinit' on. 'fvr.uant to ldaho Coda 
Section' 72-404 72.508 72.7Q7 71.'35 Ind 72.803 the CQmmi.~ 
,ion prprnulqat •• tbi. rul. to goyam the approv.l Of attorney 
!u.L. ( ) 
of mpney tQ,Wbicbo: 
" mean· g Iym QQnmtn~ati 
't.yailible gn:gall not jnc:lu~~m.!~Y I agreement t~ I a ten mly ·"'ib . b. WId prior to c:l ( chara :r not d1 lIP,!t!ld o. ~:t~l.n the attorney 
b.... "Apptay.l bv Cogpni.oipn" mOln. tb. emami"!g" h •• 
Ipprgy.d ~b. attorD'Y f.c. in cpnjupction yi.th In 'Ylm pf 
p.n.'tipn ot. lump lum settlement. or 0th'rwi •• in 'QP0rdlDo. 
with tbi. ru~, upon I proper .bowing by-tho attorn,y , •• king tp 
baye th' ('II apptoy.d, ( ) 
. ~ "Charging 11.n~ moanl I l1en, I~ain't a clAimant"~ 
right to any sompen •• tipD under the Worker. CgmDehaation laya. 
which may ba a"ltt,d by an attorney yhQ 1. ,hi. to d,mQDatrlte 
.tll.W ( ) 
1 There Ira cgmpon.,tipn benefit. available for distri~ 
button on equitable prinCiple" 
11. The "ryie., of the attorney operated primarily pr 
CiUbBtanti'Ally to •• cur, tho fund out bC \thiGh tho attorn,y ".ki 
to b, paid, . () 
1ii.lt WI •• ;road thAt COUDIll anticipated plym'Dt from 
compan'ltion lund' tltb.t than (rOM tb. client, ( 1 
~ tho claim i. limited to C9,t •. f,e •. pr 9th,r di.~ 
bUrlemonto lngurr.d in tn. 'a a' thrgugh yhich the fund wo' 
nilO!!, and ( ) 
~ Tbat. Ire oquitable gonsiderations that neca •• it.to 
tho recognitign and .pplisltipn of the cbarging lien ( ) 
~ wil. Igreament" MOIna. written dQqum'nt~vid.nglng 
an ,gte ..... nt b.tv'lD I Claimant Ind CAUDill in ¢onfo!:l!lity \t1th 
SUi. 1 5 Idahp JUle. pf ProCo,.ipnal Cpndugt IIRPQl ( ) 
, fa •• Are con ... 
• In. that iID attQrg:y :.tilfi.d 't~~ 
"·R."onibl, mt t AIld are to, r .... ob.blBnen cp ) 
.IL. £oi .qrumtm • ellmantp ( .istcnt Yit~u~:.8Ub1.ct to tb 
available IVC 1 5 tainO!! in 
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beln held Ind helring hi' of Practice ang 
" ll. "'. ''':,!:'l''i!M ""{:I'Ml:::" '.., .... ll 'r ~[~.fl BUbml]€:f,'Oiu!es X Ind XI, 30 Procedure .gnKb!. 9~ iir •• umoa rIA 
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nt diSAbility. J n which Ggrnpgnlatign 
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ton nO) YOIn from d 5% 9£ .uch dillbility ia paid Cpr totpl 
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d
. ate .urn total po· componlltipn aft 
. ;mAlllnt disability paym.n;; 
Q2.... Shtement of chargina aen, () 
r A- 611 rlqucat f 
s; 'Ning lien. 11 hI! deomed &gUIlts for apprgv
al 9 f ;S b or approval of Cees Bh 11 
l: iii... An .tj;grn, ( ) 
• pmpena.tign matter shall r'prosenting • claimant i URgn r.quolt o( in any prppg.td 1 n I Worker.' ~,rye ~b. claimant ~~ Commi •• iap, fil. Vj~p~umc·ott1.m;bt Ar 
Iylt or memorandum cont:iCfPY DE the !e. Iqro,m:nt
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3,ion. and n nat In 10 aff1-
th .L. Tho d t ( ) A matter' # ypgn which the attpIDO y bocame inyoly,d in 
otto ll... My iuUCS yhich () 0- tim!! tb, mty btgam. Inyoly,d wire undimyt.d at tb 
oamato!! ~y~'b total dplhr nlu. pf III c ( ) involvement Y Imployer immediatlly i omP°ne.tlon paid yr . pr or tQ th. attgrney I 
th ilL. pisouttd j ( ) R attgrn'y VI' biked A8ues that arQ., lub •• gnlnt t 9 ~he date ( ) 
t ~ ~Quno,"ft it utI' Iyailobl; tund..,miHBtion 9£ spmpftngation th at saDlti .. 
vi.... Cowud ' ( ) 
r.es Ind' itemization pf Colt. and qalculAtion of 
x.u... Th ( ) 
oPDahle del' i1 0 stat,ment of tbl attorn ' pnarglng li!n, hi. or her fulfillmept Oi'Y identifying yith tea-Ilch ,lemont qf the 
~ J<.... Upon ncat t ( ) y \he COmmiBlion by rtf of cQmpliance yitb 11 R'gylation pD and I dettrm1notiqn 
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
zrno JUN -81 P 4: ttl 
RECEIVED 
INOUSTRI/\L COMMISSION 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Laurel Kulm, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
Mercy Medical Center, 
Employer, 
And 
I.C. No. 06-012770 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
ORDER DENYING ATTORNEY FEES 
AND TO ISSUE A SUBSTITUTE 
OPINION and MEMORANDUM 
Industrial Claims Management, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel, SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A., and files this 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER the Commission's FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW RELATING TO COUNSEL'S REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES (hereinafter "KULM DECISION"), decided May 20,2010. The grounds for said Motion 
are set forth below, together with the attached AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW MARSH IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER DENIAL OF ATTORNEY FEES. 
Counsel acknowledges that the Commission has made its decision and respects that 
decision. However, Counsel respectfully requests that the Commission reconsider portions of its 
DECISION as follows and issue a substitute opinion for the reasons stated below: 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
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/ 
OMISSION OF CLAIMANT'S POSITION 
The focus of the Commission's decision in this case has obviously been on the 
constitutionality ofthe Commission's regulation regarding "available funds" and whether or not 
those funds were "primarily and substantially" obtained as a result of counsel's efforts. Counsel's 
legal arguments were primarily focused upon the constitutionality ofthose regulations. However, 
the basis of Claimant's Counsel's claim to attorney fees, given the fact that Claimant's Counsel 
stipulated that they were not responsible for obtaining the impairment rating and award in this 
case, remains an important part ofthe present dispute. 
As the Commission will recall, Claimant's Counsel argued that they were entitled to a 
portion of the impairment rating as a result of their contract with the Claimant by virtue of the 
fact that they had provided services to the Claimant over a number of years at her request which 
benefited her even if those services did not primarily or substantially bring about the payment of 
her permanent partial impairment benefits. Claimant's Counsel's reasons offered in support of 
that contention need not be elaborated upon further, either here or in the Commission's decision. 
However, Claimant's Counsel would appreciate it if a substitute opinion could be issued 
clarifying that Claimant's Counsel had a good faith basis for arguing that they were entitled to 
attorneys fees to compensate them for other work done in the case, and not that they were 
entitled to a portion of the impairment benefits simply because those benefits were obtained, 
whether or not by their efforts. 
In addition to the foregoing, Counsel respectfully submits that the Commission, in issuing 
its opinion in this matter, did not address another basis of Claimant's Counsel's argument in 
favor of an award of attorney fees. Claimant's Counsel argued and produced proof that Claimant 
Laurel Kulm, herself, sought fervently to have her contract with Counsel upheld, and that she 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
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testified by sworn affidavit with that request. Thus, one of the major issues in the Kulm case, 
raised by Counsel from the beginning, has been whether an injured worker has the right to hire 
and pay the attorney of her choice. 
As Claimant's Counsel reads the present Decision there is an appearance that Claimant's 
Counsel simply wants to now be paid a portion of the permanent impairment rating because he 
was "on the case" without regard to anything further. As the Commission is aware, that is not 
the case, and the inference that may be drawn from the Decision as presently written is damaging 
to the reputation of Claimant's Counsel- a reputation built up over more than thirty years, and 
one in which Claimant's Counsel has a keen interest in protecting. Claimant's Counsel requests 
nothing more than that the Commission do nothing more than issue a substitute opinion making 
it clear that these arguments were advanced by Claimant's Counsel as the basis of their claim to 
an award of attorneys fees out of the monies paid to the claimant for her permanent impairment. 
PAGE 39, FOOTNOTE 1 
The same consideration as to Counsel's and his firm's reputation arise as a result of 
Footnote No.1 contained in the decision: 
Interestingly, in a companion case, treating a similar demand for approval of a 
requested fee, Counsel offered a Form 1022 that contained language identical to 
that quoted above. At hearing on the motion to approve the requested fee in that 
case, Counsel acknowledged that the quoted paragraph is "boilerplate" and goes 
into all of his Form 1022 recitations even where, in a particular case, surety had 
not denied or disputed Claimant's entitled [sic] to a PPI rating prior to Counsel's 
retention. This may explain why staffwas unable to obtain a satisfactory 
explanation for the averments made in the quoted paragraph. (emphasis in 
original) 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
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The "quoted paragraph" to which the footnote refers is Par. 9 of FORM 1022, REPORT 
OF EXPENSES and STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL filed in the instant case on 
May 5, 2009, which reads as follows: 
Before Counsel was retained, Defendants denied, discontinued, or 
disputed Claimant's right to additional medical benefits and treatment, 
time loss benefits, and impairment compensation, and disability beyond 
impairment, and retraining, and attorney fees. Subsequent to retaining 
Counsel, Claimant received additional medical treatment and time loss 
benefits and impairment compensation and disability beyond impairment 
compensation. 
The Footnote does not cite or identify the alleged "companion case." However, Claimant's 
Counsel assumes that the Commission is referring to the case of Drotzman v. Molson Coors 
Brewing Company and Zurich American Insurance Company, I.C. No. 06-006711. A hearing 
on Counsel's request for attorney fees was held in Drotzman on Feb. 3, 2010. 
The Drotzman Transcript reads in pertinent part, page 42: 
15 MR. SEINIGER: And, secondly, with respect to the 
16 questions that you had about Mr. Marsh's affidavit or 
17 declaration, I didn't prepare that, but I can tell you 
18 that I'm responsible, essentially, for the boilerplate 
19 language about things being disputed and it sounds to me 
20 like either that was just completely incorrect or there 
21 was a misunderstanding on Mr. Marsh's part. With respect 
22 to the TID benefits that you asked about, there was, as I 
23 understand it, a dispute and -- with respect to the IME 
24 consultation -
In addition, the Drotzman Transcript reads in pertinent part, page 49-50, quoting Mr. 
Seiniger: 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
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20 . . . And that's the problem that we have and 
21 I think that -- I take responsibility for this one thing 
22 that you picked up on, Commissioner Baskin, this thing 
23 about how benefits were denied or disputed. I asked Mr. 
24 Marsh about that and he said, well, they had admitted them 
25 and that -- that's the way he understood. But ifI'm 
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2.G 
1 incorrect, it's boilerplate, there wasn't any attempt to 
2 pull the wool over anybody's eyes and I think lowe you an 
3 apology for that. But I think, nevertheless, you see --
4 you see my point. ... 
The correct facts regarding the statements made in Drotzman are contained in the record 
in that case, and are set forth in the AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER DENIAL OF ATTORNEY FEES. Counsel respectfully requests 
that the Commission reconsider the language and implications of Footnote 1, and revise said 
Footnote to accurately reflect the facts and events that are the subject matter of said Footnote, if 
such comment even need be made at all. The basis for Counsel's request is that the clear 
implication of Footnote 1 is that Counsel knowingly files Form 1022's that are inaccurate or 
misleading. Because said implication is untrue, and because it serves to attack Counsel's 
integrity and ethics, the interest of fairness and justice require that it be corrected on the record. 
It has been said that it takes ten years to build a reputation and ten seconds to destroy it. 
Claimant's Counsel has the highest ranking for reputation and ethics given by Martindale 
Hubbell. Claimant's Counsel is listed in the Workers' Compensation section of Best Lawyers in 
America. Claimant's Counsel has already been advised that, amongst workers' compensation 
practitioners, the Commission's FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
RELATING TO COUNSEL'S REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY'S FEES is the 
"talk of the town." Given the fact that the footnote is in error, and that in any case any 
discussion of it is not necessary to the determination of the limited constitutional issues raised by 
Claimant's Counsel's requests for attorneys fees, it is respectfully requested that the footnote be 
struck. It would appear that the footnote can serve no important purpose and, indeed, would not 
appear to serve any legitimate purpose as written under the circumstances and that it will likely 
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have a seriously damaging effect on the reputation of Claimant's Counsel. 
Respectfully submitted June 8, 2010. 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, JI. 
Attorneys for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on June 8, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to 
be served as follows: 
Alan Hull 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL 
250 South 5th, Ste. 700 
PO Box 7426 
Boise ID 83707-7426 
VIA Fax: (208) 344-5510 
SEINI~~_~S' PA //(;~ 
v.J:n.Breck' Seiniger, JI. 
Attorneys for Claimant 
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LAUREL, KULM 
Ie 2006-012770 
Attorney Fee Hearing 
CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENT 
IN A WORKER'S COMPENSATION CASE 
This is an agreement for representation and consultation in a worker's 
compensation claim before the Idaho Industrial Commission. This agreement is 
between SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A., 942 Myrtle Street, Boise, Idaho 
83702, (hereafter referred to as "Attorney") and Laurel Kulm, (hereafter referred 
to as "Client"). 
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT AGREE AS FOLLOWS: 
1) Attorney will represent Client in the following action: Kulm v. Mercy Medical 
Center with respect to worker's compensation claim for date of injury of 
November 2, 2006 only. 
2) For their representation of Client, Attorneys will be paid a fee which will be in 
lien upon the cause of action and will be equal to a portion of all amounts 
recovered by way of settlement, or award including attorney fees, and 
including sums recovered in satisfaction thereof from any third party. That 
portiori will be as follows: 
i) Twenty-five percent (25%) of all amounts obtained for Client after 
execution of this agreement if the case is settled before a hearing. If 
Client is receiving temporary disability benefits at the time of the 
execution of this agreement, Attorney will not take a percentage of that 
benefit until such time as the surety discontinues or threatens to 
discontinue payment of said benefit; if Client has received an 
impairment rating which has been admitted and is being paid, Attorney 
will not take a percentage of the balance of the impairment rating unless 
it is later disputed. 
ii) Thirty percent (30%) of such amounts after a hearing and the claim is 
resolved without the filing of an appeal by either party; 
iii) Forty percent (40%) of such amounts if the claim is resolved after an 
appeal has been filed by either party; 
Attorney will take a percentage of any benefits obtained by Client with 
respect to permanent partial impairment if a rating is given after the parties 
execute this agreement. In the event that there are attorney fees awarded against 
the defendant(s) by the commission Attorney shall be entitled to be paid those 
attorney fees or the percentage calculated above, whichever is greater. 
EXHIi3IT 
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3) Client will not be required to pay attorney fees to Attorney if nothing is 
recovered by way of settlement or award unless Attorney withdraws due to 
lack of cooperation by Client. In the event that Attorney is required to 
withdraw due to lack of cooperation in presenting and prosecuting Client's 
claim, he will be compensated as set forth in paragraph 7 below. 
4) Actual costs required to prepare and prosecute Clieut's claim by Attorney, 
or to achieve a settlement, are to be paid by Client; if advanced by 
Attorney, these costs will be repaid. from Client's portion of amounts 
recovereg, as defined in Section 2, above; if a settlement is not reached in your 
case, you will be responsible to make payments on these costs until they are 
paid in full. These costs include fees for investigators if hired by Attorney, 
filing fees, fees for COJlrt reporters, travel expenses, costs of service of process, 
costs for medical records and reports, costs for expert witnesses and 
physicians, long distance telephone and fax charges, postage and related 
mailing costs, and all other costs associated with the prosecution of Client's 
claim. Attorney is authorized, but not obligated, to pay all medical bills 
outstanding at the time of settlement of Client's claim out of any funds received 
by Attorney to the health care provider or their designated agent. 
5) Client agrees that he will not make settlement except with Attorney's prior 
approval, which approval shall not be reasonably withheld. Should Client do 
so in violation of this Agreement, Client agrees to pay Attorney the sum and 
share indicated in Paragraph 2(ii), above; upon settlement Attorney is 
authorized to pay any outstanding medical bills of Client directly to the 
provider. Attorney shall not settle the case without Client's prior approval. 
6) Attorney makes no representations concerning the likelihood of a successful 
resolution of Client's case, and does not guarantee to obtain sufficient funds to 
reimburse Client for the costs or expenses incurred in the prosecution of the 
case; it is expressly agreed that all statements of Attorney on these matters are 
good faith statements of opinion only; 
7) Attorney may be discharged by Client at any time. If Attorney is discharged 
Attorney will be compensated for services rendered to the date of discharge, as 
well as for all costs, expenses and disbursements, as follows: 
i) If Attorney is discharged before the case is settled or tried, Attorney 
shall be paid at the rate of$150.00 per hour or a percentage calculated 
in accordance with paragraph 2 (based upon the highest settlement offer, 
ifany, made by the defendants at the time of the discharge) whichever is 
greater; Attorney will furnish Client with an itemized statement of such 
services. 
-:2.f.t, I 
ii) If Attorney is discharged after the case is settled or tried, the 
compensation of Attorney shall be computed in accordance with the 
provisions of this agreement just as if the verdict, award, determination 
or judgment had actually been collected in full for Client. 
iii) Attorney has the right to retain possession of Client's documents and 
money until Attorney's bill is paid in full by Client, and Attorney shall 
have a lien on the cause of action. 
8) Client will pay to Attorney an initial retainer as an advance against the costs 
referred to in Paragraph 4 aboye in the amount of $1 00. 
9) Client agrees that any interest earned on any of Client's funds held in trust will 
be donated to the Idaho State Bar in connection with its Interest on Lawyer 
Trust Accounts program. 
10)Both Client and Attorney have read this agreement, have a copy of it, and 
agree to its terms and conditions. There are no other oral or written 
representations between Client and Attorney. Any modifications of this 
contract shall be made in writing. 
11 )This Agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, successors, representatives 
and assigns of Client and Attorney. 
12)Client has been advised that Client may pick up a copy of the file in this case 
within 30 days after settlement or after the, attorney client relationship is 
terminated by either party to this agreement. After that time, Attorney's file, 
and ali documents and things in it from whatever sou.rce will be destroyed. 
13)Client has been advised that Attorney may be retained on an hourly basis of 
$150 per hour by depositing a retainer with Attorney of $2,000.00 which shall 
be replenished as Attorney charges against it. In the event that Attorney is 
retained on an hourly basis, Attorney shall not be entitled to any percentage of 
any settlement or benefits recovered by Client. Client has declined to retain 
Attorney on an hourly basis. and has chosen to retain Attorney on the 
contingent basis described herein. 
I have read the fOregOing~line to retain the attorney on an hourly 
basis, this I &..f day of , 2001-. 
~(2~ 
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
1. In workers' compensation matters, attorney's fees normally do not exceed 
twenty-five percent (25%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you in a case in 
which no hearing on the merits has been completed. In a case in which a hearing 
on the merits has been completed, attorney's fees normally do not exceed thirty 
percent (30%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you. 
2. Depending upon the circumstances' of your case, you and your attorney may 
agree to a higher or lower percentage which would be subject to Commission 
approval. Further, if you and your attorney have a dispute regarding attorney fees, 
either of you may petition the Industrial Commission to resolve the dispute. 
I certify that I have read and understand this disclosure statement and 
Contingency Fee Agreement, and agree to the terms contained herein. 
DATED this I~ day of 9~ ,200L.. 
~Q.~ 
Laurel Kulm 
~daYOf~~~ __ '20fl. 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, 
SEINlGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Attorney for Client 
EXHIBIT 
I 
SEiNXGlER 
LAV,J OFF!CES 
ProjeJ'Sio11tJ! ArsociatWn 
WM. BRECK SEINYGER, JR. 
idaho, Ongoll, Wa.rhillgt()1I, alld tiN District tf Columbia 
JULIE MAR~n SEINIGER 
idaho, indiana, alld the Distrid tf Cokmbia 
June 18,2007 
Sent via Facsimile (208) 939-4411 
Richard Radnovich D.O. 
Attn: Medical Records Department 
4850 N. Rosepoint Way, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83713 
Re: Patient: 
DOl: 
Laurel Kulm 
1110212006 
ANDREW C. MARSll 
Idaho, Indiana, t1.IId Missouri 
HEATHER M. MCCARTIIY 
Idaho 
Employer: Mercy Medical Center 
DOB: 
Date range records requested/or: 1110212006 
Dear Medical Records Clerk: 
This office represents your patient, Laurel Kulm, in connection with the above-
referenced workers compensation claim. Our office is now in the process of attempting 
to locate all of Ms. Kulm's medical records and itemized billing statements for review 
and evaluation. 
Enclosed, please find an Authorization to Release Medical Infonnation signed by 
Ms. Kulm giving full authorization for release of records from your office. By this letter 
we are requesting a complete copy of all records, notes, reports, evaluations, letters, 
correspondence, bills, and any other record in your possession or control as it 
pertains to herlhis care for the above period. Please direct these records to this office 
at the above noted address. Pursuant to mAPA 02.04.322.02(a), the fmt copy of 
medical records/reports shall be provided to a workers compensation Claimant at 
no cost. If you have any questions or concerns regarding this matter, please do not 
hesitate to call. 
Thank you very much for your prompt attention to this matter. 
Cordially yours, '\ ~ 
Cat- lice )V/LX--> 
Cade Woolstenhulme 
Paralegal 
942 W. MYRTLE STREET 
BOYSE, IDAHO 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
cade@SeinigetLaw.com 
www.SeinigetLaw.com 
AUTHORIZATION TO USE OR DISCLOSE HEALTH INFORMATION 
1. 1 hereby authorize I2tz.. 1Z.AntJO\.J I c....H 
2. 
to use or disclose the following protected health information form the medical 
records of the patient listed below. I understand that information used or disclosed 
pursuant to this authorization could be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and, 
if so, may not be subject to federal or state law protecting its confidentiality. 
Patient name: Laurel Kulm Date of Birth: 
Social Security No.:  
3. ' Information to be disclosed to: Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. 
942 Myrtle Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
4. DiscjlJSe the following information for ~ dates: ~~/o" to present date. 
~mplete Records Consult h sical erapy ischarge Summary X-Ray mergency Reports . story & Physical aboratory Outpatient Reports athology 
__ Drug and Alcohol Records __ Other:,--,-( ________ _ 
5. The above information is disclosed for the following purposes: 
Medical Care Legal Insurance Personal ___ _ 
, Litigation X Other ~ __ _ 
6. I understand I may revoke this authorization at any time by requesting such of the 
above referenced hospital/physician practice in writing, unless action has already 
been taken in reliance upon it, or during a contestability period under applicable 
law. 
7. This authorization expires three (3) years from the date below. 
8. ~uNRa.~~ Ip/I/tU20 7 
Signature of Patient Date 
9. 
10. 
Signature of Legal Representative 
Relationship to patient or authority 
To act for patient 
Date 
.,... ..... ( """m rl~.";::)<1 ss 
rh 
on 
Data/Time 
Loce I 10 
Locel Name 
Company Logo 
6-1B-07; 3:13PM 
2083454700 
Selnleer Lew O~flces 
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Laurel A. Kulm 
2309 E. Olympic Avenue 
Nampa, Idaho 83686 
June 14, 2007 
ICM, Inc. 
1150 W. State Street 
Suite 330 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attention: Mr. Steven Haase, Claims Administrator 
Re: Industrial Claims No: 06-54899 
Dear Mr. Haase: 
Dr. Nancy Greenwald has been in charge of my Workmen's Compensation Case. On our last 
visit she looked at the MRI and was going to see about an epidural shot. She was not sure and 
was going to check into this. I didn't know if this kind of treatment would work. I requested 
from Dr. Greenwald and Valerie, her assistant, if I could keep continuing going to physical 
therapy, they gave me an OK on this. 
I've just completed last week the physical therapy. Jared Prince, Physical Therapist from Mercy 
North was going to forward her his report. He feels that some of my symptoms have changed 
and maybe we should go about making some changes to the treatment. 
I also previously requested from Dr. Greenwald if she would OK a temporary handicap sticker 
for my vehicle, she left me a message on my phone saying 'that I should walk from the back of 
the parking lot due to a pinched nerve. This is a change from her written prescription to Physical 
Therapy stating that it was a herniated disc. I feel that I'm not getting the communication needed 
and have lost confidence in her. I would like to recommend Dr. Richard Radnovich. I believe he 
would be able to help me with my problem. 
Please get back to me on this. I can be reached at (208) 899-7580. 
Sincerely, 
~9-~ 
Laurel A. Kulm 
Lak! 
bcc:'Breck Seiniger, Esq. 
Richard Radnovich, D.O. 
REC'D JUN 18 2007 
Laurel A. Kulm 
2309 E. Olympic Avenue 
Nampa, Idaho 83686 
June 14,2007 
ICM, Inc. 
1150 W. State Street 
Suite 330 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attention: Mr. Steven Haase, Claims Administrator 
Re: Industrial Claims No: 06-54899 
Dear Mr. Haase: 
) 
Dr. Nancy Greenwald has been in· charge of my Worlanen's Compens.anon Case. On our last 
visit she looked at the MRI and was going to see about an epidural shot. She was not sure·and . 
was going to check into this. r didn't know if this kind of treatment would work. I requested 
from Dr. Greenwald and Valerle, her assistant:, if I could keep continuing going to physical 
therapy, they gave me an OK on this. 
Pve just completed last week the physical·therapy. Jared Prince; Physical Therapist from Mercy 
North was going to forward her his report. He feels that some of my symptoms have changed 
and maybe we should go about making some changes to the treatment.· 
I also previously.requested from Dr. Greenwald if she would OK a temporary handicap sticker 
for my vehicle. she left me a message on my phone saying that r should walk from the back of 
the parking lot due to a pinched nerve. This is a change from her written prescription to Physical 
Therapy stating that it was a herniated disc. I feel that I'm not getting the communication needed 
and have lost confidence in her. I would like to recommerulDr. Richard Radnovich. I believe he 
would be able to help me with my problem. 
Please get back to me on this. I can be reached at (208) 899-7580. 
Sincerely, 
Laurel A. Kulm 
Laki 
LAW OFFICES 
WM. BRECX SEINIGER,JR.. 
ldaJxJ, ~ Washitf!lmarrith?Dist:riaifOi:tniia 
JWE MARsHSElNIGER 
Idaho, IrrIit.rm ani the District if Oi:tniia 
June 1,2007 
Richard Radnovich, D.O. 
Injury Care Medical Center 
4850 N. Rosepoint Way, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83713 
Fax: 939-4411 
Re: Laurel Kulm 
Dear Dr. Radnovich: 
ANDREWC. MARsH 
Idaho.lrriaN. aniMissatri 
HEA1HERM Mc:::c:.ARTIiY 
We represent Laurel Kulm. As you know she had a work related injury on 
November 2, 2006. I have enclosed a copy of an authorization permitting you to 
provide us with copies of her medical records. 
I am also enclosing copies of certain records that your patient provided to my 
office. She informed me that has been advised by Dr. Greenwald that she 
sustained a disk herniation - or that was her understanding. In order to assist her I 
will need to know the following as relates to her occupational injury: 
1. Your diagnosis of any conditions that you relate to her fall at work 
2. Her prognosis 
3. Any temporary restrictions and their duration 
4. Any permanent impairment rating 
5. Any pennanent restrictions 
6. Her anticipated future medical requirements and their cost 
7. Any apportionment you would make to any pre-existing condition with 
respect to any of the foregoing 
To facilitate the provision of this information I have enclosed two fonns that 
you can use to provide the above infonnation. Please feel free to copy the fonns. 
When I receive the information above I will provide it to the opposing party and 
942 W. MYRTLE STREET 
RoT~F. TnA'H() 83702 
(208) 34S-1ooo 
FI1X: (208) 345-4700 
WB5@SeinigerLaw.com 
www.SeinigerLaw.com 
attempt to secure her workers compensation benefits. I anticipate that your patient 
may not be stable, and, therefore I would request that you advise me of any 
temporary restrictions and need for treatment so that I can request the appropriate 
workers compensation benefits from the surety with your letter as support. Thank 
you. 
Cordially, 
wm Breck Seiniger, Jr. 
TEMPORARY FUNCTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
ASSESSMENT 
Name of Claimant: Laurel Kulm Date of Injury: 11102/2006-
Important: Please complete the following items based on your clinical evaluation of 
the elaimant and other treating results based upon what is more probable than not. 
Any item that you do not believe you can answer should be marked nla (not 
answerable). 
Period of limitations: 
------------------------------
NOTE: In terms of an 8 hour work day, "occasionally" equals 0% to 33%; frequently," 
34% to 66%; "continuously," 67% to 100%. 
I. In an 8-hr. work day, claimant can: (Circle full capacity for each activity) 
A.) Sit -No.- 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, (hrs.) 
B.) Stand -No.- 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, (hrs.) 
C.) Walk -No.- 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, (hrs.) 
II. Claimant can lift: 
Never Occasionally Frequently Continuously 
A.) Up to 10 Ibs. 
B.) 11-20Ibs. 
C.) 21-50Ibs. 
D.) 51-1001bs. 
III. Claimant can carry: 
Never Occasionally Frequently Continuously 
A.) Up to 10 Ibs. " .. 
B.) 11-201bs. 
C.) 21-501bs. 
D.) 51-1001bs. 
N. Claimant can use hands for repetitive action such as: 
Simple Grasping Pushing and Pulling Fine manipulating 
A.) 
B.) 
Right 
Left 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
V. Claimant can use feet for repetitive movements as in operatingfoot controls: 
Right Left Both 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Name of Claimant: LaurJ Kulm Date of Injury: 11102/2006 
VI. Claimant is able to: 
Not at all 
A) Bend 
B.) Squat 
C.) Crawl 
D.) Climb 
E.) Reach above 
shoulder level 
VII. Restriction of activities involving: 
A) Unprotected 
heights 
B.) Being around 
moving machinery 
C.) Exposure to 
marked changes in 
temperature or humidity 
D.) Driving auto-
motive equipment 
E.) Exposure to dust, 
fumes & gases 
None 
Remarks (on above, on other functional 
Occasionally Frequently Continuously 
Mild Moderate Total 
limitations):. _________________________ _ 
) 
PERMANENT FUNCTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
ASSESSMENT 
Name of Claimant: Laurel Kulm 
Date of Injury: 11/02/2006 
Important: Please complete the following items based on your clinical evaluation of 
the claimant and other treating results based upon what is more probable than not. 
Any item that you do not believe you can answer should be marked nla (not 
answerable). If these limitations are expected to increase with time please specify in 
the comments section. 
NOTE: In terms of an 8 hour work day, Itoccasionally" equals 0% to 33%; frequently," 
34% to 66%; "continuously," 67% to 100%. 
I. In an 8-hr. work day, claimant can: (Circle full capacity for each activity) 
A.) Sit -No.- 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, (hrs.) 
B.) Stand' ·No.- 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, (hrs.) 
C.) Walk -No.- 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, (hrs.) 
II. Claimant can lift: 
Never Occasionally Frequently Continuously 
A.) Up to 10 Ibs. .. 
B.) 11-20Ibs. 
C.) 21-501bs. 
D.) 51-1001bs. 
III. Claimant can carry: 
Never Occasionally Frequently Continuously 
A.) Up to 10 lbs. .. 
B.) 11-20Ibs. 
C.) 21-50Ibs. 
D.) 51-100Ibs. 
IV. Claimant can use hands for repetitive action such as: 
Simple Grasping Pushing and Pulling Fine manipulating 
A.) 
B.) 
Right 
Left 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
V. Claimant can use feet for repetitive movements as in operatingfoot controls: 
Right Left Both 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
:.21tf 
VI. Claimant is able to: 
Not at all 
A.) Bend 
B.) Squat 
C.) Crawl 
D.) Climb 
E.) Reach above 
shoulder level 
VII. Restriction of activities involving: 
A.) Unprotected 
heights 
B.) Being around 
moving machinery 
C.) Exposure to 
marked changes in 
temperature or humidity 
D.) Driving auto-
motive equipment 
E.) Exposure to dust, 
fumes & gases 
None 
Occasionally Frequently Continuously 
Mild Moderate Total 
Remarks (on above, other functional limitations, or anticipated increase in limitations 
over time specifying the time period involved): 
· , Tr miss 
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March 20, 2007 
ICM, Inc. 
INDUSTRIALCLAIMSI 
INSURANCECONSULTING 
M' A NAG E MEN T 
Attn: Luke Mayes, D.C. 
Mayes Chiropractic, Inc. 
5975 Overland Road 
Boise, ID 83709 
Re: Employee: 
"Employer:' 
Claim No.: 
Injury Date: 
Dear Dr. Mayes: 
Laurel Kulm 
, MercyMedicalCenter 
06-54899 
11-02-06 
As you know from previous correspondence, Dr. Ben Terry has referred Ms. Kulm to you for 
chiropractic care dUI3 to Jow back pain caused by her November 2,2006 work injury. 
According to the chart notes we've received, Dr. Terry initially approved six treatments and, in 
January, approved six more for a total of twelve. However, we have received chiropractic 
billings for twenty-four dates of service, ranging from November 2,2006 through February 15, 
2007. 
We can only pay for the twelve visits approved by Ms. Kulm's treating physician. As such, we 
have processed the attach~ invoices for dates of service November 2, 2006 through December 
12,2006 (totaling twelve vitits). Please note, the invoice for dates of service November 8, 2006 
through November 22, 20b6 was paid on March 19,2007. 
Thankyou .. 
Sincerely, 
Steve Haase 
Claims Administrator 
cc: Idaho, Industria] Commission 
Karen Otter - Mercy Medical Center 
Ben Terry, M.D .• Siltzer Medical Group 
Laurel Kulm 
1150 W. STATE STREET, SUITE 330· BOISE, IDAHO 83702 • TELEPHONE: 208/388-8768 • FAX: 208/388· 
Ie ,Inc. 
Februaty 27,2007 
INDUSTRIALCLAIMSI 
INSURANCECONSULTING 
MAN AGE MEN T 
Attn: Luke Mayes, D.C. 
Mayes Chiropractic, Inc. 
5975 Overland Road 
Boise, ID 83709 
Re: Employee: Laure] Kulm 
. EmpJoyer: "_ . Mercy Medical Center 
Claim No.: 06-54899 
Injury Date: 11-02-06 
Dear Dr. Mayes: 
Based on telephone conversations with Saltzer Medical Group, it is our lmderstanding that Ms. 
Kulm was authorized for six. treatments in November of2006 and in January 2007 for six 
additional treatments. However, Saltzer has never received a chart note or status repoq with 
regards to their referral for chiropractic care. No further treatment wiIJ be authorized without 
first receiving these past chart notes. 
Our office will reimburse the reasonable and customary amount for the approved twelve visits 
but no additional care will be authorized for payment without a referral from Ms. Kulm's treating 
physician, Ben Terry, M.D. In order to evaluate and pay the reasonable and customaty fee for 
the past tweJve treatments, we will need an invoice and chart notes to support each visit. 
Thank you. 
Sincerely, 
.... __ . ._." ••• ___ ._. __ 0' _____ • __ ._.. , __ • __ .......... - •• --'-'--'--'-_. -"'-'-'-
Steve Haase 
Claims Administrator 
cc: Idaho Industrial Commission 
Saltzer Medical Group 
Karen Otter - Mercy Medical Center 
Laurel Kulm 
1150 W. STATE STREET. SUITE 330· BOISE, IDAHO 83702 • TELEPHON~:.208/3a8-8768 • FAX: 208/388·8;,.,-.,. 
;J.7i 
I , Inc. 
INO'USTRIALCLAIMSI 
INSURANCECONSULTING 
MANAGEMENT 
February 16,2007 
Attn: Luke Mayes, D.C. 
Mayes Chiropractic, Inc, 
5975 Overland Road 
Boise, ID 83709 
Re: Employee: 
Employer: 
Claim No.: 
Injury Date: 
Dear Dr. Mayes: 
Laurel Kulm 
Mercy Medical Center 
06-54899 
11-02-06 
We have received invoices for medical services provided by your clinic from November 2, 2006 
througb February 6, 2007 (three months of treatment). OUf recor~s indicate that Ms. Kulm was 
first seen at Saltzer Medical Group and has been under their care since her injury, which 
occurred November 2, 2006. 
In order to process your request for payment of services rendered, we will need a detaiJed 
medical report of ber treatment and the name of the doctor who referred her to you for care. 
Thank you. 
Sincerely, 
-.. -- -.. -.- -- .... ~ ..... ---~- - - ..... ,--.... -
Steve Haase 
Claims Administrator 
cc: Idaho Industrial Commission 
Laurel Kulm 
Karen Otter - Mercy Medical Center 
Ben Terry, M.D. - Saltzer Medical Group 
Dr. &aD Te('r~ 
1150 W. STATE STREET, SUITE 330" BOISE, IDAHO 83702 .. TELEPHONE: 2081388-8768 .. FAX: 2081388-8734 771 

November 8, 2006 
LaurelKulm 
528 Tollman Place 
Nampa, ID 83651 
ICM, Inc. 
INDUSTRIALCLAIMSI 
INSURANCECONSULTING 
MAN AGE MEN T 
Re: Employer: Mercy Medical Center 
... - .. ,.. ... -- --Employee:"--""', Laurel-Kulm ----- ,-----
Injury Date: 11-02-06 
Claim No: 06-54899 
Dear Ms. Kulm: 
Our company handles the workers' compensation claims for your employer. We have received 
your claim for benefits and will require additional information prior to making a decision on the 
compensability (acceptance or denial) of your claim. 
You will be contacted by either Susan Calvin or Carol Calvin within the next few days for the 
purpose of taking a recorded statement over the phone. Please make every effort to be available 
for them. in order to expedite your claim. We currently have your telephone number listed as 
208-899-7580. 
If this is incorrect, please contact our office as soon as possible so that we may correct our 
records. You can reach me at: 1-877-388-8768. 
Thank you in advance for your cooperation. Once our investigation has been completed, we will 
advise you of the status of your claim by November 22, 2006. 
- ----- . ----_ ... - .... ----.. _-- _.-.. -.. --_.-------_. __ .. _-_._----_ .. --_._ .. _._-----
Sincerely~ 
JJf~ Steve~; n 
Claims Examiner ~ r / 
1150 W. STATE STREET, SUITE 330· BOISE, IDAHO 83702 • TELEPHONE: 208/388·8768 • FAX: 20Bl38S.a73, 2. ¥ I 
Laurel Benzaquen Kulm 
Dear Sir or Madam: 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD 
Norwich Shopping Plaza 
6142 state Route 12 • Suite 13 
Norwich, NY 13815 
WCB Case Number 
29306832 
We are in receipt of your request for a of the records in the above-captioned case. 
THIS AGENCY EMPLOYS AND SERVES 
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES WITHOUT 
DISCRIMINATION 
DATE: July 13, 2007 
Date of Accident 
1/28/92 
121· A copy of the records will be sent upon receipt of the photocopying fee. The fee is: $15.25 
' . 
o 
NOTE: eODies do not include flt1IlJl"I(;J.JTIlnU{I~:$ or deposition transcripts. Please call the Senior Verbatim Reporter at 
(516) 560-7753 for information on obtaining hearing minutes. For assistance in 
obtaining 8 copy of any transcript, speak to 8 Customer Service Representative at your 
local District OffIce. Please have letter available when you eal/. 
Send a check or money order payable to Compensation Board, with the lower portion of this letter, to: 
Workers' Compensation Board 
Norwich Shopping Plaza 
6142 State Route 12 • Suite 13 
Norwich, NY 13815 
If you would like these records sent via Federal Express, thei'lldlditi!on,al 
NOTE: Federal Express will not a street address. 
We are in receipt of your payment; however, we are unable n,.,., ........... your request The number of 
documents in the case file may have increased significantly. or rnA!r"C",,.,av been a typographical error on 
the check, or the check may be unsigned. Enclosed please find Please resubmit payment of 
this amount: . 
From: AnnMarie 
Telephone No: 
It Is unlawful to disclose individually identifiable lnfonnation from Workers' COlmJ)emlstlon'1Soarcl records to any person who 
is not otherwise lawfully entitled to obtain these records. Any person who willfully obtains workers' 
compensation records which contain individually identifiable infonnation under false or otherwise violates 
Workers' Compensation Law Section 110-a shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor and shall ubJect, upon conviction, to 
a fine of not more than one thousand dollars. 
Claimant's Name 
Laurel Benzaquen Kulm 
Photocopying Fee EnClosed: 
this section and 
WCB Case Number 
29306832 
Federal Express Fee Enclosed: 
SENDTO: __________________________________________ __ 
WEC·333 (8-06) 
of Accident 
AnnMarie Baker -
July 13,2007 
··~d ,/13/01 
)6d~!~53d@ 
2309 E. Olympic Avenue 
Nampa, Idaho 83686 
lune 13, 2007 
. 
NYS Workers' Compensation Board 
P.O. Box 5205 
Binghamton, NY 13902 
.. <if .... __ .. 
Re: Case #29306832 
Year: 1992 
.. ".. .. , .... -..... ~ 
Dear NYS W~rkers' Compensation Board! 
I am enclosing $3.00 for a copy of my report, ifmore is needed please advise me at the above 
address. 
I recently got hurt and need a copy of this report to see ifit can be related in anyway. 
Here is my pertinent information: 
I was using my maiden name at the time: Benzaquen 
My date of birth: 
My Social Security Number: 
I greatly appreciate your cooperation in this manner. 
Sincerely~ 
'~Q~ 
Laurel A. Kulm 
BncV 
---. 
Laurel A. Benzaquen 
P.O. Box 21261 
Alb~querque, NM 87154 
The Workmen's Compensation 
175 Fulton Avenue 
Hempstead, NY 11550 
RE: Laurel A. Benzaquen 
WCB Case #: 29306832 
Carrier ID#: W204002 
Carrier Case #: 35878693106 
Date of Accident: 02/28/92. 
Social Security #:  
Attention: W.C. Law Judge Eaton 
De~ Judge Eaton: 
1993 
RECEIVED 
Please be advised that since the hearing I have 
relocated to the State of New Mexico. I stated this 
, , 
to you at the time of the hearing and I was told to l " , 
give my new permanent address and phone number. (',''' "!""'U""'''''''' 
My new address is: 
P.o. Box 2 1 261 
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87154 
A residence address I can be reached at is: 
2412 Gretta Street, N.E. 
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87111 
My new phone number is: 
(50S) 299-3356 with answering machine. 
A relative phone number is: 
"JAN 5 1994 
(50S) 293-9276 - Relative: Carla Gallipoli or Mark Gallipoli. 
If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate 
to contact me. I greatly appreciate your cooperation in this 
matter. 
Sincerely, 
~Q_~ 
Laurel A. Benzaquen 
tI) 
STATE OF NEW YORK . 
Social Securitv Number 
mero d ocial 
\.YORKERS· COMPENSATION BOARD EMPLOYEE'S CLAIM 
FOR COMPENSATION 
\  IMPORTANT: IMPORTANTE: Your Social Security Number Must Be Entered EI Numero de au Seguro Social Debe Ser Indicado 
WCB Case No.(If Known) ._~_~~~_~:~_. _____ . ______________ ._ CarTier Case No. (If Known)._ji~~OO.2 .... _. ____ . ______ ._ 
ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS FULLY 
« . :IE~ 
g~ 
1. NamL_!:~~:.~_. ____ ._ .. _ .. _________ • ________ .. ~. __ . __ ..• __ Benzaquen ZI Cd 
FIrft N..... Mlddlo Name Family Nlm. M:JIt·~· 
-0 
rx: ..... 
2. Address _.192_~~E.!'?~~~~~ __ ~tr!=~ ____ ._~r~~li~_~~:!..~ .. __ . __ ... _m ___ ._~~9]:~ ::::~. 
Nllmbet and Str •• t (Include Apt No.) ellr State "Ip Codo . Oobe Sor 
ti;< 
00 
w 2 C~ 
«w 
Z...J 
Injured 
Person 
b •• lulda 
3. Sex __ .E' __ . ____ Age_~ __ Date of Birt ~. __ Married or single ___ .. ~~~~. ___ ._ .. _._._ 
4. Do you speak English? -_ . .!.':!-_______ If not, what lanJmage do you speak? •. _____ ._ •...•. _ ... __ ._. ___ . 
f N/K' -5. Name 0 union and local number) if member _____ . ___________ .. _ .•• _______ ._ ... _____ . __ ._ .• _______ .• __ 
. 6. State what ypur regular work was .• .aru;x:et.a.ti~.e-.G.o.feJ:J!.-deliv.e~-pi~k:=-Up....----.... -.-
-w ~ ... 
IJ-w 
00 
7. What were you doing when you were injured?_.E:.~~E5L_~. __ ~~!.~E...yel1.~.2!~:.· ______ .. 46-.o 
8. Wages or average earnin~ per day) including overtime, board, rent and other allowances $ ____ = ... ?".a.pp •. 
~~ 
«IX: 
«W 
0== ::J~ (.)2 
<tCl) 09 
0>-ZCI) 
f!~ 
wO 
.,.J-
we.,) 
t-e.,) 
rx:W 0== 0..0 
w~ 
:IE .... 
Employer 
Place 
and 
Time 
The 
Injury 
9. Were you paid full wages for the day of injury?.....: ________ ._ ... _____ X Yes No 
1 O. Were you at the time of'injury a piece worker? ______ ... _. __ .. ____ .•.. _... Yes X No 
Or a time worker? ___ ._. ___ .. _ ... _ .• _. ___ ._lx Yes No 
11. Your wo~ w~~i~atl~ ?~ii!~frr. wlfv~hE~k~ri)l<;;a;LS~ 1,",,",,,,1.6daYJ 17 day 1 Othet __ ______ _ ____ • __ ... _. __ . ______ • ____ .•• --_ _ ___ .,____ ._ ..... ..,.. _' __ "' __ '.-" .. ,.--.. --:-.... -.. ----. 
1. How did injU.ty occur?_.I.....was headj ng WesLon Northe.rrL.s.tat~ __ .ParkH.a'YL-.t~.aff.~c 
stopped due to merging of lanes. I ~.in...l.ef.t.....la.nsL.at:_...a...d.e.ag._~..t.Q1l. __ 
I was hit from behind by a 1980 Chevrolet. _ _ _._._. _~._. _....... .. 
1. State. fully nature of your injury/illness {In~ury to Low~r Back anctN~£~ ______ . __ · _ 
--------------'--~-------.-----.---.---------.. ---~<C 
~ ~ N~... 2
3
, HOn what dateturndidedYO
t 
u sto~.?wo~~~kecauseIfo~,thisy· ,~nju:ry?h-d~L~_--.. -~!!~ne ---=--==:--1
1
9
9
--= 
..::; ..... add.' ave you re 0 worl\,. _J,U.£______ es on w at ate ______________ ~ '_-"_ 
rx:IX: ~m~ 
o W EDeLl: • 4. :DQes injury keeJ}.you from work? .----.--------- ---- I I Yes I I X I No I 
IJ- is ... of" 5. It.:e.yeu done any work during period of disability? __ N/A __ .-
~ 0 : • • : I j. 6 HIlT........· ed an age 81' ur' .,. ... ,A) NO' ". If "Y "f hat r- n utl • aM "eu """elV y w s nee yo ffiJ . .  ,. __ : .::________________ es or w 
m l! . ,. : · .... · ~. '" .' . ------------
rx: II .. t01d.at that rate? JU~L ____ ._____ (check one) I IHourlyl I I Dallyl I I Weekly I 
Z
<t « .. : :. .... • 7. ltUMjGry resulted in amputation? .-NL.tL ___ ..lf so, describe same ____________ --w···.. . ..... . 
w'Z -----~~~~~.~~~====~~==?==========--===-======-==-====~~-==r=~=-r--~·-·~==-~ 
:::: ~ .:.. 1. Did you receive medical care? -----_______ _ X Yes No 
« == • ••• 2. Are you now receiving medical care? ____ - X Yes No 
Z 8 . .... 3. Are you now in need of medical care? ------ ----- X Yes No 
~ W Medrcar· 4. Have you requested your employer to authorize medical care? ___ .(>. Yes No 
::::) C Benefits 5. Name and address Dr. Joeph Lacerenza D • R 11 M' 11 r ~;:! of attending doctor~~~~r: Aye ••. __ F?AnK~ffi Ave~._~E~l~~~.:_. 
w § 6. If you were in a hospital, give thetates hospitalized _____ N/A ____________ • ___ •... __ • ___ . ______ .. 
~ ..., Name and address of hOSPital.J-f A __. ___ no _ _ .___ .___ 
a :3 1. Have you received workers' compensation payments for the injury 
W Workers' reported above? ---.. -- ----.. ---.---------_.---- Yes X No ;5 Q CompeJloo 2. Are you receiving workers' compensation payments? _________ .. ___ ._ Yes X No fa ~ saDon 3. Do you claim further workers' compensation payments? .________ Yes X No (.) « Payments If "Yes" explain _._ _ _____________________ . _______ . __ ... __ . __ ._ 
w(,.) 
Za: 
_&.&.I 
tI)(,.) 
Notice 
1. Have you given your employer (or supervisor) notice of injury? .... _.. X Yea No I 
If"Y" h' . (N u'.E 10' ~ .... . es suc notice was given to ame) ________ .hl.UgQ __ SJ..l.&at:
1 
r..l. ! tl..a.. _________ .. _. __ .. _. ____ "".,.. IJ.;) c-
-- Januacv 3 , -- '-f/ pL5 J 
.-
75-35 31st Avenue, East Elmhurst. New York 11370 • Tel. (718) 426-6999 • Toll Free (800) 551-5015' Fax (718) 426·8266 
MEDICAL DETERMINATIONS, P.C. 
April 29, 1994 
INSURANCE CO.: State Insurance Fund 
Hempstead, NY ADDRESS: 
INSURED: 
CLAIMANT: 
CLAIM NO.: 
WeB CLAIM NO.: 
Frame Auto Call., Inc. 
Laurie Benzaquen 
35878693106(4) 
29306832 
DATE OF ACCIDENT: 
ATTENTION OF: 
January 28, 1992 
P. Hill 
DATE OF EXAM: April 11, 1994 
I was very pleased to re-examine your claimant, Laurie Benzaquen, on 
April 11, 1994. She was previously examined on January 14, 1994 in 
re1ation to injuries she had to her neck and lower back in a work-related 
car accident which occurred on January 28', 1992. 
• ••• 
• • The patient 'continues to receive chiropractic treatment at a'freqd~cyof 
two times per week and she feels better, although she still has pAtd:in 
her low back area on the left. She is, otherwise, asympt~~~ic. •• • 
The patient is, ,cu'rrent1 y unemployed. 
.r"f • 
•••••• 
• •• 
• • 
• • 
•••••• 
• 
PHYSICAL IXNlINATIOlf: ': Height~: 4' 11" ' tall; Weiqht:' e1'"!SO ' potW~s.. 
•••••• 
u~er Extremities: •••••• , , 
•• 
• 
• • • ,. . 
•••• 
There is full range of motion of the shoulders in forw~Q 
•••••• 
• • 
• ••••• 
•••• 
• • 
• • 
• ••••• 
• • e 
••••• 
elevation, backward elevation, abduction, adduction, ·~ternal 
rotation, and internal rotation. There is full range of 
motion of the elbows in flexion, pronation, and supination. 
Range of motion of the wrists is full in dorsi flexion, palmar 
flexion, radial deviation, and ulnar deviation. A full' fist 
can be made bilaterally, and digital dexterity is normal. 
There is full range of motion of the MP, PIP, and DIP joints 
of both hands. 
Lower Extremities: 
There is tenderness of the left hip on palpation. There is 
full range of motion, of the hips in forward flexion, backward 
flexion, abduction, adduction, internal rotation, and external 
rotatlon. Range of motion of the knees is full in flexion, 
and there is no instability. Range of motion of the ankles is 
normal in dorsi flexion, plantar. flexion, inversion, and, 
eversion. Movement of the'toes is normal. There is no leg 
. ,discrepancy. ' 
Cervical Spine: 
The patient does not complain of vertebral tenderness. There 
is no paravertebral spasm. Motion of the spine is full in 
75·35 31st Avenue, East Elmhurst, New York 11370· Tel. (718) 426·6999· Toll Free (800) 551-5015· Fax (718) 426-8266 
MEDICAL DETERMINATIONS, P.C. 
Laurie Bensaquen - Page 2 
flexion, extension, lateral bending, and rotation. Foraminal 
Compression and Soto-Ha11 Tests are negative. 
'.rhoraooJ, "mhar spine: 
Gait.: 
The patient complains of minimal vertebral tenderness. There 
is minimal paravertebral spasm. Motion of the spine is full 
in flexion, extension, lateral bending, and rotation. 
Straight leg raising is positive on the left in the supine 
position. Kemp's, Goldthwait's, and Lasegue's are negative. 
The patient ambulates with a normal gait. •••• • to 
•••• 
Motor syst.em: 
....... 
to 
• ••• 
• •• 
•• • 
~. . Muscle strength measures 4/5 at the left quadr~geRs aud.. • ••••• 
hamstrings; otherwise, muscle strength is norncal: -}n tltt·eppe~:: ••• 
and lower extremities. Inspection of the musq1~.9roupa.. • ••••• 
reveals no atrophy. • ••• :. ••• : •• 
Reflexes: •••••• • • •• 
• 
• • • 
•• • 
•••• 
•••••• 
.. .. 
••••• 
Deep tendon reflexes are present and symmetric. 
pathologic reflexes present. 
There 'efl!'e no 
sensation: 
Sensory findings are normal. 
Coordinat.ion: 
Testing for coordination was essentially normal. 
D:r:AGNOSIS: 
Low back pain. 
CONCLUSIOll: 
• ••• 
This patient is doing much better since I last examined her on January 
14, 1994. I feel she has achieved maximal improvement, and further 
chiropractic treatment is not necessary for her work-related back pain. 
75-35 31st Avenue. East Elmhurst, New York 11370 • Tel. (718) 426·6999 .. ToU Free (800) 551-5015 • Fax (718)426-8266 
MEDICAL DETERMINATIONS, P.C. 
Laurie Bensaquen - Page 3 
I certify and affirm that the 
lonowledge under the penalties 
foregoing report is true to the best of my 
of perjury. 
~~ ~~)t?C 
GP:sj Greg Perea, D.C. 
co: Worker I s Compensation Board 
Dr. ~dwin Thomas Arnold 
•••• 
• • 
•••• 
.. ••• 
• • • 
••••• •• .. 
• 
•• . • 
•••••• • 
.. •••••• 
•••••• • • .. • • •••••• 
• .. • 
•••••• •••• •••• .. .. • 
.. .. 
• •• • 
.. 
•••••• 
.. 
•••••• 
.. • ••••• 
• • .. 
• • • . .. 
.. .. 
• • 
•• • • • 
•••• 
••• 
•••• 
'I."" 
75-35 31st Avenue. East Elmhurst, New York 11370 • Tel. (718) 426-6999 • Toll Free (800) 551-5015. Fax (718) 426-8266 
MEDICAL DETERMINATIONS, P.C. 
INSURANCE CO.: 
ADDRESS: 
INSURED: 
CLAIMANT: 
WeB CLAIM NO.: 
CLAIM NO.: 
DATE OF INJURY: 
ATTENTION OF: 
DATE OF EXAM: 
February 8, 1994 
state Insurance Fund 
Hempstead, NY 
Frame Auto ColI. Inc. 
Laurie Benzaquen 
29306832 
35878693106(3) 
January 28, 1992 
P. Hill 
January 14, 1994 
Laurie Benzaquen came to my office on January 14, 1994 for a chiropractic 
evaluation. She is a forty one year old female who, on January 28, 1992, 
was involved in a work-related car accident. 
PATIENT'S HISTORY: 
The patient was driving her car on that' date and was struck from"Dehind 
by another veh~cle~ ,She had injuries' to her neck and, back.' for wlirch she, 
did not seek emergency room care.' She had consulted with two di{feient 
chiropractors and a :private physiciah' "and had' ':x..:;rays "ctnd.·'lft·MRI tpken. 
,'" . ,'. . '.' , ....... ',.... .:: .. . 
She is currently beiri4 treated wlth"physical 'therapy anl1·~1nal· ••••• , ...... . 
manipulations three times per week, and she states she feel. bette~ now~···. 
However, she still reports pain in her'head, neck, back;·T4rt upp~ and· • 
left lower extremity, and difficulty walking, bending, ano·1iftin!. :--:-: 
•••••• • •••• 
•• • •• 
•• ••• PAST HISTORY: •••• 
•••• 
• Her past medical history includes hypothyroidism, for which sh~·1. on 
medication. She states she had a whiplash injury in 1985 (but no further 
details were provided). Her surgical history is unremarkable. 
EMPLOYMENT HISTORX: 
The patient was working in a clerical position when this accident 
occurred. She states she did not miss any time from work due to the 
accident but is not currently working. 
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: Height: 5'3" tall; Weight: 150 pounds 
Upper Extremities: 
There :is tenaerness 'on 'pa'lpation o-f, the left shoulder, elbow, 
,,:wrist and hand. ,The;re. ,i~ full range of motion of the 
, , shOUlders in forward ,elevation, -baokward elevatio,n; , abduction, 
adductIon, external rotat:ion, and, internal rotation,. There is 
full range of motion 'of thEa' el,bows 'in flexion" pronation, and 
supination. Range of motion 'of the wrists is full in dorsi 
",1 
75-35 31st Avenue. East Elmhurst, New York 11370 • Tel. (718) 426-6999 • Toll Free (800) 551-5015· Fax (718) 426·8266 
MEDICAL DETERMINATIONS, P.C. 
Laurie Bensaquen - paqe 2 
flexion, palmar flexion, radial deviation, and ulnar 
deviation. A full fist can be made bilaterally, and digital 
dexterity is normal. There is full range of motion of the MP, 
PIP, and DIP joints of both hands. 
Lower Extra.i ties: 
There is full range of motion of 'che hips ill forward flexion, 
backward flexion, abduction, adduction, internal rotation, and 
external rotation. Fabere Patrick is negative on the right 
and positive on the left. The left hip is tender on 
palpation. At the left knee, there is decreased flexion to 
130 degrees, associated with pain. There is tenderness on 
palpation of the left knee. There is no ,instability. Range 
of motion of the right knee is full in flexion. There is 
tenderness at the left ankle. However, both ankles have a 
full range of motion in dorsi flexion, plantar flexibn,.· 
inversion, and eversion. The feet are normal bilatera11~. 
The left leg is 1/2" shorter than the right. -••••• 
•••••• 
• 
cervical Spine: 
• 
••••• 
•••• 
•••••• • • 
• ••••• 
•• 
• ••••• 
• •• • ••• 
• • •••• The patient complains of moderate vertebral ~~rne~~ :Th~e.· 
is moderate paravertebral spasm. Motion of t.be.)ipine iff •••••• 
decreased to 40 degrees of flexion, extension~.And lat4ral : •••• : 
bending, and 70 degrees of rotation. Pain is a~ocilt4~with 
all movements. Foramina1 Compression and Soto-Hal,l are-
•••• Positive. • 
•••• 
Thoracolumbar Spine: 
Gait: 
Th~ patient complains of moderate vertebral tenderness. There 
is moderate paravertebral spasm. Motion of the spine is 
decreased to 70 degrees of flexion, and 20 degrees of 
extension, lateral bending, and rotation. All of these 
movements are associated with pain. straight leg raising is 
positive in the supine position and negative in the sitting 
position, bilaterally. Kemp's is positive; Goldthwait's and 
Valsalva Tests are negative. 
The patient ambulates with a normal gait. 
Motor system: 
There is a decrease in muscle strength to 4/5 at the entire 
left upper and lower extremity, except for the extensor 
hallucis longus and intrinsic muscles, which have normal 
( 
~I ,I' 
75-35 31st Avenue, East Elmhurst. New York 11370· Tel. (718) 426·6999. Toll Free (800) 551·5015· Fax (718) 426-8266 
IEDICAL DETERMINATIONS, p.e. 
LAURIE BENZAQUEN - Page 3 
the lumbar spine, cervical flexion/extension injury. 
DIAGNOSIS: 
1. Lumbar sprain and strain; 
2.- Cervical flexion/extension injury. 
CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP: 
If the patient's history is accurate, the diagnoses are causally 
related to the above work-related incident. 
CONCLUSIOlf: 
Based on my examination findings today, .1 feel that there is no 
need for further chiropractic treatment or therapy as maximal 
benefit in my.field of specialty has been achieved. 
ADDITIONaL IBMABIS: 
As per my April, 1993 exam recommendations, a home stretching 
program WOuld be beneficial. 
I am available to testify on Tuesdays and Thursdays. 
1 CERTIFY AND AFFIRM THAT THE FOREGOING REPORT IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF MY 
KNOWLEDGE UNDER THE PENALTIES OF PERJURY. 
~mbel' 
cc: Worker's compensation Board 
Joseph Lacerenza, D.C. 
••• 
• 
• 
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f1EDICAL DETERMINATIONS, p.e. 
LAtnRIE BENZ~QUEN - Page 2 
PHYSl:CAL BDXlHATIOH: 
Height: 4'11"; Weight: 150 pounds. 
Ce~ieal Spine: 
The patient complains of minimal vertepral tenderness. There is 
no paravertebral spasm. Motion of the spine in flexion, 
extension, and lateral bending is full. Rotation is decreased to 
65 degrees bilaterally. Foraminal Compression, Valsalva and soto 
Hall tests are negative. 
7horacolumbar spina: 
Tbe patient complains o~ minimal vertebral tenderness. There is 
moderate paravertebral spasm-. Motion of the spine in flexion is 
decreased to 70 degrees, extension to 25 degrees, an~ lateral 
J:',}endiil9' a·nd r.c:t;:a;tion.'to 30 degrees. Kemp's, GOldthwait·s, 
Lasequets and Valsalva tests are negative. 
Motor system: 
l1ef'lexes: 
sensation: 
Muscle strength is normal in the upper and lower extremities. 
Inspection of the muscle groups reveals no atrophy. 
Deep tendon reflexes are +2 bilaterally. pathologic reflexes are 
negative. 
Sensory findings are normal. 
Higher Corti;.! Functions: 
The patient is oriented x 3. .. • ••• • • • 
• • • • • .. 
• .. • • .. • 
••• ... • .. • • 
• • .. ..... • • 
• ••• • • . ... BBYlBW 0' IBDlQALS: 
A bill from Dr. Lacerenza gi~t~ ~ di~~is.9f:.sprain/strain of 
. ... 
.. .. .. 
• • & • 
•• •• 
.. .. 
. . .. 
•• • 
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• •• 
• • 
.. ." 
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• •• • .. .. 
•• • ••• 
••• • • • • 
•••• •• 
• •• •• 
• • •• 
• • • • • • .. . ... \ 
75-35 31st Avenue, East Elmhurst. New York 11370· Tel. (718) 426-6999 • Toll Free (800) 551-5015· Fax (718) 426-8266 
JlEDICAL DETERMINATIONS, P.C. 
INS~CE COMPANY: 
ADDRESS: 
INSURED: 
CLAIMANT: 
CLAIM NUMBER: 
DATE OF INJURY: 
ATTENTION OF: 
DATE OF EXAM: 
WCB NO.: 
October 1, 1993 
state Insurance FUnd 
Hempstead, New York 
Frame Auto College Inc. 
Laurie Benzaquen 
35878693106(2) 
January 28, 1992 
~9't!!!4!4:::e-Wh,eeler 
1993 
On september 20" 1993, I exa this 41-year-old, le'ft-handed female in 
my Carle Place, New York office. Please note that this is are-evaluation. 
I initially, examined-this patient on January 30,1993 and April 24, 1993. 
PATXBKT'S HISfgBY: 
The patient states that on January 28, 1992, she injured her neck and back. 
She was driving west on the Northern state Parkway when a 1989 Chevrolet 
struok her vehicle from the rear. The patient denies any lacerations and 
did not seek emergency room care. 
Since the accident, she has treated with an orthopedist and a chiropractor. 
She has been receiving chiropractic care 2-3 times per week. She has also 
been treated with medication. 
Her current symptoms are neck and back pain. She suffers from difficulty 
with walking, bending and lifting. At the present time she states she 
feels the same to somewhat better. 
BKPLOJKBNT HISTORY: 
At the time of the accident, the patient wae ~iqyeq on a full-time basis 
as a secretary. She is currently working a~.~~e~ ~~ in the same field. 
• •• ••••• 
... . ...... . 
PAST HISTORY: 
Her past medical history includes a' C-s;c'lpn.·~q;:sta~s·~he was involved 
in a prior accident in 1985 when she Wi' ~~r-~~Q ~t,~n~ther vehicle at a 
stop light. •• •• • .... 
•• • • •• 
aw. " 0 • • 
•••• •• 
• •• • • 
.. . . . .. 
... . . .... 
ATTENDING DOCTOR'S REPORT 
INJURED 
PERSON 
EMPLOYER" F r arne Au to Co I lis i on 
INSURANCE 
CARRIER Stat~ Ins Fund 
10. (a) ANY FACTORS DELAYING RECOVERY? 
IF "YES" OesCRIBE 
= (b) IS MEDICAL AND/OR VOCATIONAL 
REHABILITATION INDICATED? 
IF "YES" GIVE REFERRAL DETAILS 
11. HERE 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
'NORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD 
• 
PODIATRIST 
Pkwy Ex 38 'vi 
:~~~~'MU'Qalth St Fr SqNY 
71 Denton Ave NHP.NY 11040 
159 N Fr St Hempstead NY1155 
.. .. .... 
••• • • ••• 
126-44-5048 
" IF AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIAL SERVICES IS 
REQUIRED, see ITEMS 4 ANO 5 ON REVERSe. 
OF A 
• HAS 
;).y 3d' t..,y 3'~ 
ATTENDiNG DOCTOR'S REPORT 
INJURED 
PERSON 
~p~y~' Frame Auto Col I ision 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
iORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD 
CHECK TYPe OF DOCTOR: 
~ ______ ~I I~~P-OD-~-~-IS-T' f~~;OJ~;oRl 
126-44-5046 
1 Denton Ave NHP NY 11040 
. 159 N Fr St Hempstead NY1155 
Lumbar\Cervicai Flex 
!!AINU-
lTlOH 
* 
10. (a) ANY FACTORS DELAYING RECOVERY? 
IF "YES" DESCRIBE 
(b) IS MEDICAL AND/OR VOCATIONAL 
REHABILITATION INDICATED? 
IF "YES" Give REFEARAL DETAILS 
OF A nONDI. 
• HAS A 
ATTENDING DOCTOR'S REPORT 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
HORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD 
Ex 33 W 126-44-5046 
INJURED 
PERSON 
EMPLOVER" Frame Auto Coil ision 
INSURANCE Stat"" I ns Fund CARRIER '" 
SUPERVISING 
PHYSICIAN 
01 any) 
Lumbar\Cervical 
10. (al ANY FACTORS DELAYING RECOVERY? 
IF "YES" DESCRIBE 
MASlLJ. 
A'!ION (b) IS MEDICAL ANDIOR VOCATIONAL 
REHABIUTATION INDICATED? 
IF "YES" GIVE REFERRAL DETAILS 
* 
St Fr SqNY 
71 Denton Ave NHP NY 11040 
159 N Fr· St Hempstead NY 1155 
• ••••• ••• 
• •• ••• 
• •• ••• 
* IF AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIAL SERVICES IS 
REOUIRED, SEE ITEMS 4 AND 5 ON REVERSE. 
OF A 
, HAS 
~ ... ".. ... ,.,,, ___ .- _ ..... _ ... __ .. A .. _Jl_A ........... __ , . __ ._ •• _ 
,....I .. U.II'"Io. 
75-35 31st Avenue, East Elmhurst, New York 11370· Tel. (718) 426·6999 • Toll Free (800) 551-5015· Fax (718) 426-8266 
MEDICAL DETERMINA nONS, P .C. 
Laurie Benzaquen - Paqe 3 
Reflexes: 
sensation: 
strength bilaterally. I Inspection of the muscle groups reveals 
no atrophy. ! 
Deep tendon reflexes are active and equal. There are no 
pathologic reflexe,s present. 
Sensory findings are normal. 
, coordination: 
Testing for coordination was essentially normal. 
Higher cortical FUnctions: • ••• • • ..... 
• • The patient 'is alert and oriented' in all 'spheres tes~eQ; 
•••••• 
• • Higher cortical functions are intact. 
••••• • ••••• 
•••• • • 
•••••• • 
· 
• ••••• 
• • • •••• DXAGNOSIS: 
• .. • ••• 
••• 0 0 • 
•••••• • • • • 
• • • 1. Cervicalgia. 
•••••• • ••••• 
• • • 
•••••• ••• 
.. • 
" 
... 
2. Low back pain. 
•• .. • • 
CONCLtJS:r::01f: • ••• 
•••• 
• 
I conclude after examining this patient and reviewing her history"' that 
the above diagnoses are causally related to the work-related car accident 
of January, 1992. She is not currently disabled. I recommend 
chiropractic treatment for six more weeks, at a frequency of two times 
per week, after which she will be at maximal medical improvement. 
I certify and affirm that the foregoing report is true to the best of my 
knowledge under the penalties of perjury. 
GP:sj 
~4 ~<..S-..;..:~,pC 
Greg Perea, D.C. 
special ty Code,: DC 
co: Worker's compensation Board 
Joseph Lacerenze, D.C. 
• 
•• 
blot ,?;;crorcAX-
ATTENDING DOCTOR'S REPORT 
INJUREO 
PERSON 
EMPLOYER-
INSURANCE 
CARRIER 
SUPERVISING 
PHYSICIAN 
(If any) 
Frame Auto Col I ision 
State Ins Fund 
10. (a) ANY FACTORS DELAYING RECOVERY? 
IF "YES" DESCRIBE 
;w.s11J. 
'ATION (b) IS MEDICAL ANDIOR VOCATIONAL 
REHABIUTATION INDICATED? 
IF "YES" GIVE REFERRAL DETAILS 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD 
CHECK TYPE OF DOCTOR: 
I Ir---'--PO-O-IATR-IST--' 
St Fr SqNY 
1 Denton Ave NHP NY 11040 
159 N Fr St Hempstead NY1155 
OR DISEASE WHEN 
...... 
• •• 
• • 
•••••• 
32 
• 
• 
.... 
. .. 
. ... 
•••• 
* ~ 
~r!tt~1) Signature of 
tten Ing Do~or 
(Facsimile Not 
. ..... 
.. 
. ..... 
•••• 
• • 
010 
A CHIROPRACTOR OR PODIATRIST FILING THIS REPORT CERTIFIES THAT THE INJURY 
TION(S) WHICH MAY LAWFULLY BE TREATED AS DEFINED IN THE EDUCATION LAW 
THE I'NJURED PERSON TO CONSULT A PHYSICIAN OF HISIHER CHOICE. 
("" . ~-.. -. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD 
IMPAIRMENT, 
INJURY OR DISEASE 
PODIATRIST 
..L,umbar \Cer.v i .eaJ ·F.t ex Ext I.n 
10. (a) ANY FACTORS DELAYING RECOVERY? 
IF "YES" DESCRIBE 
,_u. 
TATION (b) IS MEDICAL ANDIOR VOCATIONAL 
REHABILITATION INDICATED? 
IF "YES" GIVE REFERRAL DETAILS 
11. 
* 
• IF AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIAL SERVICES IS . 
REQUIRED, SEE ITEMS 4 AND 5 ON REVERSE, 
Dr, Joseph Lacerenza 
Or. \'ay Lev i ne 
Or. Robert Moore 
Chiropractors 
P.O. Box 224 
Frankl In Square N.Y. 11010 
9/1/93 
ReI Laurel Senzaquen 
el: 35878693-106 
SS': 
To Whom It May Conoern: 
The abov.e named patient has been trea.ted at this office slnoe 
2/10/92 with only moderate suooess. She sti I I oomplains of lower 
baok pain with Dain into her leg. She is sti I I unable to sit for 
extended periods of time and I feel we mu~t rule out HPN. 
5tro~gly request permission for MRI .study of her lower back. 
If you have any questions please feel free to oat I. Thank you 
in advanoe for your oooperatlon, 
. Sflrel. IffJ~"1 
~J(.e~h aoerenza D.C •• DAAPM 
30t) 
INJURED 
PERSON 
EMPLOYER' 
INSURANCE 
CARRIER 
SUPERVISING 
PHYSICIAN (If any) 
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T 
R 
Frame AUlo C0\ j is i cn 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD 
PODIATRIST 
71 Den to~ Ave N~P ~y :~ 04C 
!1sl~~~~~~~~~~~~~mm~~~~~PnW~~~~~~~W!rt~~~~~1 
T 
M 
E 
N 
T 
D 
I 
S 
A 
B 
~~ 
T 
EHAIIIU· 
T"TlON 
* 
10. (a) ANY FACTORS DELAYING RECOVERY? 
IF "YES" DESCRIBE 
(b) IS MEDICAL ANDIOR VOCATIONAL 
REHABILITATION INDICATED? 
IF "YES" GIVE REFERRAL DETAILS 
.. IF AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIAL SERVICES IS 
REQUIRED, SEE ITEMS 4 AND 5 ON REVERSE. 
OF A 
, HAS 3~1 
, we8 CASE NO. CARRIER CASE NO. DATE OF INJURY ADDRESS ~~ERE INJURY OCCURRED INJURED PEFISON'S Lr-__ ~(I~f~K~n~oW~n)~ __ +-__ ~(~lf~K~~~O~w~n~'~ __ -t ____ ~A~N~D~T~1M~E,-~~ ________ ~ {(C~I~w.~T~ow~n~o~r~V~II~II~~)~ ________ i-__ ~S;O~C~,~SE~C;.~N~O~' __ _ 
E 
: 01/28/92 126-44-5041 
COMMONWEAL THT~'~~ItNO. E INJURED LA U R E L t3 E N £,0, Q U t::: N AGE t"DDRESS (Include Apt. No.119 7 t PE RSON (F I,... Neme) (MIddle Inltlel) (Last Neme) 4 1 F RAN K LIN SOU ARE NY 11010 
~ EMPLOYE". FRAME AUTO COLLISON INC 71 DENTON AVENUE 
T NEW HYDE PARK NY 
OR INSURANce STATE INSURANCE FUND , 199 CHURCH STREET 
c .... RRleR NEW YORK NY 10007 
T~~~~~ __ ~~~~~~~~~----------~~~~~~~--~ __ ----~--~~~~-----------Y ~~C~re R U SSE L L MIL L E R ~ M. [) • 7 2 F RAN K LIN A V E • 
~ (If _ny) F RAN K LIN S QUA R E NY 11010 
·,f t:r •• tIMnt w .. rend.red under the Volunt .. r Firemen' . Seneflt LaW ahow" EMPLOYER thellabla polltlcal lubdlvl,lon and anter "X" hare! . 0 
H 
I 
S 
T 
° R 
Y 
T 
R 
E 
A 
T 
M 
E 
N 
T 
,. HAVE YOU FILED A PFIEVIOUS FlEPOAT SETTING rv;;/ ~ I'F "YES" ENTER DATE 08/11/92 I IF "NO" COMPLETE 
FORTH A HISTOFlY OF THE INJURY? X~ ~ 1~:~~,&~~~:~:T+EMS3-10BELOW. I ~ITEMS BELOW. 
A. STATe HOW INJURY OCCURAED AND GIVE SOURCE OF THIS IHFOfllMATION. (IF CLAIM IS FOR OCCUP'ATIONAL DISEASE. INCLUDe 
OCCUPATIDNAL HISTOFlY AND DATE OF ONSET OF RELATED SYMPTOMS.) 
B. WAS PATIENT PREVIOUSLY UNDER IYESI r::::1 !I IF "YES" ENTER HIS/HER NAME AND rc' WERE X-RAYS 
THE CARE DF ANOTHER DOCTOR ~ ADDRESS. AND REASON FOR TRANSFER TAKEN? 
FOR THIS INJURY? J IN ITEM 10. 
2. IF THERE IS ANY HISTORY OR EVIDENce OF PRE·EXISTING INJURY. DISEASE OR PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT. DESCRIBE SPECIFICALLY: 
8-3-93: 
DESCRIBE NATURE AND EXTENT OF KNOWN OR F The patient apparently bend over a week prior to being seen anc:! had 
3. CHANGE OF CONDITION SINCE LAST REPORT. 1ncreased pein in the~. She has taken ant; - inflamnatory end 
analgesfc medfc::,tfon. GOll'lg to a chiropractor at this time with some 
CERVICAL SPINE STRAHl benefit. POSlttve straight leg raise, restriction of II'IOtion, 
M '( U S I 1'1 S methodic ~.ft. A,ain request authorization for Mil scan of the 
J lureal" ap,,,. end follow up. 
4 . OATE(S) OF EXAMINATION : PATE OF YOUR FIRST 'ARe YOU CONTINUING IIF "VES" WHEN WILL 
~Ns~J~THISREPOAT 08/03/93 JTREATMENT 08/11/92:TREATMENT7 YES I~~~~S~TBESEEN 6 WEEKS 
5. DESCRISE TREATMENT RENOERED AND PLANNED FUTURE TREATMENT. IF PATIENT WAS HOSPITALIZED. SO STATE AND Give 
NAME AND LOCATION OF HOSPITAL AND OATES OF HOSPITALIZATION. 
see medical-hospital report 
° 6. MAY THE INJURY RESULT IN PERMANENT If "VES" DESCRIBE 
I RESTRICTION. TOTAL OR PARTIAL LOSS OF §J B S FUNCTION OF A PART OR MEM8ER. OR PERMA- YES NO 
A NENT FACIAL. HEAD OR NECK DISFIGUREMENT? '9 e e med i c a I-ho S D i ta 1 reDo r t 
8 7. IS PATIENT !II: "YES" ON WHAT DATEIS) 010 PATIENT IS PATIENT I IF "YES" CHECK ONE 
I ""'CRKING? j..!.:...--- ---------- --------- - - -- 01 A. E? I rl l L r.:::1 I RESUME LIMITED WORK OF PoNY KINO RESUME AEGULAR WORK S BL D I t< };1'5eRTIAL DISABILITY 
+ X ~ a IDATE: UN K NOWN DATE~ xl!!] INO I II I frOTAL DISABIL.ITY 1 
Y I 
IINA.ILl· 
rAr,o .. 
8. WAS THE OCCURRENCE oeSCRIBED ABOVE (OR IN YOUR PREVIOUS REPORT WHICH GAVE THIS INFOR· 
MATION) THE COMPETENT PRODUCING CAUSE OF THE INJURY ANO PISABIl.ITY (IF ANY) SUSTAINED7 
9. (a) ANY FACTORS OELA.YING RECOVEFlY? 
IF "YES" DeSCRIBE §J~ 
(b) IS MeDICAL AND/OR VOCATIONAL . ~ ~ 
ReHABILITAl:ION-tN01~01--' . YES 
1F'-!!)f-eS-GIVE REFERRALDETAlt.S- .-.-._'" .... - _ 
--- . --- ------10.ENTER HERE ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION. WORK LIMITATIONS.~~ . 
REQUEST AUTHORIZATION FOR MRI LUMBAR SPINE ~ 
*-
I f your testimony ,hould be nacesnry in this case. ple_ 
Indicate the dav.of the w .. k end time of daV (AM or PM) -r-iU CC' IV./\' 
,lD..CKt con"enie"t to you for this purpOl.: I l (::;;:::> T,\ r \ I• IF AUTHORIZATION FO!, p'~CIAL SERViCeS IS AEQ~I.R'.P.-SEE ITEMS ,...ND 5 ON REVERSE. 
DateCS n .... "OrPTtntad'fllarne of-Attendlng-Doetor- - ACSC1,... 
~ lt C:::C:F I I MT t II! n 
106400-5 I 516 354-2080 
WCS Rating Code 
CD s 
WCB Authorlutlon No, Telephone No. Written Slgn'tura of / l ~ At;;idino Doctor ( 
(Facslrnlla Not Ac:c:apteCl) '/\ 
A CHIROPRACTOR OR PODIATRIST FILING THIS REPORT CERTIFIES THAT THE INJURY DESCRI UO,CONSISTS SOl.ELY OF A CONOI· 
TIONIS) WHICH MAY LAWFUl.LY BE TREATED AS OEFINED IN THE EDUCATION I.AW AND. WHeR6 THIS DOES NOT OBTAIN, HAS 
ADViSeD THE INJURED PI;rISON TO CONSULT A PHYSICIAN OF HIS/HER CHOICE. \ 
STATE 0' NEW YORK .. 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD .( 
..J 
CHECK TVPE OF DOCTOR: 
, WCB CASE NO. CARRIER CASE NO. DATE OF INJURY ADDRESS '!!t:lER! INJURY OCCURReD INJURED PERSON'S Lr-___ (~I~f~K~no~w~n~'~ __ ~--~(~lf~K~n~o~w~n~I----~--~A=N~D~T~I~M~E~ __ -+ _________ ~«(C~lw~.T~o~w~n~o~r~V~I~II~~~L ________ -p ____ S~O~C~.~S~E~C~.~N~O~. ____ ~ 
E 
t 01/28/92 126-44-5046 E~'-N-J-U-A-eD--PL~A~U~R~E~L------~8~E~"~N~Z~A~Q~U~E;-;N~~~=-~A~G~E~~~ID~D~R~as~~(J-ne~lu-d~a~A-p-t.~N~O'~)1~9~7~C~O~M~M~O~N~~~JE~A~L~T~f~1T~~~'~~~~~~~N~0~.~ 
~ PERSON (First Neme) (Mlddla/nlt/.I) (f,.ntName) ~1 FRANKLIN SQUARE NY 11010 
~ EMPLOYER- FRAME AUTO COLLISON INC 71 DENTON AVENUE 
T NEW HYDE PARK NY 111,340 
o INSU RANCE S TAT E INS U R 1\ NeE FUN 0 , 1 9 9 C H LJ R C H S T R E E T ~ CARFUER NEW YORK NY 10007 
Y ~~~re RUSSELL MILLER. M.D. 72 FRANKLIN AVE. 
~r-~(~If~.~ny~I~~ ___________________________________ ~F~R~A~N~K~L~I~N~S~Q~U~A~R~E~ __ ~N~Y~1~1~0~1~0 __ ~ __ ~., ____ ~ 
-If treatmant Wilt reridared under the VOIUl'\tHf Fireman'. Baneflt L.aw .how a. EMPLOYER thell.ble pOlltical.ubdlvlllon end anter "X" here: 0 
H 
1. HAVE YOU FIL.ED A PREVIOUS REPORT SETTING rii ~ ,IF "YES" ENTER DATE 1,38/11/92 I IF "NO" COMPLETE 
FORTH A HISTORY OF THe INJURY? X NO OF SUCH REPORT: % I AL'ITEMS SELOW. 
'AND COMPLETE ITEMS .. -10 BELOW. ~ 
A. STATE HOW INJURY OCCURReD AND GIVE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. (IF CLAIM IS FOR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE. INCLUOe 
OCCUPATIONAL HISTORY AND DATE OF ONSET OF RELATED SYMPT0P.-1S.) 
I , 
S 
T 
R THE CARE OF ANOTHER DOCTOR NO I ADDRESS, AND REASON FOR TRANSFER TAKEN? <;<) n. o e. WAS PATIENT PREVIOUSLY UNDER §] §J I IF "YES" ENTER HIS/HER NAME AND IC' WERE X-RAYS §] k.ol 
V POR THIS INJURY? . I IN ITEM 10. 
2. IF TH£ioR& IS ~NV HISTORY OR EVIDENCE OF PRE·EXISTING INJURY, DISEASE OR PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT, DESCRISE SpeCIFICALLY: 
• • 
••• :.. •• 8-3-93: 
••• .. • The pat i ent apparent Ly bend ov k - be - ~ ¥_ "J'!:DESCRIIlE NATURI!·~O-eXTENT OF KNOWN OR F . . . er a wee p,tlor to. 1n9 seen and had NY ••••• CHANGE'"OF CONDijI"4/;tlSNCE LAST REPORT. lnereas~ pal." 1~ the ~ck. She ~as taken antl-fnfl8lllll8tory and • •••• • anal9!S'C mechc!'Itlon. GOIng to a chIropractor at this time with some I .e E'R.vi.c·A L ~~·lIU S TR A IN· benefl~. ~os1tfve strafght leg raise, restriction of motion, ••• MYf'lC;Tr.!S :. : mel.~~lc ,!iIalt. Again request authorization for MIll scan of the _ .... ~.~.*.. ...... ....' ...... r spIne and foLLow up. . •• •• •••• • ••••• 
T 4. DATE(SI OF EXAMII'4~.!.1JQN l DATE OF YOUR FIRST 'ARE YOVCONTltWlNG ,IF "YES" WHEN WILL 
: ~NS~~"'"1.ISREPORT 08/03/93 ITREATMENT 08/11/92:TREATMENT? YES ,:~~~~TBEseEN 6 WEEKS 
A 5. DESCRIBE TREATMENT RENDERED AND PLANNED FUTURE TREATMENT. IF PATIENT WAS HOSPITALIZED, SO STATE AND GIVE 
T NAME AND LOCATION OF HOSPITAL AND DATEs OF HOSPITALIZATION. 
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I· 
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-
IlI£I.AT_ 
"INAIILI-
tATIO. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
see medical-hospital t'eport 
MAY THE INJURY RESULT IN PERMANENT IF "yes" DESCRIBE 
RESTRICTION, TOTAL OR PAFlTIAL LOSS OF §J ~ 
FUNCTION OF A PART OR MEMSER, OR PEFIMA. YES NO 
NENT FACIAL. HEAD OR NECK DISFIGUREMENT? see med lca l-h 0 SP i ta J. r e po r t 
IS PATIENT ! IF "VES" ON WHAT DATE(S) 010 PATIENT IS PATIENT 'IF "VES" CHECK ONE 
WORKING? ,...--------------------------- DISABLED? I, r:;;AATIALDISASILITY] r:::1 I RESUME LIMiTeD 'MJRK OF ANY KINO RESUME REGULAR WORK ~ ~~ _ x~ ~ IDATE: UNKNOWN DATE: xl!!] (.Nol :1 ttOTALDI$ASILlTY 1 
i I 
WAS THE OCCURRENCE DESCRISED ABOVE (OR IN YOUR PREVIOUS REPORT WHICH GAVE THIS INFOA-
MATION) THE COMPETENT PRODUCING CAuse OF THE INJUFlY AND DISABILITY (IF ANY) SUSTAINED? 
9. (.) ANY FACTOAS DELAYING FlECOVERY? 
IF "YES" OESCRIBE 
(b) IS MEDICAL. ANDIOR VOCATIONAL 
REHABILITATION INDICATED? 
IF "YES" GIVE REFERRAL DETAILS 
10.ENTER HERE ADDITIONAL PERTINeNT INFORMATION, WORK LIMITATIONS. IF ANY. ETC. 
REQUEST AUTHORIZATION FOR MR! LUMBAR SPINE 
* 
/fyourtastlmony,hol.lld be nae_ry in this c .... pia... 1- IF AUTHORIZATION FOO~:ECiAL SERViCES IS 
Indicate the day, of the week and time of day (AM or PM) -r-lU r"c"' ,.'1/\ REOUIRED, SEE ITEMS 4 NO 5 ON REVERSE. ~m~os~t_e~o~nv~e~n~i.~n~t~to~yO~U~fo~r~t~h~ls~p~u~rp~~~: _____________ ~I l~t#~~~~ __ r~\r~ \~ __ ------~----------------~~----------------_1 
D.ted Typ.d or Printed Neme of Attendl"g Doctor Address / 
01 ~ / I .... ~ I Q ~ r;, I I ~ ~ r= I I I¥t T I t= I:> M n c:: t> 1\ k V T 11.1 ('.N't I I'! t>L ,,< ,,~ " 
W~8 Rating COde weB Authorization No. Telephone No. Writtan Signature of 
~ngOoetor 
C. 0 S 106400 - 5 516 354 - 2080 (Fee.lmlle Not Accapted) 
A CHI ROPRACTOR OR PODIATRIST FILl NG THIS REPORT CERTIFIES THAT THE INJURY OESCRI!Ur'O CONSISTS SO!.EL Y OF A CONDI· 
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75·35 31st Avenue, East Elmhurst, New York 11370 • Tel. (718) 426-6999 • Toll Free (800) 551-5015 • Fax: (718) 426-8266 
MEDICAL DETERMINATIONS, P.C. 
INSURANCE CO.: 
ADDRESS: 
INSURED: 
CLAIMANT: 
CLAIM NUMBER: 
DATE OF INJURY: 
DATE OF EXAM: 
ATTENTION OF: 
TYPE OF EXAM: 
Dear Sirs: 
April 29, 1993 
state Insurance Fund 
Hempstead, NY 11550 
Frame Auto Coll., Inc. 
Laurie Benzaquen 
35878693106(1) 
January 28, 1992 
April 24, 1993 
P. Hill 
CHIRO 
The above captioned claimant was examined in my office located in Carle 
Place, New York on April 24, 1993. A chiropractic evaluation was requested 
as a result of her problems associated with a work related incident that 
took place on January 28, 1992. Please note that this is a re-evaluation, I 
previously examined this claimant on January 30, 1993. 
PATXENT'S HISTORY: 
Laurie Benzaquen whose·stated date of birth is , states that she 
was driving a car on Northern state Parkway when her vehicle was rear ended. 
She was wearing her seat belt at that time and sustained injury to her neck 
and back. There were no lacerations or loss of consciousness and she did 
not go to an emergency for evaluation of her.injuries following the 
incident. 
On February 10, 1992 she consulted with Dr. Laceranza, a chiropractor whom 
she last saw on April 23, 1993. She also treated with Dr. Miller, an 
orthopedist whom she last saw on April 20, 1993. She received conservative 
treatment in the form of medication, spinal manipulations including heat, 
modalities and ultrasound therapy and had diagnostic testing done. 
A report form Dr. ~ceranza ~ated karbh 10, 1993 gave a diagnosis of 
sprain/strain of the lumbar/~~i~t p~exion, extension. 
. . ....... ~~. . 
At the present time· she ·is receiving spinal manipulations 2 to 3 times per 
week and hotes no change iIll her • .symptoms.. She complains of nervousness, 
pain in her neck, back, r!qht· ~.and &bdakional numbness in the right arm. 
She also has difficulty b4gain~ a~ i~tt~~9. 
•• • ••• 
••• • • •• 
•••• •• 
• •• •• 
• • • • • • 
•• • ••• 309 
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MEDICAL DETERMINATIONS, P.C.· 
laurie Benllaquen Page 2. 
At the time of the incident she was employed in a secretarial position on a 
full time basis and did not miss work as a result. She is currently working 
at a new job at Lilco on a full time basis. 
PAST HISTORY: 
She denies any other serious illnesses and doesn't take any medication. Her 
surgical history includes a c-section in 1978 and a ONe in the 1980's. The 
patient states that she was involved in a similar condition in 1985 when her 
vehicle was struck from the rear and she sustained a whiplash type injury. 
PHYSICAL EXUINA'l'ION: Height' 4'11' tall; Weight 146 pounds. 
OERVICAL SPINE: 
The patient does not complain of vertebral tenderness. There is 
moderate paravertebral spasm. Motion of the spine in flexion, 
extension and lateral bending is full. Rotation was decreased to 70 
degrees. Foraminal .COmpression, Valsalva and Soto Hall were 
negative. 
THORACOLtJJmp SPINE: 
The patient complained of minimal vertebral tenderness. There is 
moderate paravertebral spasm. Motion of the spine in extension, 
rotation, and lateral bending is full. Flexion was decreased to 70 
degrees. straight leg raising is full bilat~rally. Goldthwait's 
and Valsalva are negative. 
1I0TOR SYSTQ: 
Muscle strength is normal.in the upper and lower extremities. 
Inspection of the muscle groups reveals no atrophy. 
REFLEXES: 
Knee and ankle reflexes were active and equal. Pathologic reflexes 
are negative. • • 
••• • • • 
• •• •• e. 
• •• ••• SENSATION: :.::. :.:: •• 
• ••••••••• 
Sensory findings are normal. 
• • ••• 
•• •• 
• •• 
•• • • • •• 
• •• • 
••• • ••• 
•• • ••• 
••• • • • • 
•••• •• 
• •• •• 
• • • • • • 
•• • ••• 
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MEDICAL DETERMINAnONS, P.C. 
laurie Benzaquen Page 3. 
COORDINATION: 
Testing, for coordination is normal. 
XIIPREISION: 
Cervical sprain\strain. 
Myositis •. 
Lumbar sprain\strain. 
CONCLUSION: 
There is no evidence of disability based upon these subjective 
complaints and my physical findings. 
Assuming the history is accurate, the above diagnoses are as a 
consequence of the work related injury Ms. Benzaquen was involved in 
on January 28, 1992. Although this patient has made progress since 
the last examination on January 30, 1993, today's examination 
reveals a significant amount of myofascial irritation in the 
lumbogluteal region as well as the right shoulder girdle. It is my 
opinion, that addres~ing these regions along with the home 
stretching program should yield extensive benefits. The patient is 
at maximal medical improvement from chiropractic treatment. 
I .certify and affirm that the foregoing is true to the best of my 
knowledge under the penalties of perjury. 
cc: Workman's Compensation Board 
cc: Dr. Laceranza 
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~ 11'15 FlSON (Fil'1lt'Neme) '(Middle InItIal) (Lnt Ne"",_) 41 f RAN K LIN S QUA R E 
126-44-5046 
C U i'lli'll U NWt. A L HTESSJI$OtiElNO. 
NY 11010 
• EMPLOVER- fRAMe: AU fO COLL1SON LNC 71 DENTON AVENUE 
r NEW HYDE PARK NY 11040 Jrl-N-SU--Fl-A-N-C-Et7.S~r~A~'~r~E~l;'N~S~U~R~A~N~C~'E~·~f~U~N~O~----------~~.~1~9~9~~C~H~U~R~C~H~S~T~R~E~E~T~~~~~~~----------~ 
I CAAFUER NEW YORK NY 10007 
~ SUPe.AVISING R U SSt: L L M 1 L l t: R, M.D. I 2 F RAN K LIN A V E • 
, PHYSICIAN FRANKLIN SQUARE NY 11010 ! (It anvl 
-I f treatm.nt was rendered under the Volun.tHr F Irarnen', Benefit Law thow .. EMPLOYER m. nabla polltleallubdlvislon and .ntar "X" htfG: 0 
H 
I 
S 
T 
1. HAVE VOU FILED A PFIEVIOUS REPORT SETTING r.:;;;:1 §] ,IF "YES" ENTER DATE 'fH:::'/ J. J. I ~ I! ! IF "NO" COMPt.ETE 
FORTH A HISTORV OF THE INJURY? XI..l!:5e.I NQ OF SUCH REPORT: I AI I ITEMS eet.ow 
lAND COMPLETE ITEMS 3-10 BELOW. I ..:;;:..'01& • 
A. STATE HOW INJURY OCCURRED AND Give SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. (IF CLAIM IS FOR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE, INCLUDE 
OCCUPATIONAL HISTORY AND DATE OF ONSET OF RELATED SVMPTOMS.) 
R THe CARE OF ANOTHER DOCTOR NO I AOOREss. AND REASON FOR TRANSFeR TAKEN? 
o S. WASPATtENTPREVIOUSLVUNDER §] §J I IF "ves" ENTER HIS/HER NAME AND JC. WEReX·RAYS 
v FOR THIS INJUFlY? I IN ITEM 10. 
2. IF THERE IS ANY HISTORV OR eVIDENCE OF PRE·EXISTING INJURY, DISEASE OR PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT, DESCRIBe SPECIFICALLY: 
• • 
t
D 3. DESCFUSe NATURE AND EXTENT OF KNOWN OR REPORTEO INJURY OR DISEASE WHEN eXAMINED, AND IF Aftf>UC.lII6'LE, ANY 
CHA~GE of CONDITION SINC: LAST REPORT. The pt.' states that she .has beeDo.~t:aying ,?ff h~ • 
Cf.RVICAL SPINE sTRAIN l'ieels. She has been exeroising a!'l'd·"t.he~.j!a fa.!.!.'" ... 
MYOS1TIS straight leg'raising. sa~isfaotory dors·i·"'j!l!uci~ c:!. th~:·": 
feet. Request authorizat10n for MRI scad o~.the ... : • 
T 4. DATE(S) OF eXAMINATION ! DATE OF YOUR FIRST 'ARE YOU CONTINUING! IF "YES" w.!1i.N WILt... ." 
A ONWHICHTHISAEPORT 03/09/93 ITREATMENT08/11/92 ITREATMENT? YES :PATtE"f"~SUN 6WKS •• 
E IS BASED I .AGAINl •• ••• .. •• 
A 5. OESCFlIBE TREATMENT RENDefitED AND PLANNEO FUTUFlE TREATMENT. IF PAY lENT WAS HOSPITALIZEC,..eo STATCOAHO GIVE 
T NAMe AND LOCATION OF HOSPITAL AND OATES OF HOSPITALIZATION. • • 
M ..... 
E lumbar spine arid followup. •• •• 
~ .see medical-hospital report 
D 6. MAY THE INJURY RESUI.T IN PERMANENT . IF "YES" DeSCRIBe 
I RESTRICTION, TOTAl,. OFI PARTIAL LOSS OF §] f3 
S I=UNCTION OF A PART OR MeMBER, OR PERMA· Yes NO d • A NENTFACIAL,HEADOR NECK DISFIGUREMENT? ee me lcal-hospl.tal report 
B 7. IS PATIENT ! IF "YES" ON WHAT DATE{S) DID PATieNT IS PATIENT I IF "VES" CHECK ONE 
, WORKING? t.:.-------------- -------------- DISASLED? I,E"", I \ r:::I ~ I RESUME LIMITED \/\ORK OF ANY KIND RESUME REGULAR WORK 1~£AFlTIAL DISASI LITY 
T a x ~ : DATE: DATE: ~~ I (.NO I II frOTAL DISA81LITY I 
Vi. i 
8. WAS THE OCCURRENCE DESCRIBED ABOVE (OR IN YOUR PREVIOUS REPORT WHICH GAVE THIS IN FOR· ~ ~ ~ MATION) THE COMPETENT PRODUCING CAUSE OF THE INJURY AND DISABIl.ITV (IF ANY) SUSTAINeD? ~ 
9. (.) 
HAIILI· (b) 
ATIO_ 
ANY FACTORS DELAYING RECOVERY? 
IF "VES" DESCRISE 
IS MEDICAL. ANO/OR VOCATIONAL 
FlEHABIL.ITATIDN INDICATeD? 
IF "YES" GIVE REFERRAL DETAILS 
10.ENTER HERE ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION, WORK LIMITATIONS, IF ANY, eTc. 
~ ~~U-~'S'T fV~ rn r<-r 1-u.mbar ~ 
* 
ffyourtllSti"",onyshoufd ba necessarv In this case, ple.e .........- I_ IF AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECt'ALSERVICES IS 
Indicate the dllYllof tha_k and time of day (AM or PM) rl Il ....... c:::::. 1\ .tV\ REQUIRED, SEE ITEMS 4 ANP'S ON REVERSE. ~m~os~t~c~o~n~ve~n~i.~n~t~to~VO~u~f~o~r=m~ls~pu~rpo~"=: _________________ ~I~~~~~_~1lT'~J~ • 1--------~-----------------------~~~~'----------------1 
DataCb3/09/93 1R!M)'8'~1."ladM'!'1!e~t~ndit7I1.t.tP~or Addrass FRANKLIN SQUA.RE/ NY 11010 
WCB Flatlna:~e Written Signature of 
Att;ding Ooctor 
(F_lmU. Not Accepted) 
A CHIROPRACTOR OR PODIATRIST FlUNG THIS REPORT CERTIFIES THAT THE INJURY DESCRIBED CONSISTS SOLEl.V OF A CDNDI, 
TION(S) WHICH MAY LAWFULLY Be TREATeD AS DEFINED IN THE EDUCATION LAW AND. WHERE THIS DOES NOT OST'''' '''A 
AOVISED THE INJUREO PERSON TO CONSULT A PHVSICIAN OF HIS/HER CHOICE. 
3(~ 
-' .. ATTeNOjN~DOCTOR'S REPORT ' 
. 
* 
10. (a) ANY FACTORS DELAYING RECOVERY? 
IF "YES" DeSCRIBE 
(b) IS MEDICAL ANDIOR VOCATlONAL 
REHABIUTAnON INDICATED? 
IF "YES" GIVE REFERRAL DETAILS 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
i-:) WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD 
.NHP ,NY. t 0 .... 0 ... 
•• • 
•• • 
.. ... 
• IF AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIAL SERVICES IS 
REQUIRED. SEE ITEMS 4 AND 5 ON REVERSE. 
11010 
OF A 
, HAS 
),11... 
" .. 
.,r, -
ATJENDIMG DOCTOR'S REPORT 
\./ 
STATE OF NEWVORK 
COMPENSATION BOARD 
CHE K YPE OF OOCTOR C T 
(C~ilC) I)(JINITIAL.II IPROGRESSII IFINAL.I I EHYSICIAN! ( IpOD;ATRIST) \;§;HIROPRACT03 
Wce CASE~O. CARFUER CASE NO. DATE OF INJURY ADDRESS t':.ERE INJURY.~rCURReD INJURED PERSON'S Uf Knawn (If KnowrU AND TIME (CI Town or Villa SOC. sec. NO. 
~15S7SSga' .. i OS 01/28/92 " ~ lorthfi!rn St Pkwv Ex 33 W 
INJURED ~aure"1 Benzaquen AG9 !EfD"eSM'tVarflllMl; jNt'tl\ St" 'Fr SqNY ~ ~L.&f'9" NO. 
,PERSON (First Neme' (Middle Initial) {L.ut Name) 
EMI"LOVE,Roi ~rame Auto ,Co II j's ion 1 1 Denton Ave NHP NY 1'1040 
INsuRA~ee: ~tate, ,. ns Fund " '1 59 N Fr St Hempstead NY1155 CARRle"R' 
SUPeRVISING 
PHYSICIAN (If an-y) 
• If treatment was'rendered under the Volunt.eer Firefighters' Benefit Law show as EMPLOYER the liable political subdivision and enter "X" here: 0 
1. HAVE YOU FILED A PREVIOUS REPORT SETTING ~ IF "YES" ENTER DATE i IF "NO" COMPUTE FOf:lTff A HISTORY OF THE INJURY? NO 10F SUCH REPORT: §] lAND COMPLETE ITEMS 3·10 BEL.OW. I AY:,ITEMS BELOW. 
A; STATE HOW'INJURY OCCURRED AND GIVE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. (IF CL.AIM IS FOR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE, INCL.UDE 
OCCUPATIONAL. HISTORY AND DATE OF ONSET OF RELATED SYMPTOMS.) 
H 
.-- ,C<>(nP I ete I y stopped' i ~ I ef t ~~ ,mer g i ng t raf fie ~ AA,\..A.A. ~ yY\jL.> I 
S ,l.~(»t't'c..V\ D~ hi...., ..lA,(\~, ,~f\t~h'\~Q ~ 20 T 
0 a .. ,WAS PATIENT PFlEVI~.sL.Y UN"ER §1 §] I 1~J6IYES" ENTER HIS/HER NAMA~ND IC' WERE X·RAYS §l 8 R THE CARE OF ANOTHER DOCTOR YES NO I A RESS. AND'REASON FOR TRA PER TAKEN? Y FOR THIS INJURY? I IN ITEM 1~ 
2. IF THERE IS ANY HISTORY OR EVIPENCIi OF PRe-eXISTING INJURY, DiseASE 01'1 PHYSICAL. IMPAIRMENT, DeSCRIBE SPECIFICAL.LY: 
I 3. DESCRIBE NATURE AND EXTENT OF KNOWN OR REPOATED INJURY Oft DISEASE WHEN EXAMINED, AND IF APPL.ICABL.E. ANY CHANGE OF CONDITION s'tNce L~T REPORT. ' 
, ... " Spra.in, St.ra 1 n Lumb.a"r \ Ce r'v i ea I F,lex Ext In~vr1 {.~ 
..... .1 in-=> 
T 4. DA.iE(S) OF EXAMINATION'~'-L~ ':.I_.{.. I DATE OF YOUR FIRST >?FE YOU CONTINUING: IF "YES'! WHEN WILL v ~ '--
R ~,\~~'fr THI~.:~EPO,~T I"TREA.T.~~~ ~ to ~qZ,; o ,!!tV"!,!,,,? \.M: IPATlE~eo SEEN I\-QAJI, 
E .. " ,c' AGAIN ' .. ''1l''''-rv 
A s. DESCRI8E TREATMENT RENDERED, AND Pl.ANNED FUTURE TREATMENT. IF PATieNT ~ HOSPITAL.IZED. so STATE AND GIve 
T NAME AND L.OCATION. OF HOSPITAL. AND OATES of HOSPITALIZATION. 
M SPINAL 'MANIPULATION E ' .. 
N ' , 
T 
0, 6. MAV THE,INJUR,Y'RESULT IN PERMANENT ~ IF "VES" DESCRIBE I RESTRICTION, TOTAL OR PARTIAL LOSS OF §l S t=-UNCTION OF A PART OR MEMBER. OR PERMA· ••••• Ii NeNT FACIAL. HEAD OR NECK OISFIGUAEME~T? • . 8 7. IS PATIENT l.!.F "YES" ON WHAT DATE(S) DID PATIENT IS PATIENT I IF~iYt"_l:HeC~..QNE I WORKING? ....,.------------- --------------. 
rjifrl l ~AATrAL. DISA81LITYj L ~ ~ 1,~UMa UMITEO WIORK OF />NY KIND, RESUME REGl!L.AR,WORK ' I T ' NO 1000e: DATE: 'NO : I -iOTI-L DISABtL.IT .... • I V i -..-. . 
'II WAS THE OCCURRENCE DESCRIBED ABOVE (OR IN YOUR PREVIOUS REPORT WHICH GAVE THIS INFOR- ~1:.EJ - -. 
--
MATION) THE COMPETEN"( PRODUCING CAUSE OF THE INJUFtY AND DISABILITY (IF ANY) SUSTAINED? e' : NO •••• A~ 
ANY FACTORS DEL.AYING RECOVERY? §] r§]" . 9. (a) • • 
IAIILI. 
IF "YES" OESCFIIBE 
• •••••• -. Ino. (b) IS MEDICAL AND/OR VOCATIONAL ~ ~ • • • • REHABIL.ITATIDN INDICATED? •••• •••••• IF "YES" GIVE REFEf:lRAL. DETAILS :. 
-
•••••• 
• 
t 
10.ENTEFI HERE ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION, WORK LIMITATIONS, IF ANY. ETC. • •• - • 
*" 
'f your testlmonv .hou!d. be; n~rv In this " ... pl_ 'j. IF AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIAL SERVICES IS indlcat41 the days of the wMk and time of dav (AM or PM) RECiul REO., SEE ITEMS 4 AND 6 ON REVERSE., 
most convenient to you for this purpose: 
Oned":> :~.'1 L., Typed or ~rlntec\ Name of Attending Doctor Aadr ... 
""~ Or Joseph, Laeerenza P.,O.BOX 224 F r a:n. kin, Sq tN. Y • 11010 
I WCB Retlng Code WC8 Authorization NO'~ Telephone No. , Wrlttan Signature of 
DC, 
" 
C020 14.',: 1:t 16 ) 775 - 5151 At;'din. Oo~tor Th. // ~ 
, fF_lmlle Not Accapted) • 
A CHIROPRACTOR OR PODIATRI$T'FILINGTHIS REPORTCERTIFIESTHAT':rHE INJURY DESC.~~r~~LY OF AC' 
TION(::;) .wHICH,MAY LAWFULLY BE TREATED AS DEFINED IN THE,EOUCATION L.AW AND. WHER HIS 0 OT OBTAIN 
ADVISED THE INJURED PERSON TO CONSUL. T A PHYSJCIAN OF HIS/HER CHOICe. ' 
• ____ ".E" ___ ...... _ .. ~_ .... ~_ ......... * ......... CII~. __ .......... ~/7 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD .. An:ENDl~a-"DOCTOR'S REPORT. . ...... 
~ CHeCK TYPe OF DOCTOR: 
(C~~) : I INITIAL I N PROGRESS I I I RNAL I I I PHYSICIAN I '-1 -..-----, P~~~~~~~~~r=~~~-.--~~~~~~~==;=~~~~~ 
~~--~~~---+~~~~~~--~--~~~~r--+--------~~~~~~---------4----~~~~--~ 
~ E~~~~~~~~~~~~~ii~rli~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
r 
~~-------+------------------------------~---+----------------------------------+-------------1 E Auto .. CQ.I. I ision. NHP .NY. 1104.0 
,~--~---+--------~-------------------------+----------------------------------+-----------~ L. 
I. Ins Fun<t. N.Fr S~.Hempstead.NY1.t55. 
•• • 
•• • 
• •• 
• IF AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIAL SERVICES IS' 
REQUIRED. SEE ITEMS 4 AND 5 ON REVERSE. 
or 
• I' 
••••• 
••••• 
••••• 
.. . 
• 
Sl'ATE OF NEW VORK 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD 
ATTENDING-DOCTOR'S DI::I''''C'T 
~ ... 
10. (a) ANY FACTORS DELAYING RECOVeRY? 
IF "YES" DESCRIBE 
~ (b) IS MEDICAL AND/OR VOCATIONAL 
REHABILITATION INDICATED? 
11. 
* 
IF "YES" GIVE REFERRAL DErAILS 
PODIATRIST FILING THIS 
LAWFULLY se TREATED AS 
TO CONSULT A PHYSICIAN OF HIS/HER 
• •• ... . 
•••• 
•• • 
.... 
• •• 
* IF AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIAL SERVices IS 
REQUIRED. see ITEMS 4 AND 5 ON REVERSE. 
.. 
• •••• 
• •••• 
. .. 
• 
01.0: 
OF / 
, HAS 
311 
. STATE OF NEW YORK C F' 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD .. , . "'. ,rtE 
CHECK TYPE OF DOCTOR: 
ATTENDING DOCTOR'S 
P ~~:l~~~~~~~~~~1~12F~I~~~;IL:~~~ __ .-____ ~==~I~~PH§.Y~S~~I~~LI£I-;~'2-ro~~D-IA~~~I~S~T~LI~~~~~~ INJURED PERSON'S ~~ __ ~~~~ __ 4-____ ~~~ ____ ~ ____ ~~~~ __ ~ __________ ~~~~~~ ________ ~ ____ ~SOC~.S~E~C~.N~O~; ____ ~ 
A 
S 
~~~;t]ffi~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~ 
y~------~------------------------------~--~----------------------------------+-----------~ ~ .Auto CQI.I ls.ion.. Oe.nton Av.e NHP NY 110'40 
t~------~-----I.n-.$--F-... -u.-n-d--.-.---------------+--------S-.t--H-e-m-p-s-t-e-a-d--.N-.-Y-1-1-5-5--~----------~ 
I ~ ______ ~ __________________________________ ~ __________ ~ __________________ ~~+-__________ ~ 
T 
E 
M 
s~~~~~--------------------------------~--------------------------------~----------~ 
_u. 
TAllON 
* 
10. (a) ANY FACTORS DELAYING RECOVERY? 
IF "YES" DESCRISE 
(b) IS MEDICAL ANDIOR VOCATIONAL 
REHABILflA110N INDICATED? 
IF "YES" GIVE REFERRAL DETAILS 
Extln 
• ••• 
• • • 
•• • 
ANY 
• • • 
•••• 
•• • 
• . • 
• •• 
.. IF AUTHORIZA11ON FOR SPECIAL SERVICES IS 
REQUIRED, SEE ITEMS 4 AND 5 ON REVERSE. 
.. 
• 
• 
.. 
•••••• 
. ...... 
. .. • 
• • 
10 
A CHIROPRACTOR OR 
nONeS) WHICH MAY 
THE fNJURED PERSON TO 
FILING THIS REPORT CER11F1ES THAT THE INJURY 
BE TREATED AS DEFINED IN THE EDUCATION LAW 
A PHYSICIAN OF HIS/HER CHOICE. 
A !TENDING DOCTOR'S 0.:.3/''':I'r' 
STATE OF NQ.,XQAK 
WORKERS' COMPENSiti"tC>N BOARD 
p~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~rur __ -r~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~D~~ffi~!~~~~~~~~~~ 
~~--~~~--~--~~~L----4~--~~~.-~~~~--~~~~~~~~-,--~--~~~~~--~ 
A 
s ~~~~~~~~~~~~~Mr~~~~~~fri.~~~~~~~~~~: 
~~-------r--------------------~~~----~--~--~----~----------~------------+-----------~ 
E 
t~--~--~----------------------------------~--------~------------------------+-----------~ 
L Ins :Fund "'. ",. F.t\$t.~.Hemp5t:ead."NY'1155< 
+~======~---------------------------------+---------------------------------+----------~ 
E 
M sr-~--~~------------------------------------~----------------------------------~------------~ 
10. (8) ANY FACTORS DELAYING AECOVERY? 
IF "YES" OESCRIBE 
_IL~ 
TATION (b) IS MEDICAL AND/OR VOCATIONAL 
REHABILITATION INDICATED? 
IF "YES" GIVE REFERRAL DETAILS 
11. 
* 
Dj£]'·· 
YES, NO. 
;. ;" 
* IF AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIAL SERVICES IS 
REQUIRED, SEE ITEMS 4 ANO 5 ON REVERSE. 
STATE OF NEW YORK A. 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD 'YC ~ 
CHECK TYPE OF OOCTOO: ILl / 
EMPLOYER' Frame Auto Col I i~ion 71 Denton Ave NHP NY 1t040 
~~--------r-------------------------------------~-------------------------------------+------------~ 
I. IN5~~~E State'l ns Fund 159 N Fr St HeJT1pstead NY1155 
I ~--------r-------------------------------------~-------------------------------------+------------~ T SUPERVISING 
E PHYSICIAN 
M (If any) 
S~~--~--L-------------------------------------~------------------------------------~------------~ 
, If treatment was rendered under the VFBL Of VAWBL shOW as EMPLOYER the liable political subdivision and enter "X" here; 0 
1. HAVE YOU FILED A PRevIOUS REPORT SETllNG rv1 0 I IF "YES" eNTeR DATE \.q ~ '"W l.f Z I IF "NO" COMPLETe 
FORTH A HISTORY OF THE INJURY? ~ I OF SUCH RepORT: "" ITeMS BELOW. 
YES NO I AND COMPLETe ITEMS 3-11 BELOW. I ..... 
A. STATe HOW INJURY OCCURRED AND GIVE SOURce OF THIS INFORMATION. (IF CLAIM IS FOR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE, INCLUDE OCCUPATIONAL HISTORY AND 
DATE OF ONSET OF RELATED SYMPTOMS.) 
H 
I 
S 
T 
Completely stopped in left lane,Merging traf.f io' 
o S. WAS PA"ENT PREVIOUS1.Y UNDER 
R THE CARE OF ANOTHER DOCTOR 
Y FOR THIS INJURY? O [:J I IF "YES" eNTER HISIHER NAME AND IC' WERE X·AAYS . . I ADDRESS, AND REASON FOR TRANSFER TAKEN? -:-;; liN ITEM 11. [J .. ~ 
rES NO I 'liES NO 
.. 2. IF THERE IS ANY HISTORY OR EVIDENCE OF PRE·EXIS11NG INJURY, DISEASE OR PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT, DESCRISE SPECIFICALLY: .... 
... 
... 
..... "" 
..,. .. \ 
. 
D 3. DESCRIBE NATURE AND EXTENT OF KNOWN OR REPORTED iNJURY OR DISEASE WHEN EXAMINED. AND If APPLICABLE. ANY CHANG,i.pF GONDITION SINCE. 
I LAST REPORT. .... ... ,,~ .. 
A • •• .. M" 
G •• • 
N • .. : g Sprain Strain Lumbar\Cervioal Flex Ext In ••••• 
I • 
.. 
. 
.. 
S ..... .... ,.. 
T 4. DATelS} OF EXAMINATION '-l-! ""'" I DATE OF YOUR FIRST I ARE YOU CONTINUIN6 "~_·YES" ~~_~LL 
: g~wr~~THISREPORT. ~ :TREA~'f10/92 : TREATMENT? ye;e"'f~~I~~t~!b~2 
A 5. DESCRIBE TREATMENT RENDERED AND PLANNED FUTURE TREATMENT. IF PATIENT WAS HOSPITAUZED. so STATE AND GIVE NAME AND t«ATION OF 
T HOSPITAL AND DATES OF HOSPITALIZATION. 
M 
e 
N 
T 
* 
SPINAL MANIPULATION 
9. WAS TltE OCCURRENCE DESCRIBED ABOVE (OR IN YOUR PREVIOUS REPORT WHICH GAVE THIS INFORMATION) THE COMPETENT n n 
PRODUCING CAUSE OF THE INJURY AND DISABILITY (IF ANY) SUSTAINED? L.ni' y 
10. (a) ANY FACTORS DELAYING RECOVERY? 
IF "YES" DESCRIBE 
(b) IS MEDICAL ANDIOR VOCATIONAL 
REHABILITATION INDICATED? 
IF "YES" GIVE ReFERRAL OETAlI..S 
Dc:] 
YES NO 
D~ 
YES NO 
11. ENTER HERE ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMA"ON, WORK LIMITATIONS. IF ANY. ETC. 
If your testimony should be necessary in this case, please 
Indicate the days of the week and time of day (AM or PM) 
most convenient to you for thisJ)!,lr()O$&: 
I * IF AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIAL SERVICES IS J REQUIRED, SEE ITEMS 4 AND 5 ON REVERSE. 
Dated Typed or Printed Name of Attending Doctor Address 
01122/92 Dr Joseph Lacerenza P.O.BOX 224 Frankln SqtN.Y. 
weB Rating Code WCB Authorization No. 1 Telephone No, . ~icre of r-n.. -" ~ 
DC C02014-1 1(516)115-5151 ~Not%cepted) ;PI// "l/ 
A CHIROPRACTOR OR PODIATRIST FILING TliIS REPORT CERTIFIES THAT THE INJURY ~~C~D f~O To SOLELY OF 
nONeS) WHICH MAY LAWFUI-LY BE TREATED AS DEFINED IN THE EDUCATION LAW AND.··,....WHERE oes NOT. " 
THE INJUREO PERSON TO CONSULT A PHYSICIAN OF H!SIHER CHOICE. 
11010 
ArreNDING DOCTOR'S REPORT. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD 
., ..... 
CHECK TYPE OF DOCTOR: ~ 
p~(~c~g~~~~~)~:~'~~~;1~~~~~~~~~~EO~lliRY---r-----~~~~'~'~P~H~YS~~~~~N~)~I~~I~p~O~D§IAffi~'~~~~~~~~~~C~H-'~RO~~~~C~ro~~R~~ 
~~--~~~~--4-----~~~-----+----~~~-T---+----------~~~~~~---------1----~~~~~--~ 
A 
s 
E~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~wr~~~~~~~~~~-1 
T ~~5~ St Fr SqNY 2S~ 1190 ~~ ________ ~ ________________________________ -L __ -+ ____________________________________ -+ __________~~ 
E EMPLOYER' Auto Co II is ion 1 Denton Ave - NHP NY 11040 A~ ________ ~ ____________________________________ -+ ____________________________________ -+ ____________ ~ 
L 
L INSURANCE CARRIER State Ins Fund 59 N Fr St Hempstead NY1155 I ~ ________ ~ ____________________________________ -+ ____________________________________ -+ ____________ ~ 
T 
E 
M 
S~~--~--L-------------------------------------~------------------------------------~------------~ 
10. (a) ANY FACTORS DELAYING ReCOVERY? 
IF "YES" DESCRIBE 
AEliA81'~ 
TAllON (b) IS MEDICAL AND/OR VOCATIONAL 
REHABIUTA TION INDICATED? 
IF "YES" GIVE REFERAAL DETAILS 
'1. 
* 
D~ 
YES NO 
_ ETC. 
.. " : '" ' , I-
,,';, .. , 
* IF AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIAL SERVICES IS 
REOUIRED, seE ITEMS 4 AND 5 ON REVERSE. 
OF t 
. HAS 
'HONE CALLS 
Culm v. Merc~ Medical Center 7/23/2009 
)ate To 
.Er.2m 
4/13/2009 Laurel Kulm ACM 
4/13/2009 ACM Kate Beaudreau 
4/07/2009 Kate Beaudreau ACM 
4/07/2009 ACM Laurel Kulm 
4/02/2009 ACM Laurel Kulm 
4/0212009 COW Laurel Kulm 
3/30/2009 COW Laurel Kulm 
3/19/2009 COW Laurel Kulm 
3/19/2009 ACM Kate Beaudreau 
2/24/2009 KKO Laurel Kulm 
1/07/2009 Laurel Kulm ACM 
1/07/2009 COW Laurel Kulm 
1/06/2009 Laurel Kulm COW 
1/0212009 Mary Barros COW 
12118/2008 Laurel Kulm ACM 
12118/2008 Laurel Kulm COW 
12118/2008 Kate Beaudreau ACM 
12/15/2008 Laurel Kulm COW 
1211512008 COW Laurel Kulm 
12/10/2008 SNP Laurel Kulm 
12/09/2008 SNP Laurel Kulm 
12/09/2008 COW Laurel Kulm 
11/12/2008 Laurel Kulm COW 
11/1212008 COW Laurel Kulm 
10/27/2008 Laurel Kulm COW 
10/15/2008 COW Laurel Kulm 
10/15/2008 ACM Mary Barros 
10/15/2008 Mary Barros ACM 
10102/2008 ACM Kate Beaudreau 
9/2612008 ACM Kate Beaudreau 
9/25/2008 ACM Laurel Kulm 
9/25/2008 COW Laurel Kulm 
9/11/2008 COW Laurel Kulm 
9/05/2008 COW Kate Beaudreau 
8/20/2008 COW Laurel Kulm 
7/21/2008 COW Laurel Kulm 
7/02/2008 ACM Laurel Kulm 
6/27/2008 Laurel Kulm ACM 
6/26/2008 COW Richard Radnovich 
6/18/2008 Richard Radnovich COW 
5/29/2008 COW Richard Radnovich 
5/2212008 COW Laurel Kulm 
5/15/2008 ACM Laurel Kulm 
5/14/2008 COW Richard Radnovich 
5/12/2008 ACM Laurel Kulm 
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5/09/2008 ACM Laurel Kulm 
5/09/2008 Laurel Kulm ACM 
5/09/2008 Steve Haase ACM 
211812008 COW Laurel Kulm 
2115/2008 Steve Haase ACM 
2114/2008 ACM Laurel Kulm 
2114/2008 LAB 
2108/2008 ACM Laurel Kulm 
2/04/2008 SNP Spine Institute of Idaho 
1/31/2008 WBS Laurel Kulm 
1/15/2008 COW Laurel Kulm 
1/04/2008 COW Laurel Kulm 
1/04/2008 Steve Haase COW 
1/04/2008 COW Laurel Kulm 
1/02/2008 COW Beth Rogers 
12127/2007 Steve Haase COW 
12127/2007 Steve Haase WBS 
12/07/2007 COW Laurel Kulm 
12104/2007 WBS Steve Haase 
11107/2007 COW Laurel Kulm 
10/1212007 ACM Richard Radnovich 
9/26/2007 COW Laurel Kulm 
9/24/2007 COW Laurel Kulm 
9/17/2007 Laurel Kulm WBS 
8/31/2007 Laurel Kulm COW 
8/31/2007 Robin Sexton COW 
8/31/2007 Robin Sexton WBS 
8/31/2007 WBS Laurel Kulm 
8/27/2007 COW Laurel Kulm 
8/24/2007 Laurel Kulm COW 
8/2212007 COW Laurel Kulm 
8/20/2007 Laurel Kulm 
8/17/2007 Laurel Kulm WBS 
8/17/2007 Robin Sexton WBS 
8/17/2007 Laurel Kulm WBS 
8/14/2007 COW Laurel Kulm 
8/14/2007 Laurel Kulm COW 
8/06/2007 Robin Sexton WBS 
8106/2007 Steve Haase WBS 
8/06/2007 COW Laurel Kulm 
8/03/2007 COW Laurel Kulm 
7/27/2007 COW Laurel Kulm 
7106/2007 Laurel Kulm COW 
6/1212007 COW Laurel Kulm 
5/30/2007 Laurel Kulm 
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5/30/2007 Laurel Kulm WBS 
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Date 
4/02/2009 
4/0112009 
1/07/2009 
1/06/2009 
12124/2008 
12/24/2008 
12/23/2008 
1211912008 
12/15/2008 
12/14/2008 
10/29/2008 
10/15/2008 
10/1512008 
9125/2008 
9/05/2008 
9/05/2008 
8/18/2008 
8/1712008 
5/15/2008 
4/07/2008 
2118/2008 
2113/2008 
2/01/2008 
1/31/2008 
1/20/2008 
1/15/2008 
1/04/2008 
1/04/2008 
1/04/2008 
1/04/2008 
12110/2007 
12104/2007 
11126/2007 
11/2612007 
11/14/2007 
9128/2007 
9/27/2007 
9/24/2007 
9/18/2007 
9/17/2007 
9/13/2007 
8/14/2007 
8/14/2007 
8/14/2007 
8/1412007 
8/14/2007 
8/14/2007 
8/0612007 
8/06/2007 
8/06/2007 
8/0612007 
8/06/2007 
6/0212007 
5/30/2007 
To 
Gade Wooistensteuhme 
'Kulm' 
Gade Wooistensteuhme 
'Kulm' 
cade@idahorights.com 
'Kulm' 
'Kulm' 
'Kulm' 
'Kulm' 
Gade Wooisten ... 
'Kulm' 
'Kulm' 
'Kulm' 
'Kulm' 
cade@seinigerlaw.com 
"Shannon "<shan nor 
'Mary Barros-Bailey' 
cade@seinigerlaw.com 
Gade Wooisten .. . 
cade@idahorights.com 
Gade Woolsten ... 
Breck Seiniger; Gade \II. 
barrosm@ctcweb.net 
Breck Seiniger 
Gade Wooisten .. . 
Gade Wooisten .. . 
Breck Seiniger; Gade \II. 
Breck Seiniger; Gade \II. 
'Kulm' 
Gade Wooisten .. . 
Gade Wools ten .. . 
"'Shannon Pearson'" <S 
" Shannon II <shan nor 
Breck Seiniger 
Laurel Kulm <purdue2y( 
purdue2you@msn.com 
'Breck Seiniger'; cade@ 
cade@seinigerlaw.com 
Breck Seiniger 
Wm. Breck Seiniger Jr. 
'Breck Seiniger' 
'Kulm' 
cade@seinigerlaw.com 
cade@seinigerlaw.com 
'Kulm' 
'wbs@seinigerlaw.com' 
'Kulm' 
cade@seinigerlaw.com 
robinsexton@cableone. 
cade@seinigerlaw.com 
'HAASE' 
'Radnovich' 
cade@seinigerlaw.com; 
purdue2you@msn.com 
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cade@idahorights.com 
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cade@idahorights.com 
cade@idahorights.com 
7/23/2009 
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<voicemessage@velocitus.net> 
cade@seinigerlaw.com 
barrosm2002@yahoo.com 
purdue2you@msn.com 
barrosm2002@yahoo.com 
purdue2you@msn.com 
purdue2you@msn.com 
WBZ 
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"Breck Seiniger" <wbs@seiniger 
<voicemessage@velocitus.net> 
purdue2you@msn.com 
WBS 
WBZ 
jms@seinigerlaw.com 
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Kulm v. Mercy Medical Center 
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1/07/2009 
1/07/2009 
5/12/2008 
8/06/2007 
5/31/2007 
Code 
Memo to File 
Memo to File 
Memo to File 
Meeting 
Meeting 
7/21/2009 
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October 10, 2008 
Mr. Andrew March 
Attorney at Law_ 
Seiniger Law Offices 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
RE: KULM, Laurel 
DISABILITY EV ALUA nON 
TheMI07 report from Dr. Radnovichwas forwarded for detennination if the medicat 
opinions expressed in that report impacted the disability opinion provided in the 8122108 
report. Specifically, Dr. Radnovich diagnosed lumbar spondylosis with right-sided L3-L4 
disc protrusion and lumbar and radicular pain secondary to this diagnosis. The 
physician's ultimate rating was 12% of the whole person. He also noted the following 
restrictions: . 
Prolonged, uninterrupted (greater than 30% of the workday) standing. No 
repetitive (greater than 30% of the workday) bending, twisting, or stooping. No 
exposure to low frequency vibration (as would be found in operating heavy 
machinery). No lifting greater than 50 Ibs. occasional lift (less than 30% of the 
workday) greater than 30 Ibs. okay, however... No lifting from a bent position 
with outstretched arms (as wouJd happen with lifting over something or pulling a 
patientupin bed). No lift and earry greater than 20 Ibs. 
Discussion and Opinions 
Based on Dr. Radnovich's limitations that include lifting and carrying to within the light 
level of exertion, Laurel's labor market potential diminishes in the jobs that require not 
only static lifting, but static lifting and carrying tathe level of light/medium. Considering 
Dr. Radnovich's limitations, Laurel's disability would be 22%, inclusive of impairment. 
Thank you for the opportunity of reviewing additional records on the case of Ms. Kulm. 
The opinions expressed in this report are based on the information available at the time 
of its writing. Should additional information become available, I would be happy to 
review and provide a supplemental report should my opinions be affected. Please feel 
free to corrtact me with any questions you ml;iy have. 
. . .' - . . . 
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RE: KULM. Laurel 
October 10, 2008 
Page 2 
Sincerely, 
American Board of Vocational Experts-Diplomate 
Certified Disability Management Specialist 
certified Life Care Planner 
certified Rehabilitation Counselor 
Forensic Vocational Expert-Registered 
National Counselor Certificate 
o 
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August 22, 2008 
Mr. Breck Seiniger 
Attorney at law 
Seiniger law Offices 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
RE: KULM, laurel 
DISABIUTY EVALUATION 
The case of Ms. Laurel Kulm was referred by her attorney. Mr. Breck Seiniger, to 
perform a disability evaluation. I rnet with Ms. Kulm at my office on 02108108. The 
purpose of the evaluation was explained to her, as were the limits of confidentiality. No 
client-counselor relationship was developed, nor was one solicited. The release and 
professional disclosure forms were reviewed and signed. 
The records received and reviewed for this evaluation include: 
• 1113/06 - 2121/07. Saltzer Medical Group 
• 212107 - 3/2107, Advanced Open Imaging 
• 2126107 - 511/07, Dr. Greenwald 
• 415107, Intermountain Medical Imaging 
• 6nl07 -7n/07, Dr. Radnovich 
• 812107 - 1117/07, Dr. Rogers 
Social History 
Ms. Kulm was born on in New York City. She has also lived in New Mexico, 
Nevada, Wyoming, and Idaho. Her father was a lumberman and 'sharpened knives, and 
her mother worked for some years with the U.S. Postal Service as a sorter and then as 
a sales manager in department stores, but stopped working due to anxiety attacks. One 
of laurel's sisters is a nurse educator at a university, but laurel does not keep up with 
her oldest sister. 
The claimant is divorced and has a 31-year-old son who WOrks as a heating and air 
conditioning technician and as a massage therapist, and a daughter who is a 
hairdresser in New York. 
BilingualRehltblll/aflonOounaelor, 'P.O. Box 7511. 6oIse.ldaho83707-1511 
VocationIII Expert & Ufe Cal8 Planner 
IIC'D AUG 2 G 2008 
PH ..........•.. .208.229.8484 
FX ...........•. .208.279.6830 
barfosmOctcweb·net I 
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11nlO7 Dr. Rogers: Assigned a 5% impairment. A 50# lifting restriction is a reasonable 
work restriction for her. 
Ms. Kulm treats with Dr. Mayes, a chiropractor. In November and December 2007, she 
started treating with Dr. Rogers with the Spine Institute. She has also treated with 
Dr. Terry, Dr. Greenwald, and Dr. Radnovich. 
Ms. Kulm takes a long list of prescribed and herbal medications. These include 
Levothyroxine, .125 mg tablet daily, Metoprolol Succinate ER, 50 mg per day, Three-In-
One drink formula, 81 mg aspirin, food enzyme, coral calcium, potassium citrate, 
calcium citrate, Min-Col Dietary Supplement, flax seed oil, red rice yeast, KBCs, pau 
d'arco, Propancreas, calcium gluconate, and energy food. The herbal supplements are 
prescribed by Mountain Family Wenness Clinic. 
Laurel went to therapy at Mercy North, ending in 01/08. This included full therapy, 
which she believed helped her condition. She has no formal home treatment program 
aside from continuing to do the exercises that were provided to her. 
Pre-existing the most recent industrial injury, the claimant indicates that she had a 
meniscus tear and underwent repair on 09121/06, but this resulted in no limitations. 
Subjectively, Laurel indicates no limitations with forward reaching, balancing, gripping, 
handling, fingering, talking, hearing, vision, tasting, or smelling. She indicates, however, 
the following limitations: 
• Standing 
• Walking 
• Sitting 
• Lifting/carrying 
• Pushing/pulling 
• Bending/stooping 
• Twistingltuming 
• Reaching overhead 
• Squatting/crouching 
Twenty to thirty minutes. 
One to two minutes. 
Every 30 minutes. 
Fifty pounds, although she could only lift 25-30 
pounds over short distances and has to drag a 
40-pound bag of dog food. 
She has difficulty pulling heavy weights, such 
as helping people get in and out of bed 
(St Luke's has two technicians at a time for 
support these kind of activities). 
Can do this activity but not for prolonged 
periods. 
Gets sore after twisting for awhile. 
Needs to use step stools and ladders due to 
her short stature to bring things closer to her. 
Difficult due to her knees and back. 
o 
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• Climbing/balancing 
• Kneeling/crawling 
• Controls 
• Sleeping 
• Driving 
Education 
Is slow in the use of ladders and needs to take 
one step at a time since this will pull on her 
back and make her feel like she is losing her 
balance. 
Is slow in these activities. 
Does not operate a stick shift. 
Goes to bed at night at 9:00 p.m. and awakens 
at 7:00 a.m. and has fragmented sleep 
(believes this is due to effects of menopause). 
although she uses a CPAP. 
Can drive an automatic transmission for 3-4 
hours at a time but needs to get out and walk. 
Laurel graduated from John Bawne High School in Fleshing, New York, in 1970. In 
1971, she completed the Berkeley Claremont Secretarial School. In 1990, she 
completed a certificate program from Delphi University. 
Due to her registry as a polysomnographer, she has had ongoing continuing education 
units she has eamed through difference conferences. As a polysomnographer. she 
possesses the registered RPSGT designation at the national level and a license to 
practice in the State of Idaho. 
Vocational and Avocational Histories 
After graduating from high school but before entering into the field of polysomnography, 
Laurel worked as a staff clerk with Long Island Lighting and held a variety of secretarial 
and paralegal jobs. The paralegal jobs were over a four-year period in general practice 
law, mostly dealing with custody issues and family practice. 
In 01194, she started working with University of New Mexico as a transcriptionist in the 
Sleep Department. This introduced her to the field of sleep science where she started 
training on the job in sleep technology. 
By 12194, she had acquired a second job in the field and was earning between $7.50 
and $8.25 per hour between both employers. 
By 10197, she relocated to the Reno area where she started working as a 
polysomnographic technician with Washoe Sleep Disorder Center. She was on site 
with this facility through 10/05. However, she continues to do scoring for this center on 
a contract basis with her earnings received on a 1099. Simultaneous with this job, she 
worked with Mount Medical Sleep Disorder Center in Carson City from 2001 through 
o 
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2003. With the second employer, she was under the tutelage of Dr. Zimmennan who 
was the Medical Director for the Washoe Sleep Disorder Center. 
In 10/03 she relocated to Cheyenne, Wyoming, where she resided through 06105 when 
she moved to the Treasure Valley. While in Cheyenne, she continued to work on a 
contract basis, doing scoring of sleep analysis studies. 
Upon relocating to the Treasure Valley, laurel started working with Mercy Medical 
Center in 06105 and was employed with them through 05/07. She was the lead 
technician and the clinical director. Throughout this whole time she continued to do 
scoring on a very part-time basis. 
Beginning in 01/07/08, Ms. Kulm started working with St luke's. Although she has 
been in the sleep technology field for over a dozen years, she is still considered a 
potysomnographer in training. This is a part-time position of twenty hours/week. She 
also continues to do about twenty hours/week of scoring with fonner employers in other 
states. laurel indicates that she seeks a full-time position since she has always worked 
two jobs, one full time and the other part time. At St. luke's, she has the capacity to be 
in an accommodated position because the hospital has two technicians on at a time 
who could assist with lifting and pulling activities from which she is precluded. 
laurel describes herself as a "can-do· lead technician who seeks to enter into 
management or supervisory roles within the polysomnography or sleep science field. 
Avocationally, Ms. Kulm states that she "can't keep up with the grandkids." Thus, since 
she has always been very active, this tends to get her down and make her feel like she 
is limited and cannot live her life fully. She has difficulty going up and down stairs and 
doing such activities as scooping up after her dogs, making her bed, or cleaning her 
eaves. 
Transferable and Cross-Functional Sldlls 
Skills are transferable when skilled or semiskilled work activities done in past work can 
be used to meet the requirements of either skilled or semiskilled work activities. Skills 
are only transferable if the individual has not been precluded from activities allowing 
himlher to utilize these and other work activities of the same or lesser degree of skill, 
the same or similar tools or machines are used, and the same or similar raw materials, 
products, processes, or services are involved. The O*NET describes "cross-functional 
skills," as those that can be used across different classes of jobs. 
Ms. Kulm retains the ability to understand the policies and principles of 
polysomnographic technology and of sleep science; she can score sleep studies; apply 
electrodes to surface areas that do not require the movement of large and heavy limbs 
(e.g., head); to monitor diagnostic machines; to operate a close circuit television to 
o 
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observe patients undergoing sleep studies; to operate polysomnographic equipment to 
record electrical activity and other information; to monitor patient's vital signs; to enter 
and retrieve information from a computer; to do research; to write reports; to 
communicate with patients and other staff orally and in writing. 
Vocational Exploration 
The position of polysomnographic technician is classified as Medium exertional work by 
the US Department of Labor. However, both the Dictionary of Occupational TItles 
(1991) and the O*NET indicate that their data is highly aggregated and may not reflect 
how a job is carried out within a specific region or location. Therefore, all sleep centers 
that could be located within the Treasure Valley were contacted and asked the following 
research questions: 
1) Do you hire polysomnographic techs/sleep techs? 
2) If so, at what level (e.g., technician, lead technician, management, scorer)? 
3) What would be the pay for each level mentioned? 
4) If someone has a 50# lifting restriction, would they be able to do this work (at 
any level)? 
5) How about if they had the lifting restriction and experience (over 10 years)? 
6) If they can't do the work of a technician or lead technician with a lifting 
restriction and they have experience, what other kinds of jobs do they have in 
their facility they might be able to do? 
Employer Contact Number Data Results 
St Judy 367.2008 8/18 1) Hire? Yes. 
Alphonsus 2) Level? Prefer to hire respiratory therapists 
Sleep (RT) as techs, aJllevels. Have 13 techs and 12 
Disorders beds. 
3) Pay? Starts $121hr. If RT, the rate can be 
higher. Each level is different and they have 
them all. 
4) Restriction? Yes - Sometimes they have 
clients, so techs would have to lift but could 
have help from others. 
5) Restriction and experience? Yes. 
6) Other jobs? None. St AI's is on a hiring 
freeze. 
o 
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Idaho Sleep Bev 
Disorder 
Center 
Sleep Stacy 
Evaluation 
Labs 
706.5380 8/18 
. 
342.7700 8/18 
o 
1) Hire? Yes. 
2) Level? Registered, non-registered, trainee. 
3) Pay? $15-$20Ihrto start. Pay after that just 
depends on a variety of factors. 
4) Restriction? Someone could help. 
5) Restriction and experience? Yes, but 
advancement goes by seniority not so much 
experience/ 
6) Other jobs? Scoring; these are seniority 
positions 
1) Hire? Yes. 
2) level? All levels. Must be a registered 
technician or trainee. 
3) Pay? Depending on experience, $20Ihour. 
4) Restriction? No problem. Help patients get 
up once in awhile; always others to heJp you. 
5) Restriction and experience? Yes. 
6) Other jobs? No. 
www.sleepevaluationlabs.com 
Off of website under iobs: 
We are seeking compaSSionate, hard-working, 
self-directed employees to work as : RPSGT, 
Registered Polysomnography 
Technologists/T echnicianffrainee 
Must be profiCient with computers and work well 
independently. Duties include data acquisition, 
analysis and documentation as well as, 
explaining procedures and applying monitoring 
systems on patients. Previous sleep study 
experience desired but not 
mandatory. Assistance will be provided to get 
employee compliant with all certifications 
required by The Idaho State Board of 
Medicine. This is a long term career opportunity 
with an established sleep lab. Pay DOE FT 
8pm-7am Email Resumes to 
mail@kimvorsemd.com or fax 1-208-725-0028. 
Please indicate which location applying for. 
RE: KULM, Laurel 
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Western Shawn 
Sleep 
455.2400 8/18 1) Hire? Yes. 
2) Level? Respiratory therapists. After so 
Disorders many hours, a trainee can do night duties. then 
Center all duties. Thereafter, someone gets licensed. 
3) Pay? Depends on the person. 
4) Restriction? Possibly. We would have to 
meet her and talk with her. We have some pretty 
large patients that sometimes need help. 
S} Restriction and experience? Yes and 
experience helps. 
6) Other jobs? Scoring. 
West Valley Marissa 459.4641 8/18 . 1} Hire? Yes. 
Medical 2) Level? All levels :technician 11/111 and sleep 
Center lab coordinator. 
3) Pay? Only the director of HR maintains the 
pay information. 
4} Restriction? No problem. If lifting someone, 
there is some help. Job description says "up to 
50#." 
5) Restriction and experience? Yes. 
6) Other jobs? Did not know. 
Discussion and Opinions 
The case of Ms. Laurel Kulm was referred with a request that a disability evaluation be 
perfonned. Laurel presents as a 56-year-old single mother of two who has worked the 
majority of her recent worklife as a polysomnographic technician and continues to 
perfonn this work full time through two part-time positions. 
She has been provided with a 50# work restriction by Dr. Rogers, which is the only 
restriction available after Laurel's underwent her surgery. This restriction is consistent 
with how the occupational is classified by the US Department of Labor with respect to 
exertion standards. Therefore, it was necessary to contact all the employers in the local 
metropolitan statistical area for a better analysis of whether that restriction will impact 
her access to the labor market. Most employers indicated that this could be 
accommodated through the use of others in the workplace and one employer thought it 
might be a problem. To move to lighter jobs, it appears that most sleep laboratories 
consider seniority over experience. 
Laurel has moved around the Western United States considerably within the last 
several years. Therefore, a broader review of the labor market was conducted where 
o 
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245 polysomnographic positions were located nationwide. Very few of these positions 
listed lifting restrictions, except for one with Primary Children's Hospital in Salt Lake City 
that indicated occasional lifting >50#. Therefore, although it appears that there has 
been some impact on Laurel's access to the labor market, this is considered to be less 
than 20% as suggested by contacts to local employers. The limitations combined with 
age may be her greatest barrier to placeability in more competitive markets. Pay rates 
for local polysomnographic technicians range from $12 to $20. Consequently, Ms. 
Laurel should not sustain a loss of pay rate as a result of the injury. In short, the non-
medical factors that contribute to Laurel's disability include a slight erosion of the labor 
market and her age (although this is not considered to be significant). It is this 
evaluator's opinion that Laurel has sustained a 7% to 10% disability, inclusive of 
impairment. 
Thank you for the opportunity of evaluating Ms. Kulm. The opinions expressed in this 
report are based on the information available at the time of its writing. Should additional 
information become available, I would be happy to review and provide a supplemental 
report should my opinions be affected. Please feel free to contact me with any 
questions you may have. 
Sincerely, 
, CLCP, Nee, DIABVE 
American Board of Vocational Experts-Diplomate 
Certified Disability Management Specialist 
Certified Ufe Care Planner 
Certified Rehabl7itation Counselor 
Forensic Vocational Expert-Registered 
National Counselor Certificate 
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LAVV OFFICES 
Professional Association 
WM. BRECK SEINIGER, JR. 
Idaho, Oregon, Washington, and the District of Columbia 
JULIE MARsH SEINIGER 
Idaho, Indiana, and the District of Columbia 
September 18,2008 
ANDREW C. MARsH 
Idaho, Indiana, and Missouri 
VIA FAX TO (208) 388-8734 
Kate Beaudreau 
Industrial Claims Management 
1150 W. State Street, Ste 330 
Boise, ID 83702 
RE: Claimant: 
Employer: 
Date of Injury: 
Surety Case No.: 
Dear Ms. Beaudreau: 
LaurelKulm 
Mercy Medical Center 
11102/2006 
06-54899 
Attached please find a copy of a vocational evaluation report dated 8/22/08 prepared by 
Dr. Mary Barros-Bailey for Laurel, in which she makes a conclusion of a permanent 
partial disability of 7% to 10%. 
Please make arrangements to begin paying PPD benefits as provided by work comp law. 
Please contact me if you have any questions. Thank you for your kind attention. 
Sincerely, 
~A(~-
Andrew Marsh 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Enclosures: As Stated 
cc: Laurel Kulm 
942 W. MYR1LE STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Andrew@SeinigerLaw.com 
www.SeinigerLaw.com 
SEliNliGE1R 
LAVV OFF I CES 
Professional Association 
WM. BRECKSEINIGER,JR. 
Idaho, Oregon, Washington, and the District of Columbia 
JULIE MARSH SEINIGER 
Idaho, Indiana, and the District of Columbia 
September 28,2008 
ilNDREW C. MARsH 
Idaho, Indiana, and Missouri 
VIA FAX TO (208) 388-8734 
Kate Beaudreau 
Industrial Claims Management 
1150 W. State Street, Ste 330 
Boise, ID 83702 
RE: Claimant: 
Employer: 
Date of Injury: 
Surety Case No.: 
Dear Ms. Beaudreau: 
Laurel Kulm 
Mercy Medical Center 
11102/2006 
06-54899 
Thank you for your call Friday. You acknowledged that you received a vocational 
evaluation report dated 8/22/08 prepared by Dr. Mary Barros-Bailey, but you stated that 
the surety does not intend to begin paying PPD benefits pending receipt of a lump sum 
settlement offer from claimant. 
Although it is true that my client intends to make an offer ofLSS, I wanted to clarify that 
it is our position that Idaho work comp law requires the surety to begin timely payment of 
PPD benefits, or any undisputed portion thereof, even while negotiations are pending. 
Please make arrangements accordingly. 
Please contact me if you have any questions. Thank you for your kind attention. 
Sincerely, 
~~~ .. 
Andrew Marsh 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. MYR1LE STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Andrew@SeinigerLaw.com 
www.SeinigerLaw.com 
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LAURELKULM 
C/O SEINIGER LAW OFFICES 
942 W MYRTLE STREET 
BOISE, 10 83702 
CIriirI#: 06 54899 CI8mIilt K!Iin, i.auret', 
I.oa& DaIa: 11J21:im6 Service: 08IiiI: 1~,' 
CHI Site Coda: 11018 Ueroy Medlc:IIi CenIer 
RI!InIns: 
,Check Stub 
':.,. , 
,Check Date: 
Check Number: 
Check Amount 
1t6416.6 . 
10/1612008 
1164166 
$1,243.00 
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ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 S. 5th Street, Suite 700 
P. O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-5510 
Alan K. Hull - IS8 No.: 1568 
Attorneys for Defendants 
, '." 
". PI 
. ' ,,~ 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OFt~AH:§ 
c, 
:z.: 
LAUREL KULM, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
MERCY MEDICAL CENTER, 
Employer, 
and 
INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF NORTH AMERICA, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.C. No. 06-012770 mD -. U 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, 
RELEASE AND LUMP SUM 
SETTLEMENT, AND ORDER OF 
APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE 
In consideration of the premises and promises and covenants hereinafter 
set forth and subject to the Commission's approval and Order of Discharge 
pursuant thereto, the above-entitled par~o stipulate and agree as follows. 
On or about November 2, 2006, Laurel Kulm, hereinafter referred to as 
Claimant, suffered an industrial accident arising out of and in the course of her 
employment with Mercy Medical Center, hereinafter referred to as Employer. 
On the date of the accident, the Employer had assured its liability under the 
Worker's Compensation Laws of the State of Idaho with Indemnity Insurance 
Company of North America, hereinafter referred to as Surety. The Employer, 
Surety and the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho received adequate and 
timely notice of the accident and injury. _ .. --_ 
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At the time of said accident, Claimant was 54 years of age, single, and had 
no children under the age of 18. Claimant worked various hours per week and 
earned $22.60 per hour. Claimant incurred no time loss as a result of the injury. 
In the accident of November 2, 2006, Claimant was walking when she slipped 
and fell, injuring her lower/mid back, neck, and both knees. 
Claimant's prior medical history is significant for hypertension, 
hypothyroidism, type II diabetes, sleep apnea, neck and lower back injuries, and 
bilateral meniscal tears and repairs in the summer of 2006. 
On November 3, 2006, Claimant presented to Saltzer Medical Group 
complaining of pain after falling. Claimant advised that while she had fallen onto 
her knees, she had hit her back against the wall. Claimant denied any numbness 
or tingling, as well as any swelling, decreased range of motion, instability, 
crepitus or joint pain. Other than tenderness with palpation over the paraspinous 
musculature throughout the entire spine, the examination was within normal 
limits . Claimant was released to modified duty with no lifting, bending or pulling 
over 15 pounds, as well as no twisting. 
On November 15, 2006, Claimant returned to Saltzer Medical Group 
complaining of bilateral k.nee pain with somewhat limited range of motion. 
Claimant had no gross swelling but she was tender at the medial line. The 
assessment was sprain/strain of the medial and collateral ligaments. She was 
placed in a right k.nee brace. She was later given a left knee brace. 
Claimant returned to Saltzer Medical on November 29, 2006, at which time 
she was released to full duty with no restrictions. 
On January 1 7, 2007 I Claimant returned to Saltzer Medical for right leg 
pain and "pulling" since January 12, 2007, when she was injured while walking 
down a hall after physical therapy when her low back went out causing her to 
almost fall. She advised that she had low back, right hip, and right leg pain. 
There was weakness noted of the left leg and Claimant complained of weakness 
in the left lower back, hip and leg. Claimant was assessed with strain/sprain of 
the hip/thigh, low back and groin. She was placed on modified duty. 
Claimant returned to Saltzer Medical on February 21, 2007 and reported 
that overall she was doing much better, with the majority of her complaints in the 
lumbar area. With regard to the knees, it was opined that she was fixed and 
stable. Claimant was released to full duty, no restrictions. 
On February 26, 2007, Claimant presented to Nancy Greenwald, M.D . . Dr. 
Greenwald noted that Claimant's gait was good and she was able to walk without 
difficulty. Straight leg raise was negative. Sensory and manual muscle testing in 
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the lower extremities was normal. Claimant/s knees were back to baseline. It 
was noted that Claimant had preexisting arthritis and had already established a 
relationship with a chiropractor when she moved to Idaho. Dr. Greenwald felt 
that Claimant had mild soft tissue injuries and there were no radicular findings. 
Claimant could continue working without restriction. 
Claimant saw Dr. Greenwald on March 15 1 2007. Dr. Greenwald noted 
that a lumbar spine of the hip demonstrated a larger right piriformis and a cyst. 
Claimant's main complaint was right buttock pain. Dr. Greenwald recommended 
pool therapy. 
Claimant returned to Dr. Greenwald on April 4, 2007, complaining of a new 
onset of right leg pain and numbness, beginning about two weeks earlier when 
she awoke. She was continuing regular chiropractic treatments and Dr. 
Greenwaid advised her to discontinue those. Straight leg raise was negative. Dr. 
Greenwald ordered an MRI. 
In an April 26, 2007 letter to the Surety, Dr. Greenwald noted that an April 
5, 2007 MRI showed a moderate-sized disc herniation at L3-4 which was right 
paracentral in location with mass effect upon the descending right L4 nerve root I 
the epidural space. Claimant denied any acute incident, accident, hobby or 
activity that caused the sudden extreme pain. Essentially, Claimant had 
awakened with pain down her right side. In order to address causation, Dr. 
Greenwald recommended review of all chiropractic and other prior medical 
records. 
In a June 6, 2007 letter to the Surety, Dr. Greenwald advised, following 
review of Claimant's prior records, that if the physical therapy incident in January v 
of 2007 followed therapy which was prescribed for Claimant/s November 2, 
2006, injury, then that near-fall and subsequent right sided pain were work 
related. 
On June 12, 2007, Claimant's position with the Employer was discontinued ../ 
due to a reduction in work force. 
On August 2, 2007, Claimant presented to Beth Rogers, M.D., for 
complaints of right anterior leg pain, low back pain, right knee pain, and 
occasional non-radiating cervical pain. Dr. Rogers' impression was right L4 
radiculopathy, status post bilateral partial medial meniscectomies with underlying 
degenerative changes in both knees, left greater than right, with the right knee 
being more symptomatic, resolving patellofemoral contusion, and mild cervical 
strain. Dr. Rogers noted that in review of Claimant's medical records, there were 
approximately 122 visits for chiropractic care to address issues with Claimant's 
cervical spine, lumbar spine and bilateral knees. The visits occurred both prior 
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and subsequent to the November 2006 industrial injury. Due to the complaints 
that Claimant had following that injury, she believed the lumbar radiculopathy was 
a result of said injury. She felt Claimant's knees were at baseline and she 
recommended a right L4 transforaminal epidural, as well as a directed course of 
physical therapy. She placed Claimant on mOdified work. On August 6, 2007, 
Dr. Rogers released Claimant for her regular work. 
On November 7 f 2007, Claimant advised Dr. Rogers that she had no pain in 
the right leg and overall her back was much better. Dr. Rogers felt Claimant was 
medically stable and gave her a 5% whole person impairment. Dr. Rogers also 
felt that, given Claimant's disc protrusion, a 50 pound weight limit was a 
reasonable permanent restriction and therefore Claimant could continue doing her 
time of injury job. 
...,/ 
In August of 2008, Claimant's counsel has a disability evaluation performed 
by Mary Barros-Bailey, Ph.D., CRC, CDMS, CLCP, NCC, D/ABVE. Following her 
interview of Claimant, and a labor market survey, Dr. Barros opined that Claimant 
sustained a 7- to 10% disability f inclusive of impairment. 
Claimant is working at St. Luke's Regional Medical Center. 
Pertinent medical records are attached to the original Agreement as Exhibit 
1/ A". 
There are genuine and substantial disputes and differences between the 
parties as to the degree, if any, of Claimant's impairment and disability, the need 
for retraining, and the need for future medical benefits. 
Claimant and Defendants, desiring to settle the controversies in an amicable 
way and to avoid the cost and delay of litigation of this claim and to buy their 
peace, have entered into a settlement agreement which is acceptable to Claimant 
and to the Defendants and which is in the best interest of the parties. By reason 
of said settlement agreement, the parties hereto desire to settle and forever 
conclude Claimant's rights under the Worker's Compensation Laws of the State of 
Idaho. Claimant has offered to accept and the Defendants have offered to pay 
the sum of $13,000.00, as itemized below, as full and final settlement of 
Claimant's claim. The parties agree that settlement is in the best interests of the 
parties. 
It is stipulated and agreed that the aforementioned settlement consideration 
includes loss of wage earning capacity and non-medical factors, should such 
exist. 
The parties waive any Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as part of 
the consideration for this agreement. Claimant hereto specifically and expressly 
waives all rights to reconsideration of an award otherwise provided for under 
Idaho Code § 72-718. 
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In processing this claim, medical expenses in the amount of $12,651.99 
have been incurred by Claimant and paid by the Surety as itemized below: 
Doctors: 
Physical Therapy: 
Miscellaneous: 
Pharmacy: 
Diagnostic Tests: 
TOTAL 
$ 4,659.89 
1,736.97 
3,631.74 
84.87 
2(538.52 
$12,651.99 
CLAIMANT UNDERSTANDS AND AGREES THAT ANY MEDICAL EXPENSES 
NOT ITEMIZED AS BEING PAID ARE HER RESPONSIBILITY AND THAT UPON 
APPROVAL OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE DEFENDANTS WILL HAVE NO FURTHER 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES INCURRED TO DATE OR TO BE 
INCURRED IN THE FUTURE, EXCEPT AS HEREIN BEFORE PROVIDED. 
y 
Claimant hereby attests that 1) she is not currently on Medicare; and 2) 
does not expect to be on Medicare in 30 months and that she does not have a 
settlement of over $250,000.00 Claimant attests that neither she nor any of her 
medical providers to her knowledge received Medicare benefits, as provided under 
42 USC Section 1395, as a result of the work-related injuries sustained on 
November 2, 2006, set forth herein. 
The parties hereby recognize that errors running to the benefit of either 
party may have been made in the benefit computations while processing 
Claimant's claim and hereby agree and stipulate that the lump sum consideration 
to be paid upon approval of this agreement takes into account all such errors 
found in the accounting and further stipulate and agree that the Industrial 
Commission is empowered to make any necessary corrections in the accounting 
without the necessity of any party creating an addendum, so long as the amount 
to be paid Claimant, $13,000.00, is not affected. 
An itemization of Claimant's claim as required by the Industrial Commission 
is as follows: 
Permanent Physical Impairment-
5 % of the whole person 
25 weeks @ $310.75 per week 
Permanent Partial Disability-
9%\lof the whole person, 
including impairment, or 4% 
20 weeks @ $310.75 per week 
Lump Sum Consideration-
(Includes any decreased wage earning 
capacity, non-medical factors and 
permanent partial disability, if any) 
TOTAL: 
/ $ 7,768.75 
6,215.00 
12,223.13 
$26,206.88 
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LESS: 
PPI benefits paid to date 
PPD benefits paid to date 
AMOUNT DUE CLAIMANT 
CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS: 
A. Attorney fees taken prior to LSS 
B. ($550 Dr. Radnovich & Costs taken prior to LSS $823.50 Dr . Barros-Bailey) 
C. Additional attorney fees to be 
taken from lSS 
D. Additional costs to be taken 
from LSS 
ITEMIZED LIST OF OUTSTANDING MEDICALS 
Do not deduct from lump sum settlementl 
amount due Claimant 
NONE 
ITEMIZED LIST OF OUTSTANDING MEDICALS 
TO BE PAID BY CLAIMANT FROM LUMP SUM 
SETTLEMENT BALANCE: (List provider & amount) 
NONE 
E. Total of Outstanding Medicals 
To be deducted from lump sum settlementl 
amount due Claimant 
NET AMOUNT TO CLAIMANT 
(Subtract Lines C & 0 relating 
to attorney fees, and line E 
relating to outstanding 
medicals, from the total 
amount due Claimant of this 
lSS) 
7,768.75v 
5.438.13 
$13,000.00 
$3,301.72 
$1,394 . 37 
$3,250.00 
$10 . 00 
$0.00 
$9,740.00/' 
The parties acknowledge that the nature and extent of this injury, 
temporary and permanent partial disability, permanent impairment, medical and 
related expenses in this matter are uncertain and may be continuing or 
progressive and may exceed those hereinbefore set forth, and the above shall not 
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limit the scope of this agreement or the order of discharge entered by the 
Commission pursuant hereto, both of which contemplate and include all rights and 
claims to all permanent and temporary compensation and all medical and related 
benefits whether or not known, herein listed, discovered or contemplated by the 
'parties, except as herein before specifically provided. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and subject to the 
approval of this entire agreement by the Industrial Commission of the State of 
Idaho, the parties hereby stipulate and agree that the Commission may make and 
enter its order approving a lump sum settlement of this claim by the payment to 
Claimant by the Surety of the sum of $13,000.00. 
IT IS STIPULATED AND AGREED that this payment is in full and final 
settlement and release of all claims of Claimant, her heirs and representatives, for 
compensation for total and partial temporary disability, medical expenses, both 
past and future, specific indemnity for permanent disability, decreased wage 
earning capacity, and any and all claims which Claimant and her heirs now have 
or may have against the Defendants in the future on account of such accident 
and/or injury under the worker's compensation laws of the State of Idaho. 
IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that the Defendant Surety shall 
pay the sum within thirty days following their receipt of the approved and 
conformed copy of this entire agreement. Any interest allowable under the 
Workmen's Compensation Laws of the State of Idaho will not begin to accrue 
until after the thirty-day period. 
IT IS FURTHER REPRESENTED, STIPULATED AND AGREED that Claimant 
understands that by entering into this agreement, and upon its approval by the 
Industrial Commission, her compensation claims and all rights in connection 
therewith will be finally and forever settled and closed and that she will be forever 
barred from reopening this claim or otherwise claiming additional compensation 
benefits on account of such accident andlor injury. 
Claimant does agree to INDEMNIFY, DEFEND and HOLD MERCY MEDICAL, 
CENTER and INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, 
HARMLESS from and against any further claim for benefit which is, or may be, 
payable pursuant to the Worker's Compensation Laws of the State of Idaho and 
which arose out of or is related to said accident andlor injury. This 
indemnification and hold harmless agreement shall in no way inure to the benefit 
of any third party or any party not herein specifically named. 
IT IS FURTHER REPRESENTED AND AGREED by the parties that it is in their 
best interests that this claim be finally and forever settled, satisfied and 
discharged, and the parties hereto acknowledge that this agreement is made at 
Claimant's request and is the acceptance of her offer by the Defendants. 
Claimant acknowledges that she has carefully read this agreement and legal 
instrument in its entirety, has received the advice of her counsel, and that she 
understands its contents and has signed the same knowing that this agreement 
forever concludes and fully disposes of any and all claims of any kind and 
character that she has or may have against the Defendants on account of the 
above injuries. 
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STATE OF f.B~IIO } 
/' \ \: 55. 
County of ':» ~m ) 
LAUELKULM, Claimant 
By ~J{(~ ANOAMARSH, ;~ 
Attorney for Claimant 
MERCY MEDICAL CENTER, Employer, and 
INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
NORTH A RICA, Surety 
A 
LAUREL KULM~ being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says; 
That she is the Claimant in the above-entitled claim; 
That she has read the foregoing lump sum agreement, knows the contents 
thereof and believes the same to be true to the best of I"ler knowledge, 
day of 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT. AND 
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ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE 
UPON LUMP SUM AGREEMENT 
The foregoing stipulation, agreement and petition having duly and regularly 
come before this Commission, and it appearing that the interests of justice and 
the best interests of the parties herein are, and will be, served by approving this 
agreement granting the order of discharge as prayed for, 
NOW, THEREFORE, the foregoing stipulation and agreement shall be and 
the same herein is approved, and further, the above-entitled proceedings are 
hereby dismissed and concluded with prejudice. 
DATED this day of _______ ,2009. 
ATTEST: 
By~~ __ ~ _______________ _ 
Assistant Secretary 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSiON 
By~~ ________________________ ___ 
Chairman 
By 
~M7e-m~be-r-------------------------
By~ __ ~ ______________________ ___ 
Member 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on , a true and correct copy 
of STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, 
AND ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE and STIPULATION AND ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE, I.C. No.: 06-012770, was served by the method 
indicated below upon each of the following: 
__ U.S. MAIL __ COURIER __ HAND DELIVERED 
Andrew Marsh 
942 W Myrtle 
Boise, ID 83702 
Kate Beaudreau 
leM, Inc. 
1150 W State, #330 
Boise, 10 83702 
Alan K. Hull 
Anderson, Julian & Hull 
250 South 5th , #700 
P. O. Box 7426 
Boise, 10 83707 
,-
( 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
LAUREL KULM, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
MERCY MEDICAL CENTER, 
Employer, 
and 
I.C. No.: 08-012770 
STIPULATION AND ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE 
INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
NORTH AMERICA, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
COME NOW the above-named parties, by and through their undersigned 
counsel of record, Andrew Marsh, attorney for Claimant, and Mercy Medical 
Center/ Employer, and Indemnity Insurance Company of North America, Surety, by 
and through their counsel of record/ and hereby move this Commission for its 
Order dismissing the above-captioned claim pending before this honorable 
Commission with prejudice on the ground and for the reason that the same has 
been fully and finally disposed of in accordance with that certain Stipulation and 
Agreement, Release and Lump Sum Settlement, and Order of Approval and 
Discharge on file with "the above-captioned Commission. 
By ~JJ/A - /~ AND~,~~ 
Attorl1~y for Claimant 
ANJjERSON, JULIAN & HULL 
Bl--.-:-c:-:--· ~_ 
~K. H.ULI:! Of the Firm 
- Attor~efendants 
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ORDER 
The above stipulation having duly come before this Commission and the 
Stipulation and Agreement, Release and Lump Sum Settlement having been 
presented to this Commission and this Commission having fully considered all of 
the pleadings and evidence, both written and oral, herein and having approved said 
Stipulation and Agreement, Release and Lump Sum Settlement as in the best 
interests of Claimant and Defendants, and there appearing good cause therefor. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, and this does ORDER, that the above-captioned 
claim now pending before this Commission is hereby dismissed with prejudice as 
against the Defendants, and each of them. 
DATED this __ day of ____________________ ,2009. 
ATTEST: 
By~~ __ -= ________________ ___ 
Assistant Secretary 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
By~~ __________________________ __ 
Chairman 
By 
7M7e-m~be-r--------------------------
By 
7M~e-m~be-r--------------------------
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES. P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise. Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Laurel Kulm, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
Mercy Medical Center, 
Employer, 
and 
I.C. No. 06-012770 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES 
and 
STATEMENT OF 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
Industrial Claims Management, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in 
support of his claim. of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds 
of the settlement of the above captioned case. 
REPORT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES 
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528. Idaho Code. this form shall be filled out 
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final 
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final 
court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals 
specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES. P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
FORM 1022. REPORT OF EXPENSES 
AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
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BENEFITS, paid prior to Lump Sum, subjected to arty fees 
ATTORNEY FEES, paid prior to Lump Sum, on the above 
COSTS, incurred in litigation, previously reimbursed to attorney (incl. 
experts Radnovich and Barros-Bailey) 
LUMP SUM AMOUNT, New Money 
ATTORNEY FEES & COSTS, to be paid from LSS 
Attorney Fees 
Costs 
TOTAL, Attorney Fees and Costs, to be paid from LSS 
MEDICAL BILLS, to be paid from Lump Sum 
NET LUMP SUM AMOUNT TO CLAIMANT 
-$3,250.00 
-$10.00 
$13,206.88 
$3301.72 
$1,394.37 
$13,000.00 
-$3,260.00 
-$0.00 
$9,740.00 
Attachments: Statement of Costs incurred in litigation, reimbursable to attorney 
Attorney Fee Agreement including Disclosure Statement 
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
1. Seiniger Law Offices, P .A. ("Counsel") was retained by Laurel Kuhn 
("Claimant") on or about 5/30/2007. 
2. Counsel initiated this case by interviewing Claimant concerning the facts and 
. circumstances of employment, the facts and circumstances of the injury, the status of benefits, 
the status of medical treatment, and the background of Claimant as it relates to potential 
disability beyond impairment, etc. 
3. Counsel advised Claimant as to the procedures involved in processing a claim for 
benefits under the Idaho Workers Compensation Act. Counsel advised Claimant as to the need 
for cooperation with treating physicians, the Idaho Industrial Commission Rehabilitation 
Division, and Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES 
AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
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4. Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial 
Commission. 
5. Counsel created a database file for Claimant in which pertinent infonnation was 
recorded for use in the handling of the claim. 
6. During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the 
following documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement 
meeting the requirements of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employment 
release; a letter of representation and inquiry to the surety; a letter of representation to the Idaho 
Industrial Commission requesting copies of Claimanf s file; a letter to the treating medical 
providers requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; and a client 
intake questionnaire for the initial gathering of relevant infonnation concerning the client's 
employment, educational, medical and health, military, vocational, and accident history. 
7. Counsel reviewed all medical records, employment records, and other requested 
documents as they were received, and consulted with Claimant about the status of the case on a 
periodic basis. 
8. Counsel advised Claimant concerning the need to keep medical appointments, 
aspects of medical treatment which might potentially affect Claimant's impairment rating, and 
strategic issues relating to medical care which can impact the result of a worker's compensation 
case. 
9. Before Counsel was retained, Defendants denied, discontinued, or disputed 
Claimant's right to additional medical benefits and treatment, time loss benefits, and impairment 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES 
AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
PAGE 3 OF6 
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impairment compensation and disability beyond impairment compensation. 
Counsel advised Claimant to undergo a new and separate independent medical 
evaluation by a medical expert of Claimant's choosing; advised Claimant of the meaning and 
import of the 1MB report; and advised Claimant on the effect of the expert's report on the need 
for present and future medical treatment, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement. 
11. Counsel advised Claimant to undergo a new and separate vocational evaluation by 
a vocational evaluation expert of Claimant's choosing; advised Claimant of the meaning and 
import of the vocational report; and advised Claimant on the effect of the expert's report on the 
need for retraining, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement. 
12. Counsel reviewed the file in preparation for settlement Counsel engaged in 
extensive negotiations with Defendants. Counsel had extensive communications with Claimant 
concerning the status of the case, and the strategic and tactical decisions that had to be made with 
respect to settlement discussions and preparation for hearing. 
13. Counsel advised Claimant of the risks of going to hearing and the costs that would 
be incurred in connection with obtaining sworn testimony from Claimant's medical providers. 
Counsel further advised Claimant of the delay that would be involved in submitting this case for 
resolution to the Commission. 
14. Counsel obtained a compromise settlement with representatives of the defendants 
resulting in the payment of benefits over and above those which were conceded at the time that 
Claimant initiated the attorney/client relationship. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES. P.A 
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15. Claimant elected to settle the case based upon Claimant's best judgment and 
personal situation, and on the basis set forth in the lump sum agreement which has been 
submitted to the Commission for its approval. 
16. Counsel reviewed and analyzed the lump sum settlement agreement, completed 
portions of the agreement, and reviewed the lump sum agreement with Claimant. 
17. Counsel reviewed and analyzed the file; reviewed and analyzed time and billing 
program entries; reviewed and analyzed books of account to ascertain client costs advanced and 
other financial data required by the Idaho Industrial Commission; and prepared Idaho Industrial 
Commission Form 1022. 
18. As part of~e consideration supporting the contract entered into between 
Claimant and Counsel. Counsel provided legal services to Claimant from approximately 
5/30/2007 until the present time. During that time, Counsel limited his practice by declining 
certain cases because of the size of his caseload, which included Claimant's case. Counsel 
maintained an office and staff, including the services of a full-time legal assistant, to be able to 
handle whatever needs Claimant had in connection with this case, as well as the needs of his 
other clients. 
19. Claimant is presently employed. 
Dated May 5, 2009. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
~&::--
Attorney for Claimant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on May 5, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to 
be served as follows: 
Alan Hull 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL 
250 South 5th, Ste. 700 PO Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
liD Hand Delivered 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
H4~-ewMarsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myr1le Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES 
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CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENT 
IN A WORKER'S COMPENSATION CASE 
This is an agreement for representation and consultation in a worker's 
compensation claim before the Idaho Industrial Commission. This agreement is 
between SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A., 942 Myrtle Street, Boise, Idaho 
83702, (hereafter referred to as "Attorney") and Laurel Kulm, (hereafter referred 
to as "Client"). 
ATIORNEY AND CLIENT AGREE AS FOLLOWS: 
1) Attorney will represent Client in the following action: Kulm v. Mercy Medical 
Center with respeet to worker's compensation claim for date of injury of 
. November 2, 2006 only. 
2) For their representation of Client, Attorneys will be paid a fee which will be in 
lien upon the cause of action and will be equal to a portion of all amounts 
recovered by way of settlement, or award including attorney fees, and 
including sums recovered in satisfaction thereof from any third party. That 
portion will be as follows: 
i) Twenty-five percent (250,4) of all amounts obtained for Client after 
execution of this agreement if the case is settled before a, hearing. If 
Client is receiving temporary disability benefits at the '"time of the 
execution of this agreement, Attorney will not take a percentage of that 
benefit Wltil such time as the surety discontinues or threatens to 
discontinue payment of said benefit; if Client has received an 
impairment rating which has been admitted and is being paid, Attorney 
will not take a percentage of the balance of the impairment rating unless 
it is later disputed. 
ii) Thirty percent (30°;') of such amounts after a hearing and the claim is 
resolved without the filing of an appeal by either party; 
, iii) Forty percent (40%) of such amounts if the claim is resolved after an 
appeal has been filed by either party; 
Attorney wiD take a percentage of any benefits obtained by Client with 
respect to permanent partial impairment if a rating is given after the parties 
execute this agreement. In the event that there are attorney fees awarded against 
the defendant( s) by the commission Attorney shall be entitled to be paid those 
attorney fees or the percentage calculated above, whichever is greater. 
, '1 
3) Client will not be required to pay attorney fees to Attorney if nothing is 
recovered by way of settlement or award unless Attorney withdraws due to 
lack of cooperation by Client. In the event that Attorney is required to 
withdraw due to lack of cooperation in presenting and prosecuting Client's 
claim, he will be compensated as set forth in paragraph 7' below. 
4) Actual costs ~equired to prepare and prosecute Client's claim by Attorney, 
or to achieve a settlement, are to be paid by Client; if advanced by 
Attorney, these costs will be repaid from Client's portion of amounts 
recover~ as defined in Section 2, above; if a settlement is not reached in your 
case, you will be responsible to make payments on these costs until they are 
paid in full. These costs include fees for investigators if hired by Attorney, 
filing fees, fees for co}lrt'reporters, travel expenses, costs of service of process, 
costs for medical records and reports, costs for expert witnesses and 
physicians, long distance telephone and fax charges, postage and related 
mailing costs~ and all other costs associated with the prosecution of Client's 
claim. Attorney is authorized, but not obligated, to pay all medical bills . 
outstanding at the time of settlement of Clientts claim out of any funds received 
by Attorney to the health care provider or their designated agent. . 
5) Client agrees that he will not make settlement except with Attorney's prior 
approval, which approval shall not be reasonably withheld. Should Client do 
so in violation of this Agreement, Client agrees to pay Attorney the sum and 
share indicated in Paragraph 2(ii), above; upon settlement Attorney is 
authorized to pay any outstanding medical bills of Client directly to the 
provider. Attorney shall not settle the case without Client's prior approval. 
6) Attorney makes no representations concerning the likelihood of a successful 
resolution of Client's case, and does not guarantee to obtain sufficient funds to 
reimburse Client for the costs or expenses incurred in the prosecution of the 
case; it is expressly agreed that all statements of Attorney on these matters are 
good faith statements of opinion only; 
7) Attorney may be discharged by Client at any time. If Attorney is discharged 
Attorney will be compensated for services rendered to the date of discharge, as 
well as for all.costs, expenses and disbursements, as follows: 
i) If Attorney is discharged before the case is settled or tried, Attoq1ey 
shall be paid at the rate ofS150.00 per hour or a percentage calculated 
in accordance with paragraph 2 (based upon the highest settlement offer, 
ifany, made by the defendants at the time of the discharge) whichever is 
greater; Attorney will furnish Client with an itemized statement of such 
services. 
!Wi1>'--
ii) If Attorney is discharged after the case is settled or tried, the 
compensation of Attorney shall be computed in accordance with the 
provisions of this agreement just as if the verdict, award, determination 
or judgment had actually been collected in full for Client. 
iii) Attorney has the right to retain possession of Clienfs documents and 
money until Attorney's bill is paid in full by Client, and Attorney shall 
have a lien on the cause of action. . 
8) Clieat 'Nill pay te AtteHley 8ft initial ref&iflef as an &&\'anee against the eests 
refeFfe8 te iii PSfftgmph 4 aeeye Hi 1he 8fB:9\IBt ef$100. 
9) Client agrees that any interest earned on any of Client's funds held in trust will 
be donated to the Idaho State Bar in connection with its Interest on Lawyer 
Trust Accounts program. 
10)Both Client and Attorney have read this agreement, have a copy of it, and 
agree to its terms and conditions. There are no other oral or written 
representations between Client and Attorney. Any modifications of this 
contract shall be made in writing. 
11 )This Agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, successors, representatives 
and assigns of Client and Attorney. 
12)Client has been advised that Client may pick up a copy of the file in this case 
within 30 days after settlement or after the, attorney client relationship is 
terminated by either party to this agreement. After that time, Attorney's fde, 
and ali documents and things in it from whatever sou.rce will be destroyed. 
13)Client has been advised that Attorney may be retained on an hourly basis of 
$150 per hour by depositing a retainer with Attorney of $2,000.00 which shall 
be replenished as Attorney charges against it. In the event that Attorney is 
retained on an hourly basis, Attorney shall not be entitled to any percentage of 
any settlement or benefits recovered by Client. Client has declined to retain 
Attorney on an hourly basis. and has chosen to retain Attorney on the 
contingent basis described herein. 
I have read the fOregOin~e to retain the attorney on aD hourly 
basis, this Ii!" day of , 200,.L. 
~AdQ.~· . 
LallKulm, Cient. . 
:" "'1 
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
1. In workers' cqmpensation matters, attorney's fees normally do not exceed 
twenty-five percent (25%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you in a case in 
which no hearing on the merits has been completed. In a case in which a hearing 
on the merits has been completed, attorney's fees normally do not exceed thirty 
percent (30%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you. 
2. Depending upon the circumstances -of your case, you and your attorney may 
agree to a higher or lower percentage which would -be subject to Commission 
approval. Further, if you and your attorney have a dispute regarding attorney fe~s, 
either of you may petition the Industrial Commission to resolve the dispute. 
I certify that I have read and undentand this disclosure statement and 
Contingency Fee AgreemeDt, aDd agree to the terms contaiDed- herein. 
DATED this I~ day of ~ ,2001-. 
~Q.~ 
LaurelKulm 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, • 
SEINlGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Attorney for Client 
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SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. MYRTLE STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
(208) 345·1000 
Andrew@ldahoRights.com 
I CLIENT NAME 
LaurelKulm 
DATE DESCRIPTION 
07/31107 Balance forward 
OS/07/07 Copies - NY work comp to Radnovich 
OS/07/07 Postage 
12113/07 Kulm, Laurel Impairment rating 
12/27/07 Copies - Ltr to Rogers with Radnovich report 
12127/07 Postage 
02/01108 Copies - L to Barros w- CD 
02101/08 Postage 
02/01108 compact disc 
02128/08 PMT #400151830. Kulm, L. costs 
07116/08 PMT #400131602. Kulm, L. costs for upcoming voc eval 
09/04/08 2/8108,4/15/08,8/1108, 8/1S/08, 8/22108 (6.1 hours at $135.00 per) 
10/03/0S Long Distance 
10/27/08 PMT #400058744. Kulm, L. costs 
01113/09 PMT #1695. Kulm, Laurel expert payment 
04/13/09 File Closing 
Statement of Costs 
I DATE I 
4/16/09 
ATTORNEY OUR FILE NO. 
ACM 2S27 
AMOUNT BALANCE 
0.00 
9.60 9.60 
2.33 11.93 
550.00 561.93 
1.80 563.73 
0.41 564.14 
0.15 564.29 
0.58 564.87 
5.00 569.87 
-569.87 0.00 
-500.00 -500.00 
823.50 323.50 
1.00 324.50 
-30.13 294.37 
-294.37 0.00 
10.00 10.00 
I BALANCE DUE II $10.00 
Thank you for allowing us to represent you. As of this date we have concluded our work on your case and have closed your file. If 
you would like to have a copy of the file within the next 30 days you may do so at $.20 per page. If you choose to obtain your file 
at a later date there will be a $30.00 retrieval fee in addition to copying charges of $.20 per page. Your file will be destroyed two (2) 
years from the above date. 
09/09/16 SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Attorney Fees Received Prior to Lump Sum Settlement 
for Laurel Kulm 
Date Memo Fees on PPI Fees on PPD Total 
01/07/2008 PPI atty fee 621.50 
02/15/2008 PPI atty fee 310.75 
03/21/2008 PPI atty fee 310.75 
05/14/2008 PPI atty fee 388.44 
05/27/2008 PPI atty fee 310.75 
10/27/2008 PPD atty fee 310.75 
12/12/2008 PPD atty fee 310.75 
12/19/2008 PPD atty fee 310.75 
12/31/2008 PPD atty fee 427.28 
TOTAL 1,942.19 1,359.53 3,301.72 
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Total Unreasonable Atty 
Fee: $3495.94 
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Total Atty Fee to Pay via 
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SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PAjJf181~OQ.~ _______ _ 
LJ COP 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (lSB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SElNIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
.... . 
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BEFORE TIlE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Laurel Kulm, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
Mercy Medical Center, 
Employer, 
And 
I.C. No. 06-012770 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH 
IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
Industrial Claims Management, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss 
County of Ada ) 
Andrew C. Marsh, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am an associate attorney of the finn Seiniger Law Offices, P.A., and attorney of record 
for the Claimant in the above-entitled matter. I make this Affidavit based on personal 
knowledge. 
2. Seiniger Law Offices, P .A. was retained by Claimant in regard to the above matter on or 
about 5/30/07. A copy of the engagement agreement has been previously proVided to the 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
BoIse, IdahO 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH 
IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
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Commission as an attachment to my Form 1022. The engagement agreement reads in 
pertinent part: 
Attorney will take a percentage of any benefits obtained by 
Client with respect to permanent partial impairment if a rating 
is given after the parties execute this agreement. 
The above clause was in typed in bold in the original. The meaning and import of a 
permanent partial impamnent rating was explained and discussed with Claimant prior to 
execution. 
3. In retaining Counsel, Claimant specifically sought the services of Counsel as counselor 
and as advocate. 
4. At that time of retaining Counsel, Claimant wanted advice and assistance on, inter alia, 
what she viewed as efforts by the surety and the doctor to prevent her from receiving 
worker's compensation benefits. In a written "Workmen's (sic) Compensation Summary" 
provided to Counsel on or about the time Counsel was retained, she stated as follows: 
"Dr. Greenwald and Steve Haase want all medical records from Dr. Mayes (Chiropractic) 
trying to claim that my injury is 'not' Workmen's Compensation Related. Prior Injury 
related." 
S. On many occasions, Counsel provided legal counseling and/or legal advocacy on many 
topics and issues, including: Claimant's rights under the work comp statutes; the work 
comp process and procedure; the medical treatment issues as they related to work comp 
law and procedure; maximum. medical improvement (MMI) issues; permanent partial 
impairment (pPI) issues; pennanent work restriction issues; vocational evaluation expert 
issues; permanent partial disability (PPD) issues; the right of the employer to terminate 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. tvttrtte S1reet 
BoIse, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH PAGE20F3 
IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
her; and the effect of an employer-proposed "Separation Agreement and General 
Release" on her rights to worker's compensation benefits. 
6. In representing Claimant. this office drafted, reviewed, analyzed, and/or acted upon the 
documents attached hereto as Exhibit A. This includes hundred of pages of 
correspondence, damages and bills, fee and cost records. Industrial Commission records, 
and medical records. 
7. In representing Claimant, this office engaged in many phone transactions as listed in 
Exhibit B, email transactions as listed in Exhibit C, and meeting and note transactions as 
listed in Exhibit D. 
8. The benefits paid prior to Lump Sum Settlement (listed in my Fonn 1022) include PPI 
benefits of $7768.75, on which attorney fees of $ 1942.19 were paid, and PPD benefits of 
$5438.13, on which attorney fees of $1359.53 were paid (see demand letters to the surety 
dated 9118/08 and 9/28/08, attached hereto as Exhibit E and Exhibit F respectively). 
FURTHER SA YETH YOUR AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
Dated July 24,2009. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
~~ 
Attorney for Claimant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on July 24.2009. 
A"00~~ U.]2. LL);:l tp 
l~ • .t$>.\ Notary Public for Idaho 
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Boise, Idaho 83702 IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
(208) 345-1000 
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
POBox 83720 
Boise,1O 8372()..(){)41 
(208)334-6000 - FAX (208) 334-2321 
COMMISSIONERS 
R.D. Maynard. Chainnan 
Thomas E. Limbaugh 
Thoma .. P. B ... kin 
1-800-950-2110 
C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, GOVERNOR Mindy Muntgomery. Director 
September 3, 2009 
Andrew Marsh 
Seiniger Law Office 
942 W Myrtle' 
Boise, ID 83702 
Re: Claimant: Laurel Kulm 
Ie #: 2006-012770 
Proposed settlement with Indemnity Insurance Company of America 
Dear Mr. Marsh: 
The Industrial Commission (Commission) is in receipt of the proposed settlement agreement 
referenced above. In our review of the proposed settlement, the Commission has also considered 
your letters and attachments of May 5, July 24, and August 12 regarding your representation of 
the claimant and your proposed fees. The Commission staff has made an initial determination 
that the settlement is in the best interests of the parties, except for the portion of the requested 
fees related to benefits in excess of the $12,223.13 Lump Sum Consideration, which have not 
been found to be reasonable per IDAPA 17.02.08.033. 
Please be aware that this is an initial determination, and, in accordance with IDAP A 
17.02.08.033.03, you may request a hearing on the matter within fourteen days. Also in 
accordance with this rule, the Commission will shortly be issuing a partial order releasing 
available funds, and fees which have been determined to be reasonable. 
Thank you for your assistance in the review of this proposed settlement. 
Sincerely, 
~ 
Scott McDougall 
Manager, Claims and Benefits 
EXHIBIT 
700 So. Clearwater Ln., Boise, TD 
Equal Opportunity Employer 
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